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LEORA HARpAZ*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years courts have begun to ponder the first amend
ment issue of public school library book censorship. 1 These
fledgling judicial efforts have produced a mostly inadequate analysis
of the complex legal picture presented by school library book censor
ship. Courts that desire to intervene in censorship disputes almost
unthinkingly have relied on first amendment doctrines developed
outside of the censorship area and assumed their easy application to
this new problem. 2 Courts that take a hands-off attitude toward the
area rely heavily on the inappropriateness ofjudicial intervention as
their central theme. 3 . Nowhere to be found in these judicial re
• Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. B.A., State
University of New York at Stony Brook, 1970; J.D., Boston University, 1973; LL.M.,
New York University, 1975.
1. E.g., Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980);
Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976); Presidents
Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 998 (1972); Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Dirs., 475 F. Supp.
615 (D. Vt. 1979), aJid, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469
F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979); Right to Read Defense Corom. v. School Corom., 454 F.
Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978).
2. E.g., Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976);
Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979); Right to Read Defense
Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978).
3. E.g., Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980);
1
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sponses is there a comprehensive analysis of the difficult issues raised
by these cases.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
a case of school library censorship.4 That case may establish the first
amendment boundaries of such disputes, or it may mark only the
first of several Supreme Court probings of this complex problem. In
advance of any Supreme Court resolution, this article will explore
the school library censorship area with attention to the subtleties that
beset any easy resolution of the problem. Its attempt is to highlight
the often overlooked first amendment difficulties in the area even
more than to provide clear solutions to the problems raised. This
article will strive to point out where the cases fail and what issues
require further probing before an adequate intellectual framework
for dealing with the area can be created.
School library book censorship can occur in three related fact
patterns: (1) A challenge to a school board decision to remove a
Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972).
4. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 638 F.2d 404 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 385 (1981). The Pico litigation began in the New
York Supreme Court, Nassau County in an effort to overturn a decision of the Island
Trees Board of Education removing nine books from elementary and secondary school
libraries and from use in the curriculum. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union
Free School Dist., No. 22724 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., tiled December 20, 1976). Defendants later
removed the case to federal court and Judge Pratt of the Eastern District of New York
granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. 474 F. Supp. 387 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the
case for trial. 638 F.2d 404. The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit was by a divided panel, Judges Sifton and Newman voting to remand for
trial based on the allegations contained in plaintiffs' class action complaint, and Judge
Mansfield dissenting. Judge Sifton of the Eastern District of New York, sitting by
designation, reasoned that the procedural irregularities in the record, including the in
volvement of persons in the decisionmaking process not usually concerned with library
operations and the ambigious quality of the justifications offered for the removal, made
out a prima facie case justifying federal court intervention. Id at 414-15. Judge New
man, writing separately but concurring in the result, was of the view that a first amend
ment violation would be made out by a removal based on the political content of the
books. By contrast, removal because the books contained vulgar language and sexually
explicit passages would be justifiable. Since Judge Newman found the record, in the
absence of a trial, inadequate as a basis for determining the nature of the school board's
motivation, he voted to remand for trial. Id at 432. Judge Mansfield, in dissent, argued
that the majority's action was an unwarranted interference in matters of educational pol
icy. Id at 419. After the Second Circuit's ruling, defendants tiled a petition for a rehear
ing en banco The court, by a five-to-five vote, denied the request for a rehearing. 646
F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1981). Defendants then tiled a petition for a writ of certiorari and the
United States Supreme Court granted the petition on October 13, 1981. 102 S. Ct. 385
(1981).
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book from the school library;5 (2) a suit to force the removal of a
book from the schoollibrary;6 and (3) a suit to force the purchase of
a book for the schoollibrary.7 In distinguishing among these three
situations, courts have disagreed on the proper result in the first fact
pattern8 and uniformly have rejected claims in the second and third

I

5. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 638 F.2d 404 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 385 (1981) (the following nine books were ordered
removed from elementary and secondary school libraries and were no longer permitted
to be used in the curriculum: (1) Slaughter House Five by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.; (2) The
Naked Ape by Desmond Morris; (3) Down These Mean Streets by Piri Thomas; (4) Best
Short Stories by Negro Writers edited by Langston Hughes; (5) Go Ask Alice by Anony
mous; (6) A Hero Ain't Nothing But a Sandwich by Alice Childress; (7) Soul on Ice by
Eldridge Cleaver; (8) A Readerfor Writers edited by Jerome Archer; and (9) The Fixer
by Bernard Malamud; a tenth book, Black Boy by Richard Wright, was available to
students only upon parental approval); Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631
F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1980) (plaintiffs challenged defendant's decisions prohibiting the use
of Values Clar!fication, Growing up Female in America, Go Ask Alice, The Bell Jar, The
Stepford Wives and portions of Student Critic in the high school English curriculum, and
permanently removing Go Ask Alice from the school library); Minarcini v. Strongsville
City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976) (challenge to the removal of the novels
Catch 22 by Joseph Heller and Cot's Cradle by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. from the library of
the high school in Strongsville, Ohio as well as a complaint against the refusal to approve
Catch 22 and God Bless You, MT. Rosewater by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. for use as textbooks);
Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972) (challenge to the removal of all copies of Down These
Mean Streets, an autobiographical novel about growing up in New York City's Spanish
Barrio, from junior high school libraries in the District); Bicknell v. Vergennes Union
High School Bd. of Dirs., 475 F. Supp. 615 (D. Vt. 1979), affd, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir.
1980) (challenge to the removal of two books, The Wanderers, by Richard Price and Dog
Day Afternoon by Patrick Mann, from the high school library and also the adoption of
restrictive library acquisition policies); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269
(D.N.H. 1979) (challenge to the removal of issues of Ms. from the library of Nashua
Senior High School); Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703
(D. Mass. 1978) (suit to require the reshelving of an anthology of writings by adolescents
entitled Male and Female Under 18 which had been removed from the Chelsea High
School Library because of a poem included in the anthology, "The City to a Young
Girl," containing "street language").
6. Evans v. Selma Union High School Dist., 193 Cal. 54,222 P. 801 (1924) (action
to enjoin purchase of 12 copies of the King James version of the Bible for the high school
library); Rosenberg v. Board of Educ., 196 Misc. 542, 92 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sup. Ct. 1944)
(suit to halt the use of Oliver Twist by Charles Dickens and The Merchant of Venice by
William Shakespeare for classroom reading and to require the removal of the books from
school libraries).
7. In re Appeal of Daniel Kornblum, 70 N.Y.S. Educ. Dep't Rep. 19 (1949).
Daniel Kornblum, a taxpayer and the publisher of The Nation, sought to have The Hation included in the list of periodicals approved for high school libraries. Since the mag
azine previously had been on the approved list and was removed from that list for the
1948-49 school year, the case bordered between being a challenge to a decision to remove
a book and a suit to force the purchase of a book.
8. For cases ruling against a school board's decision to remove a book from the
school library, see note 2 supra. For cases upholding the school board's decision, see
note 3 supra.
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categories. 9 These distinctions are made ofibandedly without any
real attention paid to whether a coherent approach to the area is
being developed.
The first step in revealing the layers of complexity that lie hid
den below the analytically smooth surface of ~he school library cases
is to identify the reasoning relied on by the case law. From there the
task will be to explore the accuracy of this reasoning. Finally, an
additional perspective will be sought by comparing and contrasting
the three factual situations in which the school library censorship
issue arises. The aim of this part of the inquiry will be to develop
some sense of the appropriateness of distinctions made by the courts
among these three settings.
II.

CHALLENGES TO BOOK REMOVALS

The censorship scenario that has received the greatest amount
of judicial attention is that of a school board decision to remove a
shelved book from the school library.lO Typically, in response to
such action a group, variously composed of students,11 parents, 12
9. In both Evans v. Selma Union High School Dist. 193 Cal. 54, 222 P. 801 (1924)
and Rosenberg v. Board of Educ. 196 Misc. 542, 92 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sup. Ct. 1944), the
courts rejected the claims of parties seeking to remove books from the school library.
The Commissioner, however, upheld the Board of Education's decision to remove The
Nation from its list of approved periodicals in In re Appeal of Daniel Kornblum, 70
N.Y.S. Educ. Dep't Rep. 19 (1949).
10. See cases cited note 5 supra.
II. Students were among plaintiffs in all of the library book removal cases. In
some instances, due to their minority, students sued through their parents as next friends.
See, e.g., Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976). This
article, for the most part, will view the school library book removal cases from the per
spective of the rights of student plaintiffs. While other persons may have first amend
ment rights in this situation, the major impact is on the students themselves. Moreover,
the purpose of the article, to demonstrate the unrealized complexities of the case law, can
be achieved by viewing the problem from the perspective of the students. The author
will leave it to others to detail the interests of other parties in the book censorship situa
tion. For an examination of the parental interest in the related area of classroom book
censorship, see Comment, Challenging Ideological Exclusion of Curriculum Material:
Rights of Students and Parents, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 485 (1979).
12. Parents of students attending schools in which an incident of library book re
moval occurred sued on their own behalf in Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community
School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972); Bicknell v.
Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Dirs., 475 F. Supp. 615 (D. Vt. 1979), affd, 638
F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980); and Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F.
Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978). In Presidents Council and Bicknell, the parents were allowed
to remain as parties to the suit and no mention was made of the basis for the parents'
claim. In Right to Read, the parents of a student plaintiff were dismissed from the action
for lack of standing. No explanation for this dismissal was given by the court. 454 F.
Supp. at 705 n.2. The difficulty of separating the first amendment interests of minor
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teachers,13 librarians,14 and public interest organizations,15 files suit
children in the educational setting from the interests of their parents and guardians has
been recognized. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241-46 (1972) (Douglas, J., dis
senting in part); Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 321 (1979).
13. Teachers were among plaintiffs in Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community
School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. .998 (1972); Salvail v.
Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979); and Right to Read Defense
Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978). In Presidents Council, the
only special mention of the interests of the teacher-plaintiffs was a statement by the court
to the effect that the interests of the teachers had not been impaired: "[T]he teacher is
still free to discuss the Barrio and its problems in the classroom. The action of the Board
does not even preclude the teacher from discussing Down These Mean Streets in class or
from assigning it for outside reading." 467 F.2d at 292. In Salvail, the separate interests
of teachers were refiected only in testimony that Ms. had been assigned as a research tool
by several teachers at the senior high school and by the court's conclusion that the maga
zine had value "as a means of researching current feminist attitudes on matters of social
interest. 469 F. Supp. at 1272-73. In Right to Read, while plaintiffs included an English
teacher, no discussion of the scope of teacher rights is found in the opinion. The rights of
teachers were more central in Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577
(6th Cir. 1976). While students were the only plaintiffs in that case, the challenged school
board action included a refusal to approve the use of Catch 22 by Joseph Heller and God
Bless You, Mr. Rosewater by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. as textbooks. The Sixth Circuit summa
rily dismissed the claim that teachers have a right to select textbooks that is greater than
the rights of the school board in such matters. Id. at 579-80. After dismissing this claim,
the court examined an allegation that the academic freedom of teachers had been vio
lated by the school board's refusal to allow classroom discussion of the disapproved
books. The court rejected this argument, finding no clear evidence in the record to sup
port the claim that classroom discussion had been forbidden. Id. at 583-84.
The issue of teacher rights in the textbook selection process arose recently in Cary v.
Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979). In Cary, the Tenth Circuit rejected the
claim raised by five high school teachers that they had a constitutionally protected right
to academic freedom that included the right to free choice of books to assign for reading
in their high school English courses. As in Minarcini, the case did not involve a ban on
classroom discussion of books not included on the school board's approved reading list. "
See Note, Cary v. Board of Education: Academic Freedom at the High School Level, 57
DEN. L.J. 197 (1980).
The separate but related issue of the school board's right to dismiss a teacher for
using teaching methods or materials disapproved by the school board has arisen with a
fair degree of frequency. See, e.g., Brubaker v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 973 (7th Cir.),
tifid on rehearing en bane, 502 F.2d 1000 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965
(1975); Mailloux v. Kiley, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971); Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359
(1st Cir. 1969); Sterzing v. Fort Bend Independent School Dist., 376 F. Supp. 657 (S.D.
Tex. 1972), vacatedand remanded, 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974); Webb v. Lake Mills Com
munity School Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791 (N.D. Iowa 1972); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F.
Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970); Parker v. Board of Educ., 237 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md.), tifid,
348 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966); Harris v. Mechanicville
Cent. School Dist., 86 Misc. 2d 144,382 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Sup. Ct. 1976). On the scope of
teacher first amendment rights, see Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right ofPublic
School Teachers to Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1976); Miller,"
Teachers' Freedom ofExpression Within the Classroom: A Search/or Standards, 8 GA. L.
REv. 837 (1974); Nahmod, Controversy in the Classroom: The High School Teacher and
Freedom ofExpression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1032 (1971); VanAlstyne, The Constitu

.
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complaining that the board's action is a violation of the first amend
ment to the United States Constitution.
The judicial response to such lawsuits falls into one of two cate
gories: (1) A noninterventionist model in which the court takes the
position that it generally will not intrude into Platters of educational
policy; 16 or (2) a judicial review model in which the court finds such
controversies subject to first amendment limitations and then exam
ines the nature of the right interfered with and the weight of the
justification offered for the invasion of that right.J7
Courts offer a variety of explanations in defense of the noninter
ventionist model. One point consistently made by such courts is that
no one's first amendment rights have been violated by such a deci
sion. Students have no constitutionally protected right of access to
certain books in the school library; neither do the publishers of those
tional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DUKE L.J. 841; Developments in the Law-
Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1045 (1968).
14. In Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972), Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd.
of Dirs., 475 F. Supp. 615 (D. Vt. 1979), qffd, 638 F.2d 438 92d Cir. 1980), and Right to
Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978), schoolli
brarians were among the plaintiffs. In Presidents Council and Right 10 Read, the courts
failed to consider the arguably separate interests of the librarians. In Bicknell, the district
court rejected a claim of first amendment protection for librarians:
Nor do we believe that school librarians have an independent first amendment
right to control the collection of the school library under the rubric of academic
freedom. The selection of works for the library is a curricular rather than a
methodological matter, and "public secondary school boards have considerable
discretion as to the substantive content" of the curriculum.
475 F. Supp. at 622 (citation omitted). In Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union
Free School Dist., 474 F. Supp. 387, 394 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 638
F.2d 404 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 385 (1981), student plaintiffs attempted
to assert the rights of librarians to academic freedom. The court found no reason to
grant the students permission to raise the rights of the absent librarians and therefore
dismissed this claim. For an argument that librarians have constitutionally protected
rights of expression that limit the extent to which books can be removed from a library
over the objection of the librarian, see O'Neil, Libraries, Liberties and The First Amend
ment, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 209 (1973).
15. In Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Dirs., 475 F. Supp. 615 (D.
Vt. 1979), qffd, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980), plaintiffs included the Right to Read De
fense Committee of Vergennes. The committee was organized for the purpose of chal
lenging attempts to restrict school library collections. Similarly, in Right to Read
Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978), the Right to Read
Defense Committee of Chelsea was among the complaintants. On the issue of the stand
ing of public interest organizations to sue, see, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972); Zacharias, Standing ofPublic Interest Litigating Groups 10 Sue on BehalfofTheir
Members, 39 U. PIrf. L. REV. 453 (1978).
16. See cases cited note 3 supra.
17. See cases cited note 2 supra.
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books have the right to have their publications kept on the library
shelves. IS Moreover, students still can have access to the books
through means other than the school library. 19
In addition to the rejection of any first amendment right of stu
dents in this setting, the impropriety of judicial interference in the
internal affairs of the school is a frequently sounded note in the
cases. 20 Courts cite language from Epperson v. Arkansas 21 to support
this position. 22 They rely on the broad discretionary powers granted
to school officials in curricular matters as an explanation for their
approach. 23
.
By contrast, courts that are willing to intervene in school library
book removal cases justify their actions by a differing view of the
proper school/court relationship. Because the school is viewed as an
important adjunct to first amendment values, courts occasionally
must intervene in matters of school policy in order to secure those
18. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 638 F.2d 404,
429 (2d Cir. 1980) (Mansfield, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 385 (1981); Bicknell
v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Dirs., 475 F. Supp. 615,621 (D. Vt. 1979), affd,
638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980).
19. Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1306 (7th Cir.
1980); Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Dirs., 475 F. Supp. 615, 621 (D.
Vt. 1979), affd, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980).
20. Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1306 (7th Cir.
1980) ("[N)othing in the Constitution permits the courts to interfere with local educa
tional discretion until local authorities begin to substitute rigid and exclusive indoctrina
tion for the mere exercise of their prerogative to make pedagogic choices regarding
matters of legitimate dispute."); Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd.
No. 25, 457 F.2d 289, 292 (2d Cir.), cerl. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972) ("Academic freedom
is scarcely fostered by the intrusion of three or even nine federal jurists making curricu
lum or library choices for the community of scholars.").
21. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
22. Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1305 (7th Cir.
1980); Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289, 291
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972); Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd.
of Dirs., 475 F. Supp. 615, 619 (D. Vt. 1979), affd, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980). The
frequently repeated quotation from Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), stated:
"By and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and
local authorities. Courts do not and cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which
arise in the daily operation of school systems and which do not directly and sharply
implicate basic constitutional values." Id at 104 (footnote omitted). The use of this
reference is ironic because the Court in Epperson found that an Arkansas law forbidding
the teaching of Darwinian theory in the public schools did "sharply implicate constitu
tional values." The Court struck down the law as a violation of the first amendment
establishment clause. For further discussion of Epperson, see text accompanying notes
136-39 infra.

23. Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Dirs., 638 F.2d 438, 441 (2d
Cir. 1980); Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1305 (7th Cir.
1980).
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values. 24 Cases such as Shelton v. Tucker 25 and Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District ,26 in which the Supreme
Court approved an interventionist stance toward educational policy,
are pointed to by these courts as support for the conclusions they
reach.
In addition to the basic question of philosophy, interventionist
courts see the school library as a public forum.27 While the state, so
the argument goes, has no obligation to create such a forum in the
first instance, nor to stock it with any particular books, having done
so the state is not free to make content-based decisions to remove
books unless those decisions are supported by sufficiently important
state interests.28 While removal may be justified on content neutral
grounds such as a limitation on shelf space or the obsolescence of a
book, decisions based on inadequately justified hostility to the ideas
contained in the book are forbidden. 29
According to this view, students have the right to complain
about content-based removals because such removals violate the first
amendment rights of the students. While the students are not being
denied the right to speak, they are being denied the right to receive
information. 30 The "right to know" has a firm grounding in the first
amendment, and the ability of the students to obtain a book from a
source other than the school library does not minimize the gravity of
the constitutional violation. 31
While efforts are made by interventionist courts to reconcile
24. Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 710 (D.
Mass. 1978).
25. 364 U.S. 479 (1960). In Shellon, the Court struck down an Arkansas statute
that required all teachers at state-run sehools to file an annual list of every organization
with which they had been connected during the previous five-year period. The statute
was held to violate the right of teachers to free association because it indiscriminately
requested associational information not all of which was necessary to protect the state's
interest in having fit and competent teachers. Id at 490.
26. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). For a discussion of Tinker, see text accompanying notes
62-67 infra.
27. Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582-83 (6th Cir.
1976); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1275 (D.N.H. 1979).
28. Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1976);
Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (D.N.H. 1979).
29. Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 1976);
Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F.Supp. 1269, 1275 (D. N.H. 1979).
30. Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1976).
31. Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1275 (D.N.H. 1979); Right
to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 714-15 (D. Mass. 1978).
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their decisions with those of noninterventionist judges,32 it is clear
that the two lines of decision reflect ~ fundamental disagreement
about the proper role of the judiciary in matters of educational pol
icy. Additionally, the two lines of cases differ on the applicability of
two major first amendment doctrines to the book removal cases: the
public forum principle and the first amendment right to know.
A.

The Public Forum Question

As a beginning point in this analysis of the book removal cases,
it will be useful to discover if the school library qualifies as a public
forum in the way interventionist courts assume. In the first amend
ment lexicon, a public forum is a government owned place available
for the exercise of first amendment rights. 33 Government ownership
alone, however, is not enough to establish a right of access by the
public for first amendment purposes. Some places, like streets and
parks, traditionally have been considered available as forums for
speech. 34 Other places, while not considered to be traditional public
32. Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 1976);
Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 711 (D. Mass. 1978).
33. The term "public forum" gained prominence in Kalven, The Concept of the
Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1. Since Professor Kalven's classic
exposition of the public forum concept, a vast literature has been required to chronicle
the concept's continued development. See, e.g. , Cass, First Amendment Access to Govern
ment Facilities, 65 VA. L. REv. 1287 (1979); Horning, The FiFst Amendment Right to a
Public Forum, 1969 DUKE L.J. 931; Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974
SUP. CT. REv. 233; Note, The Public Fo""n: Minimum Access, Equal Access, and The
FiFst Amendment, 28 STAN. L. REv. 117 (1975).
34. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.). A statement
from Justice Roberts' opinion has come to be considered the quintessential articulation
of this concept:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been
held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient
times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.
The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for
communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest
of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to
the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good
order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.
Id. at SIS. In addition to the streets and parks, several other traditional public forums
have been identified. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555
(1980) (courtroom); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (statehouse
grounds).
In addition to encapsulating the. idea of the traditional public forum, the above
quoted language from Mr. Justice Roberts' opinion also began what has become an
ongoing debate in the public forum area. His opinion raised the still unresolved question
of whether the first amendment guarantees minimum access to certain public places or,
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forums, have been added to the list of places available for the exer
cise of first amendment rights. 3S
In examining the cases, two kinds of public forums can be dis
cemed. 36 One kind, a primary forum, is a place established by the
government specifically for the expression of ideas. For example, in
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd v. Conratf3 7 a municipal theater was
identified as ~ public forum because its essential function was to
serve as a place for a certain kind of expression. If the government
creates a place primarily as a forum, exclusions from that place must
be based on sufficiently important reasons and must follow constitu
tionally adequate procedures. 38
The other kind of forum, a secondary forum, is a government
owned place created for some other primary purpose but which is
incidentally compatible with speech use. An airport is an example of
this kind of government facility.39 In this second kind of forum, exinstead, whether equal access is all that is promised. Under the guaranteed access view,
complete closure of the streets and parks to all expressive activity would be prevented.
Under the equal access view, closure would be permissible if it was affected in an even
handed manner and not selectively. See Cass, supra note 33, at 1298-1303; Note, supra
note 33. This unanswered public forum question will not be dealt with in the context of
the school library. It is unlikely that even a clear victory for minimum access advocates
would extend to ensure access to the library bookshelves.
35. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393
U.S. 503 (1969) (school); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (library); Chicago
Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
992 (1975) (airport); Albany Welfare Rights Organization v. Wyman, 493 F.2d 1319 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 838 (1974) (welfare office); Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 268
F. Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), mod!fied, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940
(1968) (bus terminal).
36. See Cass, supra note 33, at 1297.
37. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
38. Among the constitutionally adequate reasons for exclusion is that the speech at
issue is not protected by the first amendment. Thus, if the production of the musical
"Hair" at issue in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975), had
been found to be obscene as judged by constitutionally appropriate standards, exclusion
of the production would have been justified. Further, in the case of a primary forum
opened up for a certain kind of speech, if a speaker wishes to use the forum for a manner
of expression outside the scope of the enterprise established by the government, exclusion
also might be justified. Thus, if the government created a state operated public theater to
be used solely for the production of plays and a speaker wanted to use the theater to give
a speech, this noncompatible use could be foreclosed. Constitutionally adequate proce
dures for determining if access is to be allowed also must be established. In Southeastern
Promotions, the Court's holding was based on the constitutional inadequacies of the pro
cedures established for judging the appropriateness of allowing "Hair" to be presented.
See note 80 infra for elaboration of these procedural infirmities.
39. See, e.g., Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975); Kuszynski v. City ofOakiand, 479 F.2d 1130 (9th
Cir. 1973); Fernandes v. Limmer, 465 F. Supp. 493 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
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elusions can be based on disruption of the primary activity for which
the forum was created or for other sufficiently important reasons. 40
Despite the existence of two kinds of forums, no clear-cut
method for identifying a place as either kind of forum has been es
tablished. 41 Further, whether the two categories are as distinctly
etched as the above discussion suggests is far from certain.42 Finally,
what purposes, if any, are served by distinguishing between the two
categories has not yet been resolved. 43 Without attempting to settle
these issues, an effort will be made to determine if the school library
fits into either or both of these categories.
In first turning to the library book removal cases for guidance
on these questions, the explanation for considering the school library
to be a public forum is succinctly stated: "A library is a mighty reThe character of the airport and the pattern of usual activity make the airport
an appropriate place for communication of views. . . . True, the principal pur
pose of the airport is to move people from one place to another via airplane; but
the court must look beyond "principal" purposes to determine whether or not
an area is a "public" forum.
Id at 504 n.4.
40. For instance, in Chicago Area Military.Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921
(7th Cir.), cerl. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975), the court found the public areas of the termi
nal buildings at O'Hare Airport to be a public forum available to a group seeking to
distribute literature. The court, however, excluded the areas leading to the arrival and
departure gates from use for leafteting. The primary use to which those areas of the
airport were put would be disrupted if they were made available for use by leafteteers.
The court left open the question of -whether leafteting at check-in counters similarly
could be prohibited. The court, however, pointed out that such a ban would be upheld if
it appeared "that such activities substantially interfered with rapid and efficient airport
operations." Id at 926.
In deciding whether a particular regulation of the time, place, and manner of forum
use is reasonable, the court will consider "[t)he nature of a place, the pattern of its normal
activities. . . ." Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). Thus, in Hef
fron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 101 S. Ct. 2559 (1981), the
Supreme Court upheld a rule that restricted those who wished to sell or distribute written
materials or solicit funds at the Minnesota State Fair to doing so from a rented booth.
The Court focused on "the need to maintain the orderly movement of the crowd given
the large number of exhibitors and persons attending the Fair." Id at 2565.
41. A number of criteria have been suggested as factors to be used in determining
whether a public forum exists. One recommendation is to consider the customary usage
of a place, whether it is available for general public access, any history of openness, and
consistency between use as a forum and the other public uses of a place. Homing, supra
note 33, at 945. Another suggestion is to look to the property's value for nonexpressive
purposes, to consider the value of the property for expression, and to evaluate the extent
to which speech and nonspeech uses are in condict. Cass, supra note 33, at 1317-20.
42. Professor Tribe divides public forums into three groupings: (I) Traditional
public forums; (2) "[p)ublic facilities or institutions created for the primary purpose of
public communication;" and, (3) "semi-public forums." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI
TUTIONAL LAW 688-91 (1978).
43. See Cass, supra note 33, at 1297-98.
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source in the free marketplace of ideas. It is specially dedicated to
broad dissemination of ideas. It is a forum for silent speech."44 The
major authorities cited as support for this conclusion are the
Supreme Court cases of Brown v. Louisiana 4S and Tinker v. .Des
Moines Independent Community School.District. 46
In Brown, five black men entered the Aud.ubon Regional Li
brary in the town of Clinton, Louisiana in order to protest the segre
gation of the library. One of the men, petitioner Brown, requested a
book. The branch assistant determined that the library did not have
the book and informed Mr. Brown of this along with the information
that the book could be obtained from the state library and made
available to him by mail or at a bookmobile. 47 After speaking with
the librarian, Brown sat down in the reading area and his four com
panions stood near him. The regional librarian was called from an
other room and she asked the men to leave. They nevertheless
remained in the room making no noise. Ten to fifteen minutes later
the sheriff arrived and, after unsuccessfully asking them to leave, ar
rested the men, charging them with a breach of the peace. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the constitutionality of
their convictions.
Justice Fortas, writing for the Court in an opinion joined only
by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, reversed the convic
tions. His opinion found a lack of evidence of any "intent to pro
voke a breach of the peace," or of "circumstances such that a breach
of the peace may be occasioned."48 Petitioners were present in the
library in order to express their opposition to the segregation of the
library and they did so in an orderly and nonprovocative manner.
Justice Fortas also found that even if the statutory definition of a
breach of the peace was satisfied, the Court would have to find its
application to petitioners' behavior to be a violation of their first and
fourteenth amendment rights. 49 These rights were found to "include
the right in a peaceable and orderly manner to protest by silent and
reproachful presence, in a place where the protestant has every right
44. Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 571, 582-83 (6th Cir.
1976) (citations omitted).
45. 383 U.S. 13l (1966).
46. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
47. 383 U.S. at 136. The Audubon Regional Library had two bookmobiles. The
red bookmobile serviced only whites. The blue bookmobile was for the use of black
library patrons. Blacks were not permitted to use the three branch libraries.
48. Id at 139.
49. Id at 142.
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to be, the unconstitutional segregation of public facilities."50 Be
cause the use of the library by others was not interfered with by peti
tioners, the Court did not need to consider whether disruptive
conduct also would have been constitutionally protected. 51
While Justice Brennan concurred in the reversal of the convic
tions, he would have struck down the statute as facially overbroad,
thereby eliminating the need to reach the question of whether peti
tioners' conduct was constitutionally protected and therefore could
not be punished even by a narrowly drawn statute. 52 Justice White,
also concurring in the result, reversed solely on equal protection
grounds. 53
Justice Black, writing for the four members of the dissent, at
tacked the new constitutional doctrine established by the majority:
Though the First Amendment guarantees the right of assembly
and the right of petition along with the rights of speech, press, and
religion, it does not guarantee to any person the right to use some
one else's property, even that owned by government and dedicated
to other purposes, as a stage to express dissident ideas. 54

Justice Black then insisted that the doctrine created by the plurality
opinion had no stopping off place. n necessarily would allow protest
groups to invade the peace and tranquility of the library and inter
fere with normal library use by the patrons of the library.
Brown raised more questions than it resolved. Why was the
protest activity allowed in the library? Was it because the govern
ment owned the facility? Was it important that the protestors'
message was directed at the segregation of the very facility they used
as the site of their protest? What would have been the result if dis
ruption of the facility had occurred? What other forms of expression
would be permitted on the library premises? Unfortunately, the
questions raised by Brown were not quickly resolved. When the
public forum doctrine next came before the Court, the Justices who
had been in the majority in Brown found themselves outvoted. The
50. Id
Id
Id at 149-50.
Id at 151. Justice White argued that petitioners' behavior in the library
amounted to normal library use. He was convinced that no arrests would have occurred
if the behavior had been engaged in by whites. Therefore, petitioners' arrests violated
their rights under the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. This equal pro
tection aspect of the case was not ignored in Justice Fortas' opinion for the Court. He,
too, commented on the state's obligation to regulate its facilities in a nondiscriminatory
manner. Id at 143.
54. Id at 166.
51.
52.
53.
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Brown dissenters joined by Justice White, thereby composing a ma
jority of the Court, proceeded to put a roadblock in the path of the
incipient public forum doctrine.
That development came in Adderley v. Florida. 55 In Adderley,
200 demonstrators partially blocked the driveway of the county jail
in a protest against the arrest of other demonstrators and also against
policies of segregation in effect at the jail and elsewhere. After they
refused to leave, thirty-two demonstrators were arrested and con
victed under the Florida general trespass statute. The Supreme
Court upheld the convictions. Important to this result was that the
demonstration had taken place on a part of the jail grounds not gen
erally open to the public. The Court rejected petitioners' claims of a
right of access to the part of the jail grounds reserved for transporta
tion of prisoners:
The State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to
preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is
lawfully dedicated. For this reason there is no merit to the peti
tioners' argument that they had a constitutional right to stay on
the property, over the jail custodian's objections, because this
"area chosen for the peaceful civil rights demonstration was not
only 'reasonable' but also particularly appropriate. . . ." Such an
argument has as its major unarticulated premise the assumption
that people who want to propagandize protests or views have a
constitutional right to do so whenever and however and wherever
they please. . . . The United States Constitution does not forbid
a State to control the use of its own property for its own lawful
nondiscriminatory purpose. 56

The Court in Adderley, however, was careful to point out that the
sheriff had not sought to disperse the protestors because he objected
to the substance of their protest. 57 Moreover, there was no evidence
that any other group had been permitted access to the same part of
the jail grounds for any reason. 58
The dissenting Justices in Adderley took a contrary view of the
public forum issue. They considered the jail to be a forum akin to
the statehouse, courthouse, or executive mansion and "an obvious
center for protest."59 While the dissent agreed that some public
places serve functions incompatible with their use as places for pro
55. 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
56. Id at 47-48.
57. Id at 47.
58. Id
59. Id at 49.
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test and that some forms of protest may be inconsistent with the
places in which they are sought to be held, the dissenting Justices
were not willing to leave the decision as to whether a place is a fo
rum to the discretion of public officials. 60
A dder/ey, like Brown, dealt with government property primarily
dedicated to uses other than expression, but sometimes available for
first amendment purposes. While reaching contrary results on
whether the demonstrators were entitled to access to government
property, the two decisions share a common concern. In both cases
the attention of the Court was focused on whether the demonstrators
disrupted the normal functioning of the government facility they
used as the site of their protest. 61
This same concern was central to the Court's analysis in Tinker
v. lJes Moines Independent Community School lJistrict,62 the second
public forum case relied on by the courts examining the book re
moval question. In Tinker, the locus of the protest activity was the
public high school. Petitioners, high school students, wore black
armbands to school to symbolize their opposition to the Vietnam
War. The students were suspended from school for their actions
and, thereafter, filed a complaint challenging the constitutionality of
the actions of school officials in suspending them.
In finding for petitioners, the Court first focused on the primary
activity that takes place in the public school. The learning process
was seen as a multifaceted experience encompassing both classroom
and nonclassroom hours. The Court gave this enthusiastic descrip
tion of the classroom learning experience: ''The classroom is pecu
liarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon
leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of
ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues, [rather]
60. Id at 54.
61. Focusing on the similarity between Brown and Adderley is not intended to sug
gest that the two cases do not reftect a substantial difference of opinion. While it is
possible to find sufficient numbers of factual distinctions between the two cases to view
the results reached as consistent (that is, that the library reading area was generally open
to the public while the jail driveway was not and that no disruption of library activities
occurred in Brown whereas the jail driveway used for the transport of prisoners was
blocked by the demonstrators in Adderley), the view that the cases reflect a substantial
disagreement about the scope of first amendment protection for public access to govern
ment properties is very persuasive. See Cass, supra note 33, at 1294 (arguing that the
Brown majority supported a broad based right of access to government owned places
whereas the Adderley majority would require equal access only when the government
opens up a forum).
62. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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than through any kind of authoritative selection.' "63 Education in
the schoolhouse, however, was not viewed as limited to the
classroom:
The principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to accom
modate students during prescribed hours for the purpose of cer
tain types of activities. Among those activities is personal
intercommunication among the students. This is not only an inev
itable part of the process of attending school; it is also an impor
tant part of the educational process. A student's rights, therefore,
do not embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in the
cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the au
thorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial
subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without "materi
ally and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of appro
priate discipline in the operation of the school" and without
.colliding with the rights of others.64

With this ringing endorsement, the schoolhouse joined the list of
public places available as public forums. To the extent possible
without interfering with the normal functioning of the public school,
students are permitted to exercise their first amendment rights. 6s
The Court's decision in Tinker does not stand as firm support
for viewing the book removal cases as involving a public forum.
One important point to be stressed is that the forum in Tinker was
available for the expression of student views whenever that could·
occur without interfering with good order and discipline. In discuss
ing the impact of petitioners' activities in Tinker the Court was care
ful to note: "They neither interrupted school activities nor sought to
intrude in the school affairs or the lives of others. They caused dis
cussion outside of the classrooms, but no interference with work and
no disorder."66 This statement emphasizes the idea that the rights
granted to students are rights to express their views through the mak
ing of personal statements. They may speak out so long as their
speech can coexist peacefully with the day-to-day functioning of the
school.
63. Id at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967».
Id at 512-13 (footnote and citation omitted).
65. In addition to students, teachers are entitled to the first amendment rights es
tablished by Tinker: "First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteris
tics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Id at 506. On the issue of teacher rights
of expression, see Miller, supra note 13; Nahmod, supra note 13.
66. 393 U.S. at 514.
64.
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The point to be made is that as forums, public places like the
school or the library first serve their governmentally administered
functions. As a secondary matter, they also may be available for
compatible expressive use by members of the public. 67 Therefore, as
a forum on the order of Brown and Tinker, the school library would
seem to be available as a place for silent protest by students. Mary
Beth Tinker would be permitted to wear her armband into the school
library. Groups of students would be able to stand silently as "mon
uments of protest"68 to school policies. Mary Beth even would be
able to bring her own copy of a book removed from the school li
brary and read it sitting at a table in the library as a way of pro
testing the library's book selection policies. These actions and others
like them seem to describe the kind of rights made available by
Brown and Tinker. Neither of these cases allow the protestors to
have a say in the administration of the government facility itself. If
petitioner Brown had wanted to step behind the librarian's desk and
check out books for library patrons, the case would have had an en
tirely different result. Similarly, if petitioner Tinker had interrupted
a class and demanded the right to class time to make a speech
against the Vietnam War, the Court would not have granted her a
forum so readily.
.
Tinker, however, is not the final word on the public forum issue
and it may be that subsequent cases shed additional light on the
book removal situation. After Tinker, the Supreme Court decided
several other cases that contributed to the further development of the
public forum doctrine. The first of these was Police Department of
Chicago v. Mosley.69 In Mosley, the Court gave express recognition
67. One additional point must be made about the school as a public forum. Con
trary to the situation in Adderley, the forum in Tinker was not necessarily open to the
members of the public. Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269, 273 n.5 (1981) ("[T]he
campus of a public university, at leastfor its students, possesses many of the characteris
tics of a public forum.") (emphasis added). The Court in Tinker included students and
teachers in the group entitled to use the school as a place for expression. The Court
never addressed the question of whether the schoolhouse was also available for the use of
nonstudent members of the public. This limited holding in Tinker suggests that the pub
lic forum doctrine is flexible enough to view some places as limited forums, places in
which rights of expression are guaranteed only to the special population taking part in
the primary, nonexpressive activity engaged in at the government facility. On the ques
tion of whether nonstudent, nonteacher members of the public are entitled to access to
the school as a forum, see Comment, The University and the Public: The Right ofAccess
by Nonstudents to University Property, 54 CAL. L. REv. 132 (1966).
68. This phrase was used in the opinion of Justice Fortas in Brown v. Louisiana,
383 U.S. 131, 139 (1966), to describe petitioner Brown and his four companions as they
sat and stood in the reading area of the Audubon Regional Library.
69. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
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to the equal protection component of public forum theory:
There is an "equality of status in the field of ideas," and govern
ment must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be
heard. Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by
some groups, government may not prohibit others from assem
bling or speaking on the basis of what they intend to say. Selec
tive exclusions from a public forum may not be based on content
alone, and may not be justified by reference to content alone. 70

In adding this equality principle to public forum theory, the Court
made clear what it had insinuated in Drown andAdderfey: Once the

government opens up a forum for the expression of some ideas, that
forum must be available for all ideas. 71
After Mosley, the Court decided two cases which raised a differ
ent aspect of public forum analysis. Unlike the secondary forums in
Drown and Tinker, 72 the Court next encountered two cases in which
70. Id. at 96 (footnote omitted).
71. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), was decided on the same
day as Mosley. While adding no new dimensions to the public forum doctrine, Grayned
. did serve to accentuate the need for compatibility between the primary use of the forum
and the manner in which first amendment rights are exercised:
The nature of a place, "the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the kinds
of regulations of time, place, and manner that are reasonable." Although a
silent vigil may not unduly interfere with a public library, making a speech in
the reading room almost certainly would. That same speech should be perfectly
appropriate in a park. The crucial question is whether the manner of expres
sion is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a
particular time.
Id. at 116 (footnote and citation omitted). Grayned involved a challenge to two ordi
nances: An antipicketing ordinance and an antinoise ordinance, both regulating first
amendment activity within close proximity to a school building in which school was in
session. The antipicketing ordinance was identical to the ordinance struck down by the
court in Mosley. The ordinance fell under the weight of the equality principle. The
antinoise ordinance was upheld as carefully tailored to the municipality'S "compelling
interest in having an undisrupted school session conducive to the students' learn
ing. . . ." Id. at 119.
72. While it is possible to describe the forum in Tinker as a secondary forum (see
L. TRIBE, supra note 42, at 690, describing schools as "semi-public forums" where a
greater variety of regulations designed to preserve the good order and discipline of the
school will be permissible than would be true of ordinances regulating access to streets
and parks), this characterization is subject to question. One interesting qualification of
this assumption derives from the Court's division of the educational process into several
primary parts. In. one respect the school can be classified as a conventional secondary
forum. Like the library in Brown it serves a government purpose independent of service
as a forum for student expression. These parts of the education package include the
classroom transmission of knowledge in a variety of required subjects and other extracur
ricular activities like team sports and drama club. In another respect, however, educa
tion includes a component that falls within the primary forum definition. The Court
defines an important part of the educational process as ''personal intercommunication
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the potential forum was a place created by the government primarily
for the expression of ideas. In both Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights 73 and Southeastern Promotions, Ltd v. Conrad,74 petitioners
argued for the existence of a "primary forum." In Lehman, the po
tential forum was the advertising card space in the cars of a public
transit system. That space was made available for commercial ad
vertising but not for political ads. A candidate for political office
argued that the city had created a forum by its policy of renting out
such space. A four-Justice plurality rejected this contention, finding
the advertising space to be part of the city's commercial venture and
not the creation of a forum.7s The four dissenting Justices, in an
opinion by Justice Brennan, argued that the case did not call upon
the Court to decide if public transit cars must be considered a forum
but instead involved the voluntary creation of a forum by the city.
Having voluntarily created such a forum for expression, the city was
not free to base exclusions from that forum solely on the content of
the potential advertisement. 76
After dissenting in Lehman, Justice Brennan was a member of
among the students." 393 U.S. at 512. With respect to this function the school is a pri
mary forum for the expression of ideas by students. The Court's job is to accommodate
both of these school functions. It does this by limiting student rights of communication
to those that are compatible with the other educational functions served by the school.
On the general subject of the school as a public forum, see Nahmod, Beyond Tinker: The
High School as an Educational Public Forum, 5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 278 (1970);
Comment, The Public School as Public Forum, 54 TEX. L. REv. 90 (1975). Note also the
Supreme Court's recent statement in Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981), on the
closely related question of the public forum status of public universities: "A university
differs in significant respects from public forums such as streets or parks or even munici
pal theaters. A university's mission is education, and decisions of this Court have never
denied its authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon
the use of its campus and facilities." Id. at 273 n.5.
73. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
74. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
75. 418 U.S. at 303. The deciding vote in Lehman was cast by Justice Douglas,
concurring in the result. Justice Douglas based his opinion on the constitutional rights of
commuters: "In my view the right of the commuters to be free from forced intrusions on
their privacy precludes the city from transforming its vehicles of public transportation
into forums for the dissemination of ideas upon this captive audience." Id. at 307. Jus
tice Douglas' view of the matter made the opening of the advertising spaCes to commer
cial messages irrelevant. The clear implication of his opinion was that a later challenge
brought against the intrusion of commercial ads also would result in his finding that
those ads violated the privacy rights of the passengers.
The plurality opinion in Lehman has been criticized frequently for its misuse of
public forum principles. See, e.g., Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First
Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 20, 34-35 (1975); Stone, supra note 33, at 256-61,275-80.
76. 418 U.S. at 313-14.
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the majority in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd Y. Conrad. 77 The pub
lic forum in Southeastern Promotions consisted of a municipal thea
ter. A production of the musical "Hair" was rejected by the directors
of the Chattanooga Memorial Auditorium on the ground that it was
not "in the best interest of the community."78. In analyzing the case,
the Court rejected any claim that petitioner was seeking entry to a
place principally serving nonspeech purposes. In this respect the fo
rum could be contrasted to traditional forums, such as the streets and
parks. Unlike those places, the theater, in Justice Blackmun's opin
ion for the Court, was identified as a public forum "designed for and
dedicated to expressive activities."79 Exclusions from such a primary
forum had to follow adequate procedural safeguards 80 and be based
on constitutionally sufficient justifications. 8} Since Southeastern Pro
motions, the Court has announced no new conceptual developments
in the ongoing formulation of public forum theory.82
77. 420 U.s. 546 (1975).
78. Id at 548.
79. Id at 555.
80. The Court found the procedures utilized by the directors of the municipal thea
ter to be constitutionally defective in several respects. Contrary to the teachings of
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), there was no provision for prompt judicial
review of the board's decision. 420 U.S. at 561. Additionally, the burden of instituting
judicial review and proving the play was protected expression was placed on the play's
producers and not on the board. Id at 562. Finally, the restraint on the play imposed
during the pendency ofjudicial proceedings was unduly long and altered the status quo.
Id These requirements of appropriate procedural safeguards are an aspect of first
amendment due process. See Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process", 83 HARV. L.
REV. 518 (1970).
81. After Southeastern Promotions was denied access to the municipal theater, it
sought a permanent injunction allowing it to use the facility. Following that request for
relief, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas held hearings on
the issue of obscenity vel non. 341 F. Supp. 465 (E.D. Tex. 1972). The jury returned a
verdict finding "Hair" to be obscene within the meaning of city ordinances and state
statutes. Id at 472. Petitioner than appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir
cuit and that court affirmed by a divided vote. 486 F.2d 465 (6th Cir. 1973). Petitioner
argued in the Supreme Court that the courts below had applied an erroneous standard
for determining the issue of obscenity vel non and that "Hair" was not obscene. In light
of its finding that constitutionally inadequate procedures had been applied, the Supreme
Court found it unnecessary to decide these questions. 420 U.S. at 552.
82. While the Supreme Court has relied on public forum principles in several cases
decided since Southeastern Promotions, none of these more recent decisions contribute
any new insight into the future direction of the public forum doctrine. See, e.g., United
States Postal Servo v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 101 S. Ct. 2676, 2684 (1981)
("[tlhere is neither historical nor constitutional support for the characterization of a letter
box as a public forum"); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 578
(1980) (a trial courtroom, like streets, sidewalks, and parks, is a public place that tradi
tionally has been open to the members of the public who have a first amendment right to
be present there); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 134
(1977) (a prison is not a public forum); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 834-38 (1976) (a
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In light of the public forum cases, several potential arguments
for applying the public forum rationale to the book removal cases
deserve exploration. First, however, the Brown-Tinker analogy
finally should be put to rest. In bestowing public forum status on the
library and the school, the Supreme Court stressed the compatibility
between government facilities principally serving nonexpressive
functions and the use of those places for nondisruptive forms of ex
pression. The library is principally designed for reading, reflection,
and research. If demonstrators can quietly speak in the public space
of the library reading room without disturbing library patrons, they
may do SO.83 The classroom is principally for the communication of
ideas through the transfer of those ideas to the students, but a silent
symbol can be worn into class so long as no disruption occurs. Still
in the school, but outside the classroom, other more vocal forms of
expression may be permissible. In the lunchroom, for example, stu';'
dents may be permitted to distribute literature or solicit members for
political organizations or support for candidates. 84 The common de
nominator among all these activities is that they all can peacefully
coexist with the primary function of the forum. None of them, how
ever, suggests a right to participate in those primary activities. The
forum consists of the open space within the government facility. By
the use of this space, a message may be communicated in a place
where an effective audience exists. In none of these cases does the
protestor gain the right to move into the government's own space
and supplant or join the government in the mooiog of the forum.
Speech and nonspeech uses exist side by side, but each in its separate
sphere. What this means in the library is that, as a secondary forum,
the public forum consists of the open public spaces of the library.
The government spaces, such as the library shelves and the reference
desk, are reserved for the government's own use.
To reach the library shelves, arguments other than those relying
military base is not a public forum to which civilians have a right of access because the
use of the base as a place to train soldiers and the paramount interest of the military in
maintaining itself as a politically neutral establishment are incompatible with the charac
terization of the base as a public forum for civilian expressive activities); accord, Brown
v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (military base).
83. But see Bullock v. Mumford, 509 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (sit down strike in
main reading room of the Library of Congress termed "disruptive" of study and
meditation).
84. q: Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972) (suspension of .
students for distributing copies of underground newspaper in school corridors before and
after classes and during lunch hour overturned since school rule plaintiffs were charged
with violating was an unconstitutional prior restraint on expression).

22

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:1

directly on Brown and Tinker must be advanced. Three possibilities
merit discussion. First, there is the argument that the library collec
tion is itself a primary forum. The reasoning here is that the books
on the shelves are a forum for the expression of ideas like the munic
ipal theater in Southeastern Promotions. If t~s argument is success
ful, the Mosley equality principle takes over as a basis for a
challenge to book removal. If the books themselves are a forum,
selective exclusions from the collection become suspect.
While this reasoning results in the very variation on the public
forum theme that is needed in the book removal cases, one major
difficulty stands in the way of its success. That difficulty is that, un
like the municipal theater, the library collection was not created as a
place for students to express their ideas and contribute books of their
choice. 8s The school library's collection was created as a forum for
the government's own ideas and not the ideas of members of the
school community. While the expression of those ideas is through
the vehicle of books written by a variety of authors and not by gov
ernment authorship, the main point is that outside persons were not
invited to participate in the selection of books for the collection. To
illustrate this point further, if the library were to create a shelf in the
library for student donated books, such a shelf might well be consid
ered a forum. The library, having voluntarily created such a shelf,
could not exclude some books because of disagreement with their
content. But the entire library collection is not the equivalent of a
student gift shelf. The existence of the library is not necessarily the
equivalent of a government offering of a place where all ideas are
welcome. In the absence of such a voluntary government offering,
the equal access principle of Mosley does not come into play.
While the only participant in the process of filling the library
shelves is intended to be the government itself, this restriction is not
necessarily fatal to public forum theory. A second analysis of the
library book collection is possible in which this facet of the govern
ment's intent is unimportant. In this view of the matter, a forum
may exist where the government intends to be the only voice heard
in the forum. In such a situation, the government will have the in
tent to use its voice to speak for all who wish to contribute to the
85. A similar distinction between a municipal auditorium and a publicly funded
broadcast station was relied on to deny the station public forum status in Muir v. Ala
bama Educ. Television Comm'n, 656 F.2d 1012, 1021 (5th Cir. 1981) ("There is an essen
tial difference between a public broadcaster engaged in the private broadcaster function
of selecting and presenting its own programs, and a municipal auditorium made avail
able for presentations by others.").
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forum. If the library can be seen as a place where the government
has promised to represent all points of view, a voluntary forum will
be found to have been created.
To further highlight this forum possibility, a look at a case in
which just such a forum was created will be helpful. In Alaska Gay
Coalition v. Sullivan,86 the municipality of Anchorage published a
guide to services and organizations in the greater Anchorage area.
The Anchorage Blue Book rejected an entry submitted by the Alaska
Gay Coalition because of hostility to the beliefs of the group's mem
bers. The Alaska Supreme Court identified the publication as a pub
lic forum and found that exclusions from that forum could not be
based on objections to the ideas represented by the Coalition. Since
other political groups were included in the publication, no content
neutral reason could be discerned for the exclusion. The Anchorage
Blue Book was considered to be a public forum because it was ex
pressly created in order ''to provide Anchorage residents with a sin
gle source of information regarding public services, local
government, recreational opportunities and crisis assistance."87 In
light of the municipality's intent to disseminate a complete informa
tion guide, the municipality thereafter could not exclude a group
from being listed in the guidebook based on objection to the ideas
represented by the organization.
In Alaska Gay Coalition, the government was the sole author of
the guidebook. A private group could not participate in the guide by
requesting a page in the book on which it could describe its organi
zation. The government's express intent in founding the guide, how
ever, was to include information on all organizations in the
community. Having voluntarily established this intent, a forum was
viewed as having been created. The school library shelves differ
from the Anchorage Blue Book in one critical respect. The public
school has not created its library with the express credo that it shall
contain books representing all ideas, both popular and unpopular.
To the contrary, the government's clear intent is to selectively fill the
shelves of the school library with only those books it determines are
appropriate to the school's educational mission. 88 Lacking this kind
86. 578 P.2d 951 (Alaska 1978).
87. Id at 953. The court acknowledged that in most cases a forum has been identi
fied as a physical location. It had no trouble extending the public forum doctrine to
include a publication, however, especially since the booklet's very purpose was commu
nication. The booklet, therefore, satisfied the definition of a primary forum since it had
been created voluntarily by the government for the purpose of expression. Id at 956-57.
88. As an example of the possible criteria used in book selection, the court in Presi
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of volitional intent to give voice to all ideas, the school library can
not be considered to be a public forum on the order of the Anchorage
Blue Book.
Despite the inadequacy of these two public forum theories for
the case at hand, there remains one further argument with a chance
for success in the library book removal cases. That argument does
not depend on the voluntary nature of the government's actions in
creating a forum. The essence of this argument is that by the very
act of establishing a school library, the library shelves become an
involuntary forum in which the government is obligated to represent
all ideas.
Having articulated a public forum argument that seems a plau
sible means of fastening public forum status on the library book
shelves, the next step is to evaluate whether this argument can be
supported by case law as well as logic. As a means of approaching
this inquiry, it will be useful to see how this idea of an involuntary
forum fared when applied to other areas in the schoolhouse. Not
surprisingly, the public forum issue arose in the educational setting
in a number of ways. The aspects of the school environment that
received attention in the cases included the hallways, the lunchroom,
the classroom, the school auditorium, the school newspaper,' and the
school notice distribution system. In the classroom, the hallway, and
the lunchruom, questions of use for the exercise of speech rights re
lied directly on Tinker. 89 Since students sought access to places serv
ing other primary functions, Tinker's material disruption standard
was applied. 90 Cases involving the use of the school auditorium
were resolved with the use of the Mosley principle. If the auditorium
generally was made available to some groups it must be made availdents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cerl.
denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972), cited the following regulation of the New York State Com
missioner of Education as governing selections for secondary school libraries:
The book collection in the secondary schools shall consist of books approved as
satisfactory for: (I) Supplementing the curriculum, (2) reference and general
information, (3) appreciation and (4) pleasure reading. The course of study
and the interest of boys and girls of given ages and grades are factors which
should playa large part in the selection of books for a school library. Books of
established quality and authority in sufficient quantity to meet all school needs
are recognized as necessary tools and materials of instruction. 8 N. Y. Code,
Rules & Regs. (Educ.) § 91.1(b) (1966).
Id at 291 n.4.
89. E.g., Butts v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 436 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971);
Aguirre v. Tahoka Independent School Dist., 311 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
90. Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972).
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able to others on the same terms. 91 The voluntary creation of a fo
rum idea was central in these cases. The school newspaper cases
were somewhat more complicated. Here as well, however, by the
creation of a school newspaper relying on student writers and edi
tors, the school was viewed as having voluntarily created a forum for
student expression. 92 School sponsorship and funding do not place
the school in the position of a private publisher. 93 While the school
may have been permitted to exercise control where it was necessary
for the protection of the student body,94 generally a forum was
viewed as having been created by the establishment of a student run
paper. 95 Having established a forum, student editors thereby were
protected against attempts by school officials to censor articles slated
for publication in the school paper. 96
In addition to the issue of whether school publications are fo
rums with respect to student editors and writers, the public forum
status of school publications has been raised in one other context. In
this additional context the concern is whether outside contributors
have rights of access to school publications because those publica
tions are public forums. 97 An interesting example of this problem is
91. National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010 (4th Cir.
1973); Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946).
The equality principle also is used to analyze claims of unconstitutional exclusion from
other school facilities. See, e.g., Gay Students Organization v. Bonner, 509 F.2d 652 (1st
Cir. 1974) (successful challenge by a student organization to the refusal to allow the
organization to hold social functions on campus); if. Brooks v. Auburn Univ., 296 F.
Supp. 188 (M.D. Ala.), aJid., 412 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969) (pre-Mosley challenge to the
refusal to permit the Reverend William Sloan Coffin to speak on campus).
92. Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970); Zucker v. Panitz,
299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). For a discussion of the public forum status of school
newspapers, see Note, Tinker's Legacy: Freedom of the Press in Public High Schools, 28
DE PAUL L. REv. 387 (1979); Note, Public Forum Theory in the Educational Selling: The
First Amendment and The Student Press, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 879.
93. Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570, 573-74 (5th Cir.), modified en bane, 489 F.2d
225 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974).
94. Williams v. Spencer, 622 F.2d 1200, 1205 (5th Cir. 1980) (''The First Amend
ment rights of the students must yield to the superior interest of the school in seeing that
materials that encourage actions which endanger the health or safety of students are not
distributed on school property.").
95. Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 810 (2d Cir. 1971).
96. Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731 (E.D. Va.), aJid, 564
F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977). But if. Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977), cerl.
denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978) (court upheld a denial of permission to schoolnewspaper to
distribute a questionnaire concerning sexual attitudes of students). For a thorough dis
cussion of Trachtman, see Comment, Behind the Schoolhouse Gate: Sex and the Student
Pol/ster, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 161 (1979).
97. These cases involved several aspects of the school as public forum not dis
cussed in Tinker. In addition to the obvious issue of the school newspaper as a public
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found in Avins v. Rutgers, State University.98 In Avins, a law review
article was rejected by the Rutgers Law Review, a publication of the
state-supported Law School of Rutgers University. The author of
the article claimed that it had been improperly rejected based on its
conservative jurisprudential outlook. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the exercise of editorial discre
tion by the Law Review's Editorial Board. The Rutgers Law Review
was found to be part of the law school's educational program and
not a forum available to all who wish to express their ideas on its
pages. The court rejected Avins' claim, concluding that "the accept
ance or rejection of articles submitted for publication in a law school
law review necessarily involves the exercise of editorial judgment
and this is in no wise lessened by the fact that the law review is
supported, at least in part, by the State."99 At least with respect to
outside contributors, the law review was not considered to be a vol
untary public forum and the court apparently was unwilling to con
sider it as an involuntary forum. 100
Two additional cases in the educational setting also concerned
public righ~s of access to potential public forums within the school
environment. In both of these cases, access claims were made to
school notice distribution mechanisms. In the first, Buckel v. Pren
tice,101 an even more clear-cut rejection of the involuntary forum
forum, there is also the question of the rights of nonstudents when the public forum
involved is a part of the school's educational program. See note 67 supra. At least one
case suggested that the rights of students in an educational public forum are greater than
the rights of nonstudents. Stacy v. Williams, 306 F. Supp. 963, 975 (N.D. Miss. 1969),
tiff'd,446 F.2d 1366 (5th Cir. 1972). See generally Comment, supra note 72, at 120-24.
98. 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967), cerl. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968).
99. Id at 153-54.
100. Outside of the schoolhouse" context, at least one case can be found in
which the court reached a contrary result." In Radical Lawyers Caucus v. Pool, 324 F.
Supp. 268 (W.O. Tex. 1970), the court found a right to place a political advertisement in
a state-supported publication despite a publication policy barring such ads. In Pool,
plaintiffs sought to place an ad in the Texas Bar Journal publicizing a caucus they were
sponsoring during the annual meeting of the State Bar of Texas. The Texas Bar Journal
had a policy against accepting political advertisements. Despite this policy, the court
held for plaintiffs. The court ruled that the Texas Bar Journal had no policy against
accepting advertising since it accepted commercial ads. Moreover, it found the defend
ant's explanation that it wished to remain neutral in controversial matters to be insuffi
cient in light of other political materials published by the Journal. Id at 270. While
Pool seemed to create an involuntary forum in the face of a government intention not to
open up the Journal to political ads, the case is of minimum assistance in finding support
for such an argument. The court in Pool failed to discuss the public forum issue. It
appeared to assume, suh sUenlio, ~t a forum existed, and went on to conclude that the
government lacked a compelling reason for excluding plaintiffs from that forum. Id
101. 410 F. Supp. 1243 (S.D. Ohio 1976), tiff'd, 572 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1978).
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concept occurred. In Buckel, plaintiffs based their claim on the
equal access doctrine arguing that the Kingswood Elementary
School in Columbus, Ohio had created a public forum by its practice
of sending circulars home to parents through inschool distribution to
their school-aged children. Defendant school system in Buckel had
no written policy governing the distribution of noncommercial
materials. The record in Buckel indicated that informational
"materials about home fire safety, musical instrument rental plans,
school lunch menus, summer recreation facilities and programs, and
musical concerts and recitals" had been sent home in the past. 102
Additionally, the schools had disseminated pamphlets "promoting
tax levies and a state income tax."I03 The record was further compli
cated because plaintiffs previously had been granted permission to
distribute a document urging decentralization of the public
schools. I04 Plaintiffs' lawsuit sought the right to distribute additional
materials on this same subject.
The court in Buckel recognized that the system was stepping
dangerously close to the edge of creating a public forum by having
no structured policy about distribution. At some point, the practice
of allowing individual school printipals to decide what material
could be sent home with students might give rise to the creation of a
forum. The court, however, felt that while such a potential existed,
the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the Columbus
public schools had developed a practice of permitting parents to use
student distribution to express opinions or disseminate information
to other parents. lOS Therefore, no forum had been created on the
facts before the court.
Having rejected plaintiffs' attempts to show that the school had·
voluntarily created a forum by developing a practice of allowing the
message distribution system to be used by parents, the court also
considered the possibility that an involuntary forum existed. The
idea was that the school's own use of the distribution system for the
dissemination of information gave rise to a right of parental usage of
102. Id at 1246.
103. Id
104. Id In addition to the plaintiffs previous distribution, one other incident of
private use of the school distribution system appeared in the record. A group called
"Interested and concerned Kingswood Parents" distributed a circular urging parents to
attend a discussion on the topic of school decentralization, to be held at the Kingswood
Elementary School. Id
lOS. Id at 1247.
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that same system. The court, however, rejected this possibility as
well:
[T]he distribution via students of information concerning coming
theatrical events, home safety measures, and the like, is not indic
ative of the establishment of a forum for First Amendment pur
poses. Dissemination of such material is a logical and a proper
extension of the educational function of schools in our society,
and such dissemination does not of itself give rise to any right of
access to student distribution by parents or other concerned
citizens. 106

Applying the same logic to the school library setting would result in
a rejection of any access to the library shelves. The process of book
selection is part of the educational function of the school. Engaging
in this process of itself would not be viewed as giving rise to the
creation of an involuntary foruin.
The final case involving a notice distribution system is Bonner
Lyons Y. School Committee. 107 In Bonner-Lyons, members of The
Ad Hoc Parents' Committee for Quality Education challenged the
distribution of notices about a planned antibusing rally through the
use of the internal distribution procedure of the Boston public school
system. Use of this procedure allowed the notice to reach the ap
proximately 97,000 students attending the Boston public schools.
The distribution of the notice was authorized by a resolution
adopted by the Boston School Committee. The notice informed par
ents of schoolchildren that the Boston School Committee supported
the "Parents' March on the Statehouse." Plaintiffs sought to enjoin
future use of the distribution mechanism for notices voicing opposi
tion to busing or, in the alternative, for access to the same system for
the purpose of publicizing probusing rallies. The United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in analyzing the case, as
sumed that the distribution procedure had been opened up to use by
a private group for the dissemination of antibusing views. l08 Based
106. Id
107. 480 F.2d 442 (1st Cir. 1973).
108. Id at 443. The decision is ambiguous as to the source of the antibusing no
tice. The facts indicate that on March 29, 1973 the Committee authorized the distribu
tion of the following notice:
Dear Parents:
At a meeting on March 29,1973, a resolution of the School Committee to
support the Parents' March on the State House on Tuesday, April 3, 1973, at
10:00 A.M. was passed unanimously.
The purpose of the meeting is to inform the Governor and members of the
Legislature that parents and the Boston School Committee stand united in op
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on this assumption, the court applied the Mosley equal access princi
ple and held that the system had been opened up to antibusing
views, it had to be equally available for probusing opinions or, alter
natively, to advocates of neither position. 109 Here again, a voluntary
opening of the distribution system accounted for the result reached
by the court. No issue of the involuntary creation of a forum by the
school's attempt to create a forum solely for its own use had to be
resolved.
These authorities make clear that when the public forum issue is
raised in the school environment, the case law has relied on the vol
untary creation of a forum and the equal access principle to find a
solution. Only two of these cases spoke directly to the question of
whether an involuntary forum is part of first amendment theory in
circumstances in which the government sets up a forum only for gov
ernment speech. In both of these cases such an argument was re
jected. The Third Circuit in Avins concluded that the state may
create a place for the expression of ideas that is not a public fo
rum. 110 This same result was adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Buck
el.1ll Like the law review in Avins, the school's use of an
information distribution system was found to be part of the school's
educational function and did not give rise to the creation of a forum.
A vins and Buckel both adopted what has been described as an
all or nothing approach to the· public forum doctrine. 112 A place is
or is not a forum with respect to all requests for access to that place.
This approach, however, is not the only one available for analysis of
public forum questions. One alternative is to consider the Law Re
view to be a public forum, but find justifiable many of the editorial
position to forced busing and redistricting now being considered by the State
Board of Education.
All parents are encouraged to write the Governor, the Senators and the
Representatives in support of House Bill 3439 which opposes busing without
the written consent of the parents.
Id While the content of the notice suggests that its source is the School Committee itself
and not a private party, the court rejected such an interpretation. The court found sup
port for its position in that on April 30, 1973, the School Committee apparently author
ized a second set of antibusing notices to be distributed. According to defendants these
notices were prepared by the "Home and School Association," a private association. Id
at 443 n.2. What the result would have been if the court had treated the notice as having
. been sent by the School Committee itself was not discussed in the case.
109. Id at 444.
110. 385 F.2d at 153-54.
III. 410 F. Supp. at 1247.
112. Karst, Public Enterprire and tlte Public Forum: A Comment on Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 247, 248-52 (1976).
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board's actions that result in the exclusion of certain articles from
publication in the forum.1I3 For example, the rejection of Professor
Avins' law review article because of dissatisfaction with its perspec
tive on a question of constitutional analysis would seem to fall well
within the permissible bounds of the editorial board's decisionmak
ing authority. Suppose the board, however, rejected an article for a
reason unrelated to its content. Instead, the board felt a personal
animus toward the author of the article or objected to the author's
political opinions, opinions not reflected in the work itself. This de
cision should be considered an unjustified exclusion of the article
from the pages of the Law Review. Nothing in the concept of edito
rial discretion requires a decision based on such grounds. Under this
analysis, therefore, the Law Review would be considered a public
forum, but not all exclusions from it would be unconstitutional.
While this reasoning might be preferred to the analysis of the
courts in Avins and Buckel, it does not yet have. support in the case
law.l l4 Therefore, an attempt to consider the library book collection
to be an involuntary forum first would depend on an ability to con
vince a court to adopt a more flexible response to public forum
questions.
One final approach to the problem of viewing the library book
shelves as an involuntary forum remains. Unlike the kind of invol
untary forum that would have been created in Buckel, this forum
would not involve granting access to outside persons. The govern
ment's own voice would continue to be the only voice heard in the
forum. The government, however, would take on an obligation to
express a variety of views. The argument here is for a kind of consti
tutionally mandated fairness doctrine. I IS Whenever government
puts its machinery behind the selling of certain ideas by the creation
of a forum for the expression of those ideas, as it does in the educa
tional process, the first amendment would impose an obligation that
the government make a "balanced presentation" by expressing a di
versity of viewpoints. I 16
Several lines of decision have some relevance to the question of
113. See notes 292-304 infra and accompanying text.
Cass, supra note 33, at 1303.
The fairness doctrine is a requirement imposed on private broadcasters by the
Federal Communications Commission that the broadcasters fairly present opposing
views in their coverage of controversial public issues. Applicability of the Fairness Doc
trine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10,416
114.
115.

(1964).
116.

T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 714-16 (1970).
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whether the first amendment permits the government to monopolize
the school library as a forupl for the expression of its own ideas.
One point of inquiry focuses on Supreme Court statements about the
role of public education and whether the schools are limited in the
extent to which they may teach a favored ideology. A useful starting
place in this discussion is Tinker.
In Tinker, the role of public education and limitations on the
state's ability to formulate an educational program were discussed.
The Court in that case set out limitations on the school's relationship
with its pupils. The Court stated: "In our system, state-operated
schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. School officials do
not possess absolute authority over their students."1'17 Later the
Court reiterated this point: "[S]tudents may not be regarded as
closed-circuit recipients of only that which the State chooses to com
municate. They may not be confined to the expression of those sen
timents that are officially approved."1l8 These statements by the
Court are open to two differing interpretations. One interpretation
considers the Court's words in light of the facts of Tinker itself. The
limitations on the power of school authorities to dictate certain
messages to their students are supplied by the students having first
amendment rights of freedom of expression in the schools. The state
may preach its message, but the students have the right to rejoin with
contrary messages of their own. A second interpretation of Tinker
sees the case as imposing a much more direct restraint on school
authorities. That interpretation views Tinker as requiring the school
to disseminate a variety of messages. The school's obligation would
be to expose students to a marketplace of ideas and would allow the
students to choose those ideas that appeal to them most. This re
quired democratization of the schoolhouse would limit the discretion
of school authorities in matters of curriculum content. Even if no
student desired to express contrary views to the school's favored ide
ology, the school itself would bear this responsibility. In the school
library this would mean the school would be limited in its ability to
screen out certain books because of disagreement with the ideas ex
pressed in those books. This view of the school as an involuntary
forum, however, is far from established.
To explore the question of whether such an argument can find
further support in the case law, several additional cases deserve at
1I7. 393 U.S. at 511.
1I8. Id.
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tention. In West Virginia State Board ofEducation v. Barnette, 119 the
West Virginia State Board of Education's adoption of a resolution
requiring compulsory flag salute in the schools was challenged.
Challengers, Jehovah's Witnesses, claimed the flag salute law vio
lated their rights to freedom of speech and religion. The Court in
validated the West Virginia statute, relying on free speech principles.
While the West Virginia statute did not interfere with the challeng
ers' right to speak, it did interfere with their right to remain silent, a
right also protected by the first amendment's free speech guarantee.
In declaring the West Virginia law to be unconstitutional, the Court
had no quarrel with the state's ability to foster national unity. In
stead, it objected to the state's choice of coercive means. That the
end was legitimate and only the means unconstitutional was reaf
firmed by this language in the Court's opinion: ''To believe that pa
triotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremonies are voluntary and
spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make an unflatter
ing estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds."120 Thus
Barnette cannot be viewed as a case in which the state's ability to
foster patriotism was called into question.
A similar reasoning and result also appeared more recently in
Wooley v. Maynard. 121 In that case, George and Maxine Maynard
challenged the authority of the State of New Hampshire to require
that the Maynards display the New Hampshire state motto, "Live
Free or Die," on their automobile license plate. The Maynards, Je
hovah's Witnesses, claimed the motto ''to be repugnant -to their
moral, religious, and political beliefs."122 The Supreme Court relied
heavily on Barnette in finding for the Maynards:
Here, as in Barnette, we are faced with a state measure which
forces an individual, as part of his daily life-indeed constantly
while his automobile is in public view-to be an instrument for
fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds
unacceptable. In doing so, the State "invades the sphere of intel
lect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to
our Constitution to reserve from all official contro1."123

In addition to reaffirming the notion of a first amendment right to
119. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (overruling Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S.
586 (1940».
120. 319 U.S. at 641.
121. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
122. Id. at 707.
123. Id. at 715 (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
642 (1943».
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remain silent, the Court also reaffirmed the legitimacy of govern
ment attempts to "disseminate an ideology":
The State is seeking to communicate to others an official view as
to proper appreciation of history, state pride, and individualism.
Of course, the State may legitimately pursue such interests in any
number of ways. However, where the State's interest is to dissemi
nate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest
cannot outweigh an individual's First Amendment right to avoid
becoming the courier for such message. 124

Once again, the Court had no objection to state attempts to instill
favored values, only with its attempt to coerce allegiance to those
values.
One final case provided direct support for the acceptability of
state attempts to disseminate a favored ideology in the schools. In
Ambach v. Norwick,12S the Court upheld a ban on the employment
of aliens as public school teachers. In doing so, the Court com
mented: "Public education. . . 'fulfills a most fundamental <;>bliga
tion of government to its constituency.' The importance of public
schools in the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens,
and in the preservation of the values on which our society rests, long
has been recognized by our decisions."126 After describing public
education as " 'a principal instrument in awakening the child to cul
tural values,' "127 the Court also recognized the role of public educa
tion in the indoctrination of fundamental values:
Other authorities have perceived public schools as an "assimila
tive force" by which diverse and conflicting elements in our soci
ety are brought together on a broad but common ground. These
perceptions of the public schools as inculcating fundamental val
ues necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system
have been confirmed by the observations of social scientists. 128

The Court went on to hold that the state's effort to further its educa
tional goals justified imposing a citizenship requirement on public
school teachers.129
In upholding the legitimacy of state efforts "to promote particu
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

430 U.S. at 717 (footnote omitted).
441 U.S. 68 (1979).
Id. at 76 (citation omitted).
Id. at 77 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954».
441 U.S. at 77 (citations omitted).
Id. at 80-81.
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lar values and attitudes toward government"130 the Court, by impli
cation, reinforced a narrower reading of Tinker. The Court's
holding in Ambach suggests that the restraint on state authority im
posed by Tinker was directed at the state's ability to silence student
ideas and not at the state's right to choose to t~ach only certain ideas
and values.
The impact of these cases in the school library setting cuts away
from the idea of the school library as an involuntary forum in which
a broad spectrum of ideas and values must be represented. As there
appears to be no element of coercion in the library setting, the limi
tation established in cases like Barnette is inapplicable. The school
library serves as a place for doing research on classroom assign
ments, borrowing books for voluntary spare time reading, spending
study hour time reading books of a student's own choice, and similar
activities. Students are not compelled to read any particular
books 131 and certainly are not compelled to affirm belief in ideas
represented in books read or to serve as walking advertisements for
ideas expressed in those books.
In searching for support among Supreme Court decisions for
the argument that the school's ability to create a value laden library
collection is subject to constitutional limitations, only two cases look
promising. Upon closer examination, however, the support offered
by these decisions is slight.
In Meyer v. Nebraska, 132 the Supreme Court struck down a stat
ute which forbad the teaching of any modem language, other than
English, to any child who had not completed the eighth grade. The
Court concluded that the statute interfered with the constitutionally
protected liberty to acquire knowledge and with the right of parents
130. Id at 79 n.lO.
131. Unlike the school library situation, the element of coercion plays a role in the
classroom setting. Since the students are required to participate in the classroom learn
ing process and since the content of that process is controlled by the school, the class
room environment is distinctly more coercive than that in the library. This makes more
persuasive the argument for first amendment limits on classroom curriculum content.
See, e.g., Comment, supra note II, at 497-503 (arguing that the vulnerability of children
in the classroom setting to indoctrination gives rise to a constitutional right to challenge
curriculum exclusions that result in a curriculum that imposes ideological homogeneity).
But if. Hirscholf, Parents and the Public School Curriciulum: Is There a Right to Have
One's Child Excused from Objectionable Instruction?, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 871, 905-09
(1977) (arguing that practical obstacles stand in the way of relying on a balanced presen
tation obligation for classroom teachers and that these obstacles point toward the alterna
tive of allowing parents who disagree with the values taught in certain public school
classes to have their children excused from such instruction).
132. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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to control the upbringing of their children. 133
While Meyer appears to be an example of a constitutionallimi
tation on curriculum content, its importance should not be exagger
ated. In the first place, just as in the later cases of Barnette and
Ambach, the Court recognized the legitimacy of "[t]he desire of the
legislature to foster a homogeneous people with American ideals
prepared readily to understand current discussions of civic mat
ters."134 The Court's quarrel was with the state's choice of means,
not with its ends.
One further limitation on the importance of Meyer results from
the Court restricting its decision to the facts before it. While the
Nebraska statute was applicable to both public and private school
instruction in foreign languages, plaintiff in Meyer was a teacher at a
parochial school run by the Zion Evangelical Lutheran Congrega
tion. The Court therefore dealt with the statute only as applied to
the private school setting raised by plaintiff. The Court specifically
eliminated from its consideration the question of the validity of the
same curriculum control as applied to state run schools. 13s This lim
itation on the Court's decision is critical. Its impact was to reduce
the value of Meyer in invalidating public school curriculum restric
tions. Thus, the case has no direct application to curtailing what the
state may teach in a forum of its own creation.
One Supreme Court case that involved the issue of a constitu
tional limitation on what mayor may not be taught in the public
schools is Epperson v. Arkansas. 136 In Epperson, an Arkansas law
made illegal the teaching of the Darwinian theory of evolution in the
public schools. In striking down this law, the Court retlected gener
ally on past judicial involvement in educational controversies impli
cating constitutional values. While discussing Meyer and its reliance
on the interference with the due process rights of students and teach
ers, the Court Clearly disavowed any reliance on Meyer as a basis for
Epperson. The controversy in Epperson was resolveable solely on
establishment of religion grounds without any need to consider the
broader problem of the general right to freedom of expression. 137
The Constitution requires the government to take a position of neu
133. Id at 401. On the same day as Meyer, the Court struck down three very
similar statutes in effect in Iowa, Ohio, and Nebraska. Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404
(1923) (cases consolidated).
134. 262 U.S. at 402.
135. Id
136. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
137. Id at 105-06.
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trality in religious matters, thus government advocacy of "a religious
doctrine or the prohibition of theory which is deemed antagonistic to
a particular dogma"138 is forbidden. The Arkansas law was found to
have been motivated by a desire to outlaw all discussion of evolution
that contradicted the Biblical account of the <;lrigin of the species. 139
The law, therefore, was a violation of the establishment clause of the
first amendment.
Meyer and Epperson provided only a feeble endorsement for the
notion of a constitutional requirement that the government give
something akin to equal time to the teaching of opposing ideas in the
public schools. Instead, the message of Tinker, Barnette, Wooley,
and Ambach is that the government is free to place its weight behind
a particular idea so long as it does not coerce others to pledge alle
giance to that belief.
The public school's ability to monitor its library collection so as
to have it represent appropriate values is one aspect of the larger
question of the constitutional treatment of government advocacy.
This question has received scant attention until now. l40 The most
direct treatment of the question came in a series of cases that chal
lenged government advocacy in the electoral context. 141
138. Id at 106-07.
139. Id at 107.
140. While this issue thus far has provoked infrequent scholarly comment, e.g., Z.
CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MAss COMMUNICATIONS 732-34 (1947); T. EMERSON, supra
note 116, at 697-716; Van Alstyne, The First Amendment and the Suppression of Warmon
gering Propaganda in the United States: Comments and Footnotes, 31 L. & CONTEMP.
PROB. 530, 531-36 (1966), there are indications this situation is changing. For two excel
lent recent treatments of the topic of government expression, see Kamenshine, The First
Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1104 (1979) (argu
ing that the first amendment contains an implied prohibition against political establish
ment similar in its operation to the religious establishment clause and limiting the right
of government to advocate political viewpoints); and Yudof, When Governments Speak:
Toward a Theory of Government Expression and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV.
863 (1979) (suggesting that excessive government expression should be curbed by courts
becoming aware of the dangers of such speech and strengthening individual speech rights
to combat those dangers, and by strengthening legislative limits on government speech
through the use of the ultra vires technique). A third approach to the problem ofgovem
ment speech is advocated in Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 V.C.L.A. L. REv. 565
(1980) (arguing that the legitimacy of government speech ought to be evaluated by an
eclectic approach, in each case balancing the interests which weigh against allowing such
speech against the interests in favor of government speech).
141. For an analysis of the problems presented by such cases, see Ziegler, Govern
ment Speech and the Constitution: The Limits ofOffiCial Partisanship, 21 B.C. L. REv. 578
(1980); Note, The Constitutionality ofMunicipal Advocacy in Statewide Referendum Cam
paigns, 93 HARv. L. REv. 535 (1980).
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In Anderson v. City ofBoston 142 the city sought to expend funds

"for the purposes of providing educational materials and disseminat
ing information urging the adoption by the people of a proposed
amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution relating to the classifi
cation of property for purposes of taxation." 143 In pursuit of his ef
forts to encourage passage of the classification amendment, the
mayor created the Office of Public Information on Classification. As
a result of the city's efforts, eleven taxpayers sued to prevent the city
from engaging in activities to bring about the passage of the classifi
cation referendum. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
ruled in favor of plaintiff taxpayers on the ground that the city lack
ed statutory authority to appropriate funds for the purpose of influ
encing election results.l44
Despite the lack of statutory authorization, the city argued that
the first amendment protected its right to speak even in the absence
of enabling legislation. The city was entitled to such constitutional
protection, it therefore could expend funds in order to advocate pas
sage of the proposed amendment. 145 In commenting on the constitu
tional claim raised by the city, the court suggested that the city's
right to speak, while it might be constitutionally protected, also was
subject to some degree of constitutional restraint:
There are, no doubt, constitutional restrictions on governmental
speech even where the subject under discussion is one at the heart
of the First Amendment's protection. On the other hand, there
are a variety of instances in which government funds are used
lawfully to express views and conclusions on matters of impor
tance where various taxpayers may disagree with those views and
conclusions. The Constitution of the United States, thus, does not
forbid all government communications and publications which
are not neutral and purely informative. l46
142. 376 Mass. 178, 380 N.E.2d 628, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 1060 (1979) (dis

missed for want of substantial federal question).
143. Id at 180,380 N.E.2d at 631 (footnote omitted).
144. Id at 182, 380 N.E.2d at 182.
145. Id at 188-89, 380 N.E.2d at 635.
146. Id at 191-92,380 N.E.2d at 637 (footnote omitted). The court specified some
of the restrictions on government speech in a footnote to this statement:
Surely, the Constitution of the United States does not authorize the expen
diture of public funds to promote the reelection of the President, Congressmen,
and State and local officials (to the exclusion of their opponents), even though
the open discussion of political candidates and elections is basic First Amend
ment materiaL Government domination of the expression of ideas is repugnant
to our system of constitutional government.
Id at 191 n.14, 380 N.E.2d at 637 n.14.
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The remainder of the court's analysis assumed for purposes of argu
ment that the government speech at issue in Anderson was of the
constitutionally protected variety. The court, however, even assum
ing such a protected status, found that the state has a sufficiently
compelling interest in "assuring the fairness of elections and the ap
pearance of fairness in the electoral process"147 to justify curbing
such advocacy.
The government's right to engage in political advocacy also was
raised in Citizens to Protect Public Funds v. Board of Education of
Parsippany-Troy Hills l48 and Stem v. Kramarsky.149 The facts of
Citizens to Protect Public Funds were similar to those of Anderson.
The case involved a referendum on a proposal to issue bonds to
finance a school building program. Prior to the referendum vote, the
Board of Education printed and distributed an eighteen-page book
let entitled "Read the Facts Behind the Parsippany-Troy Hills School
BUilding Program." The booklet contained facts about current
school facilities and detailed plans of the proposed school expansion
program. On the cover of the booklet and on several inside pages
the reader was urged to "Vote Yes" on the referendum. The booklet
also set out the untoward consequences of a negative vote. Plaintiffs
challenged the legality of the Board of Education's use of public
funds for the distribution of the booklet. The Supreme Court of
New Jersey found no express or implied statutory authority for the
expenditure of public funds for publication of the booklet. While
not deciding the case on constitutional grounds, some of the court's
reasoning seemed to bear on that question as well. The court found
it appropriate for the school board to expend funds to fairly present
all the consequences, both good and bad, of the proposed building
program. For example, the Board of Education could sponsor a
public forum for the airing of all views on the proposal or could
broadcast a radio debate between proponents and opponents of the
referendum. ISO The Board's authority, however, did not include the
"use of public funds. to advocate one side only of the controversial
question without affording the dissenters the opportunity by means
of that financed medium to present their side."lsl The court's real
objection was to ''the expenditure of public funds in support of one
side only in a manner which gives the dissenters no opportunity to
147. Id. at 193,380 N.E.2d at 638.
148. 13 N.J. 172, 98 A.2d 673 (1953).
149. 84 Misc. 2d 447, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
150. 13 N.J. at 182,98 A.2d at 677-78.
151. Id. at 180-81,98 A.2d at 677.
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present their side."152
A similar opinion was expressed by the court in Stern v. Kra
marsky.153 In Stern, a taxpayer sued to enjoin the Commissioner of
the Division of Human Rights of the State of New York from engag
ing in activities to bring about the adoption of the proposed equal
rights amendment to the Constitution of the State of New York.
While the court upheld the propriety of activities designed to edu
cate and inform the public concerning the proposed equal rights
amendment, it spoke out strongly against government departures
from a position of neutrality on issues or candidates: "It would be
establishing a dangerous and untenable precedent to permit the gov
ernment or any agency thereof, .to use public funds to disseminate
propaganda in favor of or against any issue or candidate."154
While Anderson, Citizens to Protect Public Funds, and Stern sug
gested some limitation on the right of government advocacy, several
caveats to the application of these cases to the school library book
removal problem must be raised. First, there is the nonconstitution
al ratio decidendi of these decisions. Second, there is the lack of any
cited authority for the restrictions on government speech expressed
in the opinions. Third, there are obvious distinctions between gov
ernment support for a candidate or election issue and government
support for certain positions in an educational setting. One possible
distinction is based on the concept of a government function. Ac
cording to Professor Emerson, the government's right of expression
should "not extend to any sphere that is outside the governmental
function."155 While "direct support of a particular candidate for of
fice"156 is not a government function, education clearly is an impor
tant government concern. 157 Inherent in the administration of a
public school system is the need to make choices of some ideas over
152. Id at 182, 98 A.2d at 678.
153.

84 Misc. 2d 447, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1975).

154. Id at 452, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 239.
ISS. T. EMERSON, supra note 116, at 699.
156. Id
157. As the Supreme Court recognized in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954):
Today, education is perhaps the most important function I)f state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures
for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education
to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic
public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very founda
tion of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful
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others. Ideological neutrality is not part of the history of public edu
cation in the United States. ISS One other distinction is that the selec
tion of certain books for the school library is not as direct an instance
of government advocacy as occurs when government supports a can
didate for office. The act of placing books in a library for students to
read at their option does not put the active voice of government be
hind those ideas, campaigning for their adoption. While the govern
ment may intend a student to hear a particular message, its manner
of presenting that message is a great deal more subtle. ls9
While the political advocacy cases of Anderson, Citizens to Pro
tect Public Funds, and Stem, and the government forum cases of
Avins and Buckel, all raised the issue of the government's right to
create a forum for the dissemination of its own speech, the two lines
of cases came at the issue from different directions. The government
forum cases contemplated limiting the government's right to reserve
a forum exclusively for its own use, while the political advocacy
cases allowed the government to monopolize a forum but restrain
that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education.
Id at 493.
158. It is common for state statutes to require the teaching of patriotism and demo
cratic values in the public schools. E.g., ALA. CODE § 16-40-3(c) (1975) which states:
The direction of study shall be one of orientation in contrasting the government
of the United States of America with the Soviet government. . . . It shall lay
particular emphasis upon the dangers of communism, the ways to fight commu
nism, the evils of communism, the fallacies of communism and the false doc
trines of communism.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1613 (1980) (''The instilling into the hearts of the various pupils of
an understanding of the United States and of a love of country and of a devotion to the
principles of American Government, shall be the primary object of such instruc
tion. . . ."); NEB. REv. STAT. § 79-213(5)(b) (1976) which states
In at least two grades of every high school, at least three periods per week shall
be devoted to the teaching of civics, during which courses specific attention
shall be given to. . . [t)he benefits and advantages of our form of government
and the dangers and fallacies of Nazism, Communism, and similar
ideologies. . . .
159. Some might argue that despite their subtlety, government efforts at indoctri
nation in the educational process are more effective than any direct advocacy engaged in
during the electoral'process. See Hirschoff, supra note 131, at 905-07. While this gener
ally may be true with respect to classroom instruction, it is a much more difficult argu
ment to make convincingly with regard to the school library. Attempts to tailor the
school library collection to indoctrinate certain ideas must contend with the absence· of
required reading assignments and of the infiuential presence of the classroom teacher.
Further, the subtlety of these efforts makes much more difficult the creation of an effec
tive and appropriate remedy for excessive government expression. See Yudof, supra
note 140, at 910-12.
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what the government may say in its exclusive forum. Both of these
principles, however, have application in the school library setting.
If the school is not free to create a library exclusively for its own
use, the consequences would seem to involve either allowing others
to donate books to the school library for placement on the library
shelves, giving library patrons the right to suggest additional titles
for inclusion in the library collection and have those suggestions
judged by constitutionally adequate standards, or at the very least,
allowing students to protest the removal of books from the school's
collection. In this way the school would have the right to attempt to
foster favored ideas in its selections for the library, but students
would have a right to check these efforts by being given a constitu
tionally guaranteed voice in what the library places on its shelves. In
this instance,' the burden for speaking up is on the students them
selves and does not fall directly on school administrators.
The application of the theory of a restricted right of government
expression would have an even greater impact in the school library
setting than the inability to create an exclusive forum. If the govern
ment may create a forum for its own use, but is constrained in the
extent to which it may engage in advocacy in that forum, this would
suggest that the school may not design the library collection with an
eye toward indoctrination of several favored ideas. Outright expul
sions of books because they represent a disfavored position would
come up against this barrier. If the state were to include prolife
abortion literature in the library, but refuse to keep shelved any
prochoice literature arguing in favor of the right to choose an abor
tion, this barrier would be crossed.
The acceptance of either of these positions would lead to some
amount of constitutional restraint on school board decisions to re
move books from the school library. It, however, is clear that these
two arguments are found far afield from the public forum doctrine
routinely cited by courts willing to intervene in book removal cases.
While these courts relied on Brown v. Louisiana 160 and Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District,161 the issue of
whether the school library qualifies as a public forum clearly cannot
be resolved on the basis of these authorities alone. A complete anal
ysis of the public forum status of the school library• book collection
requires a court to grapple with the idea of an involuntary forum
and restrictions on the right of government advocacy. Neither of
160. 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
161. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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these inquiries appear in the book removal cases, thus revealing the
inadequacy of the analysis engaged in by the book removal courts.
B. The Right to Know
It is evident from the discussion of the public forum doctrine

that one difficulty found in applying traditional first amendment
principles to the school library book removal cases is that the plain
tiffs in these cases are not asking to speak. Unlike the students in
Tinker, these student plaintiffs seek access to books removed from
the school library and the right to the information contained in those
missing volumes.
This significant difference between the right to engage in speech
and the right to receive information did not escape the attention of
courts faced with deciding book removal cases. All of the school
library censorship cases considered the nature of the first amend
ment right interfered with by the school board's action. The results
of this consideration, however, varied depending on whether the
court in question adhered to the noninterventionist model or the ju
dicial review model of resolving book removal disputes.
The beginning premise for both kinds of courts is that the first
amendment protects both the speaker and the listener. While agree
ing on this initial assumption, the two lines of cases thereafter go
their separate ways. The noninterventionist courts assert that the
rights of the listener are no greater than those of the speaker. 162 As
the speakers in these cases, the publishers of the removed books,
have no right to have their books retained on the library shelves, it
therefore follows that the readers of the books have no such right. 163
Moreover, the courts go on to assert a second line of defense to the
claim that a constitutionally protected right has been invaded. These
courts point out that because the students have alternative means of
access to the removed books, they have not been deprived of any
right to receive the information contained in the books.l64
162. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 638 F.2d 404,
429 (2d Cir. 1980) (Mansfield, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 385 (1981); Bicknell
v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Dirs., 475 F. Supp. 615,620 (D. Vt. 1979), offd,
638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980).
163. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 638 F.2d 404,
429 (2d Cir. 1980) (Mansfield, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 385 (1981); Bicknell
v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Dirs., 475 F. Supp. 615, 621 (D. Vt. 1979), offd,
638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980).
164. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 638 F.2d 404,
428 (2d Cir. 1980) (Mansfield, J., dissenting), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 385 (1981); Zykan
v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1306 (7th Cir. 1980); Presidents
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A different analysis is offered by courts willing to review book
removal controversies. These courts also rely on the right to know as
established by such Supreme Court cases as Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. :165 "Freedom
of speech presupposes a willing speaker. But where a speaker exists,
as is the case here, the protection afforded is to the communication,
to its source and to its recipients both."166 The willing speaker is
identified as the book itself and the recipient as the student-reader. 167
No examination of the protected interest, if any, of the speaker is
undertaken by these courts. Further, the existence of alternative av
enues of access to the books is regarded as irrelevant. 168
Only one of the cases invalidating such school board action re
lied on a more expansive view of the nature of the student rights
involved. In Right to Read Defense Committee v. School Committee
of Chelsea, 169 the rights of the students were not viewed as reciprocal
rights to those of the speaker. An independent right of access to in
formation was identified: "It is the right of the public to receive suit
able access to social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas and
experiences which is crucial here."17o
The right to "receive information and ideas" relied on in the
book removal cases is firmly established as part of the first amend
ment territory.l7l Whether this right, however, extends so far as to
protect the student-readers is far from clear. The Supreme Court
first definitively recognized the "right to know" as an independent
Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289, 292 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972); Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Dirs., 475
F. Supp. 615, 621 (D. Vt. 1979), affd, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980).
165. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
166. Id at 756 (footnote omitted). This language was quoted by the courts in
Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577,583 (6th Cir. 1976) and Salvail
v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (D.N.H. 1979).
167. Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (D.N.H. 1979).
168. Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1976);
Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 715 n.19 (D. Mass.
1978).
169. 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978).
170. Id at 714 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969».
171. For a sampling of articles documenting this right, see, e.g., Emerson, Legal
Foundations ofthe Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. I; Henkin, The Right to Know and
tlte Duty to Withltold' The Case of the Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 271 (1971);
Note, The Constitutional Right to Know, 4 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 109 (1977); Note, The Right
to Know in First Amendment Analysis, 57 TEX. L. REV. 505 (1979); Note, The First
Amendment Right to Gother State-Held Information, 89 YALE L.J. 923 (1980).
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first amendment right in Lamont v. Postmaster Genera/.l72 In La
mont, the constitutionality of section 305(a) of the Postal Service and
Federal Employees Salary Act of 1962 was challenged. Section
305(a) required that the addressee of a piece of mail identified by the
Post Office as "communist political propaganda" be mailed a notice
that the mail was being held by postal authorities. If the addressee
desired the delivery of the piece of mail, a reply card requesting such
delivery had to be returned within twenty days. Failure to return the
card would result in the destruction of the mail. In Lamont, several
addressees of mail identified as "communist political propaganda"
argued that the statute violated their first amendment rights. The
Court agreed with the challengers and struck down the statute be
cause the requirement that the addressee request a piece of mail be
delivered in order to receive it was found to abridge the first amend
ment rights of the addressees.173
The issue of whether the rights of the recipients were in any way
dependent on the rights of the senders of the mail was raised in La
mont as well. Justice Brennan's concurring opinion took the posi
tion that the "addressees assert First Amendment claims in their own
right."174 While "the First Amendment contains no specific guaran
tee of access to publications,"175 Justice Brennan had no difficulty
identifying such a right as part of the first amendment's protection:
"I think the right to receive publications is such a fundamental right.
The dissemination of ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise will':'
ing addressees are not free to receive and consider them. It would be
a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no buy
ers."176 After Lamont, the right to receive information continued to
be recognized as an independent constitutional right with those as
serting the right being granted standing on their own and not in or
der to assert the rights of absent speakers. The cases, however, as in
Lamont, involved government interference with communication be
tween a willing speaker and a willing listener.
172. 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
173. Id at 307.
174. Id at 308. Justice Brennan noted that the case would present a more trouble
some problem if the addressees were relegated to raising claims dependent on the rights
of the senders. The reason for this was that the addressees then would need to demon
strate a justification for allowing them standing to raise the rights of absent third parties.
Further they would need to establish "First Amendment protection for political propa
ganda prepared and printed abroad by or on behalf of a foreign government." Id
175. Id
176. Id
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In Kleindienst v. Mandel,177 Ernest Mandel, a Belgian citizen
and self-described "revolutionary Marxist," was invited to partici
pate in a series of conferences, lectures, and panel discussions
throughout the United States. To enter the United States, Mandel
applied for but was denied a nonimmigrant visa. The legitimacy of
the government's refusal to issue a visa to Mandel was challenged by
Mandel and a group of eight university professors. The professors
were "persons who invited Mandel to speak at universities and other
forums in the United States or who expected to participate in collo
quia with him so that, as the complaint alleged, 'they may hear his
views and engage him in a free and open academic exchange.' "178
That the interests of those who sought the right to hear Mandel were
independent of Mandel's own constitutional rights was obvious to
the Court. Because Mandel, "as an unadmitted and nonresident
alien, had no constitutional right of entry to this country,"179 appel
lee scholars could not depend on Mandel's rights as the basis for
their claim. Instead, they relied on the right to receive information
and ideas. The Supreme Court, while it ultimately held for the gov
ernment,180 recognized the legitimacy of this claim.l8l The govern
ment's action in this case, as in Lamont, interfered with willing
communication between a speaker and his audience, as Mandel
sought entry to the United States and desired to participate in the
scheduled conferences.
Kleindienst also raised, but did not resolve, another right to
know issue disputed in the library book removal cases. The govern
ment argued in that case that no first amendment infringement had
occurred because appellees had alternative avenues for access to
Mandel's ideas ''through his books and speeches, and because 'tech
nological developments: such as tapes or telephone hook-ups, read
ily supplant his physical presence."182 In responding to this
argument, the Court first pointed out that these alternatives might
177. 40S u.s. 753 (1972).
17S. Id at 759-60.
179. Id at 762.
ISO. Id at 770. In reaching its conclusion, the Court relied on the plenary congres
sional power to exclude aliens. Under § 212(a)(2S) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 27, Congress had delegated this authority to the Executive.
The Court, in reviewing the Executive exercise of this authority, found it to be based on a
facially legitimate and bona fide reason. Id at 769. Under those circumstances, the
Court refused to balance the government justification for its decision to exclude Mandel
against the first amendment rights of those who wished to meet and speak with Mandel.
Id at 770.
lSI. Id at 765.
IS2. Id
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not compensate completely for the benefits of face-to-face communi
cation. 183 As for a final resolution of the relevance of alternatives,
the Court found it unnecessary to resolve the question:
While alternative means of access to Mandel's ideas might be a
relevant factor were we called upon to balance First Amendment
rights against governmental regulatory interests-a balance we
find unnecessary here in light of the discussion that follows in Part
V-we are loath to hold on this record that existence of other al
ternatives extinguishes altogether any constitutional interest on
the part of the appellees in this particular form of access. 184

This statement on the relevance of alternatives left the issue very
much up in the air. While the Court was unwilling to rule out the
relevance of alternatives, it also was unwilling to include them and
express any opinion on how much weight alternatives are to be
given.
The theme of willing speakers and listeners showed up again in
the more recent right to know cases of Procunier v. Martinez l85 and
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc. 186 Procunier involved a challenge, on first amendment
grounds, to the censoring of prisoner mail. The Court, in deciding
the case in favor of the inmates, found it unnecessary to address the
scope of prisoner·first amendment rights. Whatever the scope of
those rights, it was clear to the Court that the first amendment rights
of noninmate correspondents also were being infringed. As in La
mont, the intended recipient of a letter had a constitutionally pro
tected interest. 187 Also as in Lamont, willingness characterized both
sides of the communication in Procunier.
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con
sumer Council, Inc., 188 a ban that prohibited pharmacists from ad
vertising the prices of prescription drugs was attacked. The
challenge to the statute was raised not by a pharmacist but by a per
son required to take prescription drugs on a daily basis and by two
nonprofit organizations. Plaintiffs claimed "that the First Amend
ment entitles the user of prescription drugs to receive information
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
186. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
187. 416 U.S. at 408-09. The Court in Procunier not only protected noninmates
when they were the intended recipients of letters. Noninmates also received protection
from the censoring of their correspondence when they authored letters to prisoners. Id.
188. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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that pharmacists wish to communicate to them through advertising
and other promotional means, concerning the prices of such
drugS."189 The Court agreed that plaintiffs, as willing recipients of
the price information, were entitled to first amendment protection. 190
Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court in Virginia Pharmacy
Board also responded to an argument raised by the dissenting opin
ion of Justice Rehnquist. That argument concerned the relevance of
alternative methods of obtaining drug price information. Despite its
somewhat diffident handling of this issue in Kleindienst v. Mandel,191
the Court in Virginia Pharmacy Board unequivocally declared alter
native methods for obtaining the information to be irrelevant:
The dissent contends that there is no such right to receive the in
formation that another seeks to disseminate, at least not when the
person objecting could obtain the information in another way, and
could himself disseminate it. Our prior decisions, cited above, are
said to have been limited to situations in which the information
sought to be received ''would not be otherwise reasonably avail
able. . . ." We are aware of no general principle that freedom of
speech may be abridged when the speaker's listeners could come
by his message by some other means, such as seeking him out and
asking him what it is. Nor have we recognized any such limitation
on the independent right of the listener to receive the information
sought to be communicated. Certainly, the recipients of the polit
ical publications in Lamont could have gone abroad and thereaf
ter disseminated them themselves. Those in Kleindienst who
organized the lecture tour by a foreign Marxist could have done
the same. And the addressees of the inmate correspondence in
Procunier could have visited the prison themselves. 192

Justice Rehnquist remained far from satisfied with the majority's re
sponse to his argument. He rejected its contention that alternatives
were equally available in Procunier, Kleindienst, and Lamont: "In
Procunier this would have entailed traveling to a state prison; in
Kleindienst and Lamont, traveling abroad. Obviously such measures
would limit access to information in a way that the requirement of a
phone call or a trip to the comer drugstore would not."193
If the majority's position in Virginia Pharmacy Board is ac
cepted as the last word on the issue of alternatives, nonintervention
189. Id at 754.
190. Id at 756-57.

191. 408 U.S. at 765; see text accompanying notes 182-84 supra.
192. 425 U.S. at 757-58 n.15.
193. Id at 783.
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ist courts which point out that students will be able to obtain
removed books through purchase or at other libraries are in error in
their analysis. 194 If the distinction urged by Justice Rehnquist is ac
cepted as viable, however, the position taken by these courts is more
credible. Unlike the situation in Procunier, K(eindienst, and Lamont,
the alternative means of access in the book removal cases are not so
obviously inferior. In these cases there is no loss of face-to-face con
tact with the speaker by being forced to accept an alternative method
of communication. In all cases the means of communication will be
the same: the reading of the book by the student.
Despite the surface appeal of these alternatives, however, they
still may make access to the books involved more difficult for the
student. Purchase of the book as an alternative will involve a
financial outlay not encompassed in the borrowing of the book from
the library. 195 Borrowing the book from a municipal library may not
be all that easily accomplished. The city library may not have a
copy of the book, or it may be shelved in the adult section of the
library. This latter possibility would mean student access would be
come dependent upon the willingness of the student's parents to bor
row the book and give it to the student to read. None of these
alternatives provide as ready access to the book as would be avail
able in the school library. 196 The school library is established for the
194. E.g., Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Dirs., 475 F. Supp. 615,
621 (D. Vt. 1979), affd, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980).
Finally, we note that there has been neither evidence nor argument in this case
that the Board's actions have in fact abridged the student plaintiffs' constitu
tional rights of free expression. Students remain free to purchase the books in
question from private bookstores, to read them in other libraries, to carry them
to school and to discuss them freely during the school day.
Id
195. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 774 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
196. The need to carefully analyze available alternatives to make sure they are
equally effective exists both when the listener is seeking access to information and when
the speaker desires to convey a message. For an example of such scrutiny when a
speaker's preferred communication medium has been banned, see Linmark Associates,
Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977). In that case, an ordinance prohibit
ing the use of real estate "For Sale" signs was found to violate the first amendment. In
finding that the ordinance did not leave the sellers of property with ample alternative
methods for communication, the Court remarked:
Although in theory sellers remain free to employ a number of different alterna
tives, in practice realty is not marketed through leafiets, sound trucks, demon
strations, or the like. The options to which sellers realistically are relegated
primarily newspaper advertising and listing with real estate agents-involve
more cost and less autonomy than "For Sale" signs; are less likely to reach
persons not deliberately seeking sales information; and may be less effective
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benefit of the students and exists as a readily available source of
books. Thus, even if equally available alternatives were to be con
sidered a relevant factor in the court's analysis, reasonable minds
could differ on the issue of whether such alternatives exist in the
book removal cases. Under either the view of the majority or the
dissent in Virginia Pharmacy Board, the possibility of alternative
methods of obtaining removed books need not affect the outcome of
the right to know issue.
The elimination of the barrier posed by the existence of alterna
tive methods of access to removed books, however, does not resolve
all problems raised by the application of the right to know doctrine.
There is still the requirement that the relationship between speaker
and listener be a voluntary one. The question arises whether the
term "voluntary" accurately describes the speaker/listener relation
ship in the context of the book removal cases.
The first step in answering this question is to determine the
identity of the speaker. The identity of the listener is not in doubt.
The student-readers desire access to the library books and the benefit
of the information contained in the books, thereby qualifying them
as willing listeners. Three possible speakers, however, must be con
sidered: The publisher, the author, and the school board.
Addressing the first two possibilities, it is difficult to see how the
interests of the publisher and the author differ in any significant way.
As the disseminator of the book, the publisher stands in the shoes of
a speaker. 191 Similarly, the author of the book, having penned the
words contained in the book, is speaking through its pages. To this
extent one can argue that the government in the form of the school
board is interfering with the relationship between a willing speaker
(the publisher or author) and a willing listener (the student-reader).
The speaker/listener relationship, however, is not a direct one. The
publisher or author has not attempted to sell or mail the book to the
student and had that activity interrupted. Here the speaker and lis
tener were able to communicate because of government purchase of
the book. This is a much more active government role in the transmedia for communicating the message that is conveyed by a "For Sale" sign in
front of the house to be sold.
Id at 93 (citations omitted).
197. Cf. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 64 n.6 (1963) (while the
Rhode Island Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth purported to regulate only.
. the distribution of books, the publisher of books found "objectionable" by the Commis
sion could assert an independent constitutional claim based on the first amendment's free
press guarantee).
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action than is found in any of the other right to know cases. In at
least one of those cases, the transaction was purely private. 198 In
Virginia Pharmacy Board, the pharmacist purchased advertising
space in an appropriate place and the consumer was able to see or
hear that advertising. The first amendmen~ simply prevented the
government from interfering in that private transmission of informa
tion. No affirmative obligation was imposed on the government,
such as providing the pharmacist with a place in which to advertise.
In Lamont and Procunier, the government's role was a slightly more
active one. The speech was transmitted by the use of the postal serv
ice. As the Court, however, remarked in Lamont:
Whatever may have been the voluntary nature of the postal
system in the period of its establishment, it is now the main artery
through which the business, social, and personal affairs of the peo
ple are conducted and upon which depends in a greater degree
than upon any other activity of government the promotion of the
general welfare. 199

The government's role in the transaction was the passive one of not
denying the use of the postal system to two willing private communi
cators. The system generally was available to all on the same terms
and the government simply was prevented from interfering with its
use. This negative prohibition on government action again was not
the imposition of an affirmative duty to aid the communication be
tween the speaker and the listener. 2OO
198. The speaker/listener relationship was purely private in Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557 (1969), although the setting made irrelevant any inquiry into the exact na
ture of the means by which information was transmitted. In Stanley, appellant was con
victed of "knowingly hav[ingJ possession of ... obscene matter." Id. at 558. The
Supreme Court ruled that punishment for the mere private possession of obscene materi
als was not permitted under the first amendment. Id at 568. The rights asserted by
appellant in the case were described by the Court as follows: "He is asserting the right to
read or observe what he pleases-the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs
in the privacy of his own home. He is asserting the right to be free from state inquiry into
the contents of his library." Id at 565. Because of the unprotected nature of the speech
in Stanley, the only protection afforded was to the possessor of such material in the pri
vacy of his home. The seller of the material had no reciprocal right to disseminate the
material. Therefore, under the unusual circumstances of Stanley, the government was
prevented from interfering with private possession of obscene material, but could punish
the commercial distribution of this material. United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351
(1971).
199. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 305 n.3 (1965) (quoting Pike v.
Walker, 121 F.2d 37, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1941».
200. The distinction made here is further supported by the Supreme Court's opin
ion in United States Postal Servo v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 101 S. Ct. 2676
(1981). In that case, the Court found that appellees had no first amendment right to use
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It is at this point that the right to know doctrine and the public
forum doctrine meet in the book removal cases. If the government
activity required in order to bring about contact between speaker
and listener is constitutionally mandated, the right to know doctrine
is easy to apply. Such a constitutional mandate will exist whenever
the speaker/listener relationship is to be consummated in a place
that has been identified as a public forum. This result will follow
whether the government has voluntarily created a forum or had a
forum forced upon it by the operation of the involuntary forum doc
trine. In either case the existence of a public forum gives rise to con
stitutionally protected interests on the part of both speakers and
listeners.201 Alternatively, if no forum exists the government is not
free to interfere with a private meeting of speaker and listener, but
takes on no special obligation to bring about their meeting. For ex
ample, if a speaker wishes to rent out a municipal auditorium in
order to reach an audience, a member of the prospective audience
also can sue on the basis of the right to know, claiming the munici
pality's refusal to rent the hall is unconstitutional.202 Because the
city has created a forum available for speech, it must make it avail
able to all on a nondiscriminatory basis. The city, by its establish
ment of the auditorium, has taken upon itself the obligation of
providing a forum in which the speaker and listener can find each
other. On the other hand, suppose a speaker wishes to rent a public
school auditorium but that auditorium is not made available to
outside groups and the court is unwilling to find it to be an involun
tary forum. In this setting, while the listener may have a constitu
tionally recognized right to know, that right standing alone will not
be enough to force the school to provide the speaker with a place to
speak. 203
Applying this same reasoning to the publisher or author in the
letter boxes for the deposit of unstamped civic notices. While the Postal Service could
not restrict appellees' right to use the mails to circulate their notices based on the content
of the notices, id at 2684, the Postal Service had no affirmative obligation to make letter
boxes available for the deposit of letters that bore no postage.
201. This explanation dovetails with the situation in Lamont v. Postmaster Gen
eral, 381 U.S. 301 (1965). The characteristics of the postal system described in that case
make it easy to characterize the system as a voluntary public forum. Since the govern
ment has voluntarily created a forum by which to transmit communication between the
sender and the recipient of a piece of mail, it follows that the recipient has a right to
challenge wrongful exclusions from the use of that system.
202. See Smith v. University of Tenn., 300 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. Tenn. 1969); Brooks
v. Auburn Univ., 296 F. Supp. 188 (M.D. Ala.), affd, 412 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969).
203. Lawrence Univ. Bicentennial Comm'n v. City of Appleton, 409 F. Supp.
1319,1324 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (''The state is under no duty to make school buildings avail
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role of the speaker and the student-reader cast as the listener, the
right to know fails to provide a self-sufficient basis for first amend
ment protection. While the right to know in this guise provides the
student with standing to complain about the book removal, a suc
cessful result from the plaintiffs point of view will depend on the
plaintiffs ability to argue that a public forum has been created in the
form of the school library collection. While the rights of the listener
are independent of the rights of the speaker, the right to know doc
trine, while a necessary part of the plaintiff's case, is not a sufficient
argument to sustain that case.
Still relying on right to know principles, the task now is to deter
mine if any theory exists whereby the right to know can be viewed as
a self-sufficient basis for judicial review in library book removal dis
putes. This attempt will involve an alternative analysis in which the
government in the form of the school board steps into the speaker's
shoes. In this analysis the focus is on the government's role in creat
ing the library and stocking it with books. For purposes of the right
to know, it is possible to say that the government is speaking through
the books it places on the library shelves. Unfortunately, from this
perspective, the government as speaker in a book removal situation
is far from willing. Since the school has removed the book from the
library shelves, the government has indicated its unwillingness to
continue to speak.
The question raised by this alternative analysis is whether the
right to know extends to situations in which the relationship is be
tween an unwilling speaker and a willing listener. Two cases are
relevant to this point. In both Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC204
and Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,20S the problem of the un
willing speaker received attent~on. In Red Lion, the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of Federal Communication Commission
. (FCC) rules adopted to implement the fairness doctrine. The fair
ness doctrine requires that broadcasters devote time to the discussion
of public issues and that fair coverage be given to each side of an
issue. To aid in the enforcement of the fairness doctrine, in 1967 the
FCC promulgated rules to govern personal attacks made in the
course of discussing controversial public issues and to regulate the
tight to reply to political editorials. These new rules were challenged
able for public meetings.") (quoting Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal.
2d 536, 545, 171 P.2d 885, 891 (1946».
204. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).

205. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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on both constitutional and statutory grounds. The constitutional
claim made by the broadcasters was that the first amendment pro
tected their right to broadcast what they chose. 206 The Supreme
Court responded to this argument by relying on the unique character
of the electronic broadcast media, especially the scarcity of spectrum
frequencies:
Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the government is
permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose
views should be expressed on this unique medium. But the people
as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their
collective right to have the medium function consistently with the
ends and purposes of the First Amendment. 207

Contrary to the broadcasters' claim, the Court found a first amend
ment interest to adhere, not to the broadcasters, but to the audience
of viewers and listeners:
It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhib
ited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail,
rather than to countenance monopolization of that market,
whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee. . . .
It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social,
political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences which is
crucial here. That right may not constitutionally be abridged ei
ther by Congress or by the FCC.20S

The Court in Red Lion found a right to view and listen and
allowed that right to be implemented even at the expense of an un
willing broadcaster. RedLion, however, is only of limited preceden
tial value in the school library context. First, the obligation on the
unwilling broadcaster is imposed by statute. There is no suggestion
that such an obligation would flow directly from the first amendment
in the absence of a statute. 209 Second, there is the unique nature of
206. 395 U.S. at 386.
207. Id at 390.
208. Id
209. The Court in Red Lion avoided the need to decide if the first amendment
would dictate a version of the fairness doctrine, even in the absence of any FCC require
ment, by the simple expedient of assuming the broadcast companies are private broad
casters. In the absence of a finding of sufficient government activity on the pan of the
broadcasters to bring into play the first amendment, the Court was free to ignore the
issue of whether the first amendment guarantees certain access rights to governmentally
sponsored broadcast stations. On this question see, Comment, Access to Stale-Owned
Communications Media-The Public Forum Doctrines, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1410 (1979).
In a later case, Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94 (1973), the Court for the first time addressed both the question of whether the
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the broadcast industry to consider. 210 These factors make it difficult
to draw out of Red Lion a constitutional obligation for the govern
ment to speak, even if unwilling.
A more recent case, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,211
may provide firmer support for such a proposition. In Richmond
Newspapers the Court addressed the question of ''whether the right
of the public and press to attend criminal trials is guaranteed under
the United States Constitution."212 To find an answer to this ques
activities of the electronic broadcast media are sufficiently governmental to require the
application of first amendment principles and whether, assuming they are, the first
amendment would guarantee members of the public access to broadcast time to air their
views. Unfortunately, while the Court addressed both these questions, no clear consen
sus developed on the government action question. The case raised these issues in the
context of a .challenge to a broadcaster's refusal to sell air time for editorial advertise
ments. While the Court held for the broadcaster, a majority was formed by a combina
tion offour Justices (Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist, and Douglas)
who believed the first amendment did not apply to the broadcaster, and three Justices
(Justices White, Blackmun, and Powell) who reasoned that, even assuming the first
amendment did apply, the fairness doctrine and its policy of allowing broadcasters lee
way in deciding how to comply with its requirements was consistent with the first amend
ment. The remaining two Justices (Justices Brennan and Marshall) dissented on the
ground that there was sufficient government involvement to require the application of
first amendment principles and that those principles required "that citizens be permitted
at least some opportunity to speak directly for themselves as genuine advocates on issues
that concern them." Id. at 189-90 (emphasis in original). While no majority of Justices
was found on either side of the government action question, there was a majority in
agreement that, if applicable, the first amendment would not require the selling of time
for editorial advertisements. Five Justices shared this view although the conclusion was
dictum for three of the five because they had previously found the first amendment inap
plicable to the case. Four Justices, however, suggested that the first amendment would
impose an obligation to allow access to the broadcast station to members of the public
since, under those circumstances, the station would have to be viewed as a public forum.
210. The Court has continued to adhere to the distinction between the broadcast
industry and other communications media that it relied on in Red Lion. In Miami Her
ald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), the Court struck down a statute that
gave a candidate for political office a right to reply to newspaper criticism. Despite the
similarity between the Florida right to reply law and the FCC regulations upheld in Red
Lion, the Florida statute was held to be a violation of the first amendment's guarantee of
freedom of the press. The Court, in reaching its conclusion, refused to adopt an analogy
between the scarcity of broadcast frequencies and the increasing concentration of press
ownership in the hands of large media conglomerates. Id. at 256-57. The unique charac
ter of the broadcast industry was also a factor justifying regulation in FCC v. National
Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978) (upholding FCC regulations bar
ring common ownership of a radio or television station and a daily newspaper located in
the same community).
211. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
212. Id. at 558. The Court specifically limited its decision to criminal trials. The
question of a right of access to civil trials was left unresolved. The Court, however, did
note that the tradition of openness it identified as an aspect of the criminal trial also
applied to the civil trial. Id. at 580 n.17.
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tion, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, in an opinion
joined by Justices White and Stevens, first traced the uncontradicted
history of openness in the court system at both English common law
and in the American colonies. The Chief Justice then found a con
stitutional recognition of this important common-law tradition in
herent in the first amendment guarantees: "In guaranteeing
freedoms such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment
can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as
to give meaning to those explicit guarantees."213
As Richmond Newspapers arose out of a request by defendant to
have the press and the public excluded from his criminal trial, the
government was not interfering with willing communication by
granting his request. The government, however, by finding merit in
defendant's motion, implicitly became the custodian of speech it was
unwilling to let go public. The media representatives, as surrogates
for the public, sought to enforce a right of access to the information
the government refused to release. The Court, in responding to this
claim of a right to know what went on in the courtroom, once again
recognized the constitutional protection afforded listener status:
Free speech carries with it some freedom to listen. "In a variety of
contexts this Court has referred to a First Amendment right to
'receive information and ideas.''' What this means in the context
of trials is that the First Amendment guarantees of speech and
press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily clos
ing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at
the time that amendment was adopted. 214

In order to protect the listeners' rights, the Court made it clear that

the government is not free, without compelling reasons, to oust the
public from the courtroom. 2lS
The question arises whether this imposition on an unwilling
speaker necessarily is based on an extension of right to know princi
ples. The answer appears to be that it is not. By the Court's own
statements in Richmond Newspapers, the explanation for why the
government is not entitled to summarily close the courtroom is
found in the history of openness that surrounds the criminal trial:
"[A] trial courtroom also is a public place where the people gener
ally-and representatives of the media-have· a right to be present,
213. Id at 575.
214. Id at 576 (citation omitted).
215. The Court left open the question of what circumstances would be sufficient to
justify the closure of all or part of a criminal trial. Id at 581-S2 n.1S.
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and where their presence historically has been thought to enhance
the integrity and quality of what takes place."216 By comparing the
trial courtroom to other "places traditionally open to the public,"217
such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, Chief Justice Burger placed the
courtroom alongside other traditional public forums. Thus, under
the analysis of the right to know doctrine developed previously,2lS
Richmond Newspapers can be seen as a case in which the right to
know alone is not a constitutionally sufficient basis for the result.
That the courtroom is considered to be a traditional public forum is
critical. Because such a forum exists, the government is not free to
close it to listeners. 219
While it may be possible to draw out of Richmond Newspapers
the beginnings of a right to information from an unwilling govern
ment, the Court really had no need to reach that question in the case.
The issue of what other institutions of government have this same
history of openness such that access to them cannot be restricted eas
ily was not addressed by the Court.220 Further, the broader question
of whether a right of access will be guaranteed even in the absence of
such a history was not even hinted at by the Court. Only the concur
ring opinion of Justice Stevens reflected on the possible future reper
cussions of the case:
This is a watershed case. Until today the Court has accorded
virtually absolute protection to the dissemination of information
or ideas, but never before has it squarely held that the acquisition
216. Id. at 578.
217. Id. at 577.
218. See text accompanying notes 201-03 supra.
219. As a forum, separate from its role as a tribunal in our criminal justice system,
the courtroom is peculiarly a forum for listeners. Use for most speech purposes would
disrupt the primary activity taking place in the courtroom: the trial of criminal cases.
There are exceptions, of course. For example, the wearing of a black armband by a
spectator in a courtroom is no more disruptive than it was in the schoolroom in Tinker.
220. The only reference by the Court to this larger issue came in the form of a
finding that prisons, like military bases, do not enjoy a history of openness and "are not
'open' or public places." 448 U.S. at 576 n.ll. The Court, therefore, was able to distin
guish the prior cases of Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). and Saxbe v. Washington
Post Co.• 417 U.S. 843 (1974). in which the Court rejected press claims of a right of access
to penal institutions for the purpose offace-ta-face interviews with inmates designated by
the press representatives. In both Pell and Saxbe. however. the Court was careful to
point out that the press had not been denied the same rights of access that were available
to the general public. The Court in Richmond Newspapers was not faced with the ques
tion of whether the media have greater access rights than the general public and thus the
cases are distinguishable on that ground as well. 448 U.S. at 584 n.2 (Brennan. I.,
concurring).
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of newsworthy matter is entitled to any constitutional protection
whatsoever. . . .
. . . Today, however, for the first time, the Court unequivo
cally holds that an arbitrary interference with access to important
information is an abridgment of the freedoms of speech and of the
press protected by the First Amendment. 221
Justice Stevens extended his remarks further and also commented
that he found the Court's willingness to find a right of access to crim
inal trials "somewhat ironic" in light of its prior refusals to recognize
a similar right of access to penal institutions. 222 Even Justice Stevens
chose not to speculate on the possible future scope of the right to
information about the operation of government suggested by Rich
mond Newspapers.
The possibility of a more generalized first amendment right to
information from an unwilling government, while having little basis
in case law, has been urged by a variety of commentators. 223 In a
221. 448 u.s. at 582-83.
222. Id at 583. Justice Stevens' comment is directed at the Court's earlier decision
in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. I (1978). Ip that case, KQED news personnel were
denied access to the Greystone portion of the Alameda County Jail other than as mem
bers of monthly public tours scheduled at the facility. KQED complained that: I) The
tours did not provide adequate media access because the scheduled tours were limited to
25 persons; 2) once this number was signed up media representatives were denied access;
3) the tours did not include parts of the jail involved in allegations of brutality and
substandard conditions; 4) no cameras or tape recorders were permitted; and 5) inmates
generally were kept from the view of tour members and could not be interviewed during
the tour. Id at 5. In rejecting a claim by KQED of a first amendment right of access to
the jail, Chief Justice Burger stated: "Neither the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth
Amendment mandates a right of access to governmental information or sources of infor
mation within the government's control." Id at 15. Only Justices White and Rehnquist
joined Chief Justice Burger's opinion. Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment. While
agreeing with the Chief Justice that the press was entitled only to receive treatment equal
to that of the general public in questions of access to government-held information, Jus
tice Stewart argued for a more flexible definition of equal access. He recognized that
there might be times when the terms of access applied to the general public would ''be
unreasonable as applied to journalists who are there to convey to the general public what
the visitors see." Id at 17. This four member majority was sufficient to outvote the
dissent of Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Powell since Justices Marshall and Blackmun
took no part in the consideration of the case. Therefore, despite a decision denying the
journalists' claim of a first amendment right of access, no majority of the Court sup
ported such a result.
223. E.g., Klein, Towards an Extension ofthe First Amendment: A Right ofAcquisi
tion, 20 U. MIAMI L. REv. 114 (1965); Parks, TIle Open Government Principle: Applying
the Right to Know Under the Constitution, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REv. I (1957); Steel, Free
dom to Hear: A Political Justtfication of the First Amendment, 46 WASH. L. REv. 311
(1971); Note, TIle Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather Information, 87 HARV. L.
REv. 1505 (1974); Note, Access to O.fficiallnformalion: A Neglected Constitutional Right,
27 IND. L.l. 209 (1952); Note, Access to Govemmentlnformalion and the Classification
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seminal article written in 1976, Professor Emerson argued for the
existence of "a constitutional right in the public to obtain informa
tion from government sources necessary or proper for the citizen to
perform his function as ultimate sovereign."224 According to Profes
sor Emerson, "this right would extend, as a starting point, to all in
formation in the possession of government."225 Whether an
extension of the right to know along these lines would incorporate a
right of access to books removed from the public school library is
open to doubt. One question that must be asked is whether such
information is relevant to the process of self-government. It could be
argued that as prospective self-governors, all information is relevant
to the future effective functioning of young citizens. Education fur
thers the goal of training young people to assume their roles as par
ticipants in our political system, thus the better their education, and
the more ideas they are exposed to, the more effectively they will
fu1fi11 this future role. But this argument leads us into the realm of
the house that Jack built. Certainly, knowledge of the contents of a
removed book is not as directly related to self-government as knowl
edge of the workings of one of our government institutions, such as
the courts. Second, the information being sought is not especially
governmental in nature: It is not a document prepared by govern
ment officials relevant to some official action, nor is it access to a
government institution to examine its workings, such as a prison. In
itially, the book in question is placed in the private domain and
made available through the commercial marketplace to all who wish
to purchase it. The government has made it available through the
alternative mechanism of a loan from a government run library, but
query whether this transforms the book into the equivalent of gov
ernment information. Thus, even this scholarly expansion of the
right to know does not easily incorporate access to removed school
library books.
One further extension of the right to know may be somewhat
more helpful in this regard. Professor Emerson also has suggested
one additional aspect of the right to know doctrine:
A third use of the right to know as protection against govern
ment interference with the system of freedom of expression arises
Process-Is There a Riglttto Know?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 814 (1971); Note, supra note 171,89
L.J. 923 (1980). But see O'Brien, The First Amendment and tlte Public's "Riglttto
Know," 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 579 (1980).
224. Emerson, supra note 171, at 16.
225. Id.

YALE

1981)

PUBLIC SCHOOL LIBRARY CENSORSHIP

59

in certain situations when the government itself engages in expres
sion. The government of course is entitled to participate in the
system of freedom of expression and, while its contribution may at
times tend to drown out others, no constitutional objection can
normally be entered. Under some circumstances, however, the
government may possess a monopoly, or a near monopoly, of the
means of communication. Here restrictions on the government
are necessary to prevent a serious distortion of the system. For
this difficult task, a limiting principle may be found in the right to
know.
For example, in the field of public education, where the gov
ernment has a virtual monopoly, certain kinds of curriculum re
strictions seem to run afoul of the right to know. Thus in Epperson
v. Arkansas, the Supreme Court considered an Arkansas statute
which prohibited teaching the doctrine of evolution in the public
schools. A majority of the Court found that the law violated the
establishment clause of the first amendment, but the Court might
better have placed its decision upon a violation of the right to
know. Similarly in the area of public broadcasting, the right to
know would seem to compel the public broadcaster to present a
reasonably balanced view on issues of public interest. The
Supreme Court has not thu,s far employed right to know doctrines
in this way, but the concepts are applicable and should be
utilized. 226

This argument, striking many of the same chords as the concept of
an involuntary public forum discussed earlier,227 is not as clearly rel
evant in the school library as in the classroom setting described by
Professor Emerson. Students in the classroom are a captive audience
for the receipt of government ideas. 228 In this way the government
monopolizes their education. Students in the school library are not
equally captives for particular ideas. Books are available on a vol
untary basis. While students may be required to spend some time in
the school library, they usually will not be required to read certain
books during that time. The concept of required reading is associ
ated with course materials for classroom use. 229 Further, the school
226. Id at 7-8 (footnote omitted).
227. See discussion of involuntary forum in text accompanying notes 89-161 supra.
228. Comment, supra note II, at 497-99.
229. Challenges to material selected for required classroom reading occasionally
have been brought by students and their parents. All of these suits have been unsuccess
ful. E.g., Williams v. Board of Educ., 388 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. W. Va. 1975); Todd v.
Rochester Community Schools, 41 Mich. App. 320, 200 N.W.2d 90 (Ct. App. 1972); Car
roll v. Lucas, 39 Ohio Misc. 5, 313 N.E.2d 864 (C.P. 1974); In re Mitchell, 13 N.Y.S.
Educ. Dept. Rep. 228 (1974).
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library may be monopolized by the government because it has total
control over the book selection process, but the government message
is much more muted in the many volumes on the library shelves than
it is when it speaks through the person ofthe classroom teacher. The
teacher's labeling of some ideas as true and others as false may be
given almost conclusive weight by impressionable school age chil
dren. 23o A book read in the school library does not so obviously
come with a government seal of approval. Unlike the teacher in the
classroom, no government voice has preached the ideas contained in
its pages and identified them as true. The assumption that if a book
is in the library it must be true is an improbable one. Students are
unlikely to equate library shelf space with school approval. There
fore, even under this extension of the right to know doctrine, the
doctrine would have difficulty reaching the library shelves.
Thus, just as with the public forum doctrine, the right to know
doctrine does not easily extend to cover the problem of library book
removal. The majority of the case law deals with government inter
ruption of communication between a willing private speaker and lis
tener. In the book removal cases, the student as listener and the
publisher or author as speaker certainly are willing. No enforceable
right to know, however, protects their relationship without the addi
tional finding that the school library serves as a public forum. Alter
natively, if the government assumes the speaker's position, the
speaker ceases to be a willing one. While this speaker/listener rela
tionship exists independent of reliance on public forum priIiciples, it
requires the extension of right to know theory to cover the listener's
right to obtain information from an unwilling government speaker.
Such a result, while arguably suggested in case law and scholarship,
will not necessarily extend to the library book removal situation.
These complexities are virtually ignored in the decided censorship
cases. The library book removal courts, in this aspect of their analy
sis as in their public forum discussions, have failed in their task of
adequately applying first amendment principles to the facts
presented to them.
Cj Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 78-79 (1979).
[A] teacher serves as a role model for his students, exerting a subtle but impor
tant influence over their perceptions and values. Thus, through both the pres
entation of course materials and the example he sets, a teacher has an
opportunity to in1luence the attitudes of students toward government, the polit
ical process, and a citizen's social responsibilities.
Id (footnote omitted).
230.
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of a Standard of Review

If a court were to overcome the many first amendment hurdles

placed in the path of judicial review of book removal disputes, the
question of the scope of review would need to be addressed. With
the threshold question of the existence of a constitutionally protected
right out of the way, the merits of the dispute would next invite judi
cial scrutiny. This aspect of the decisionmaking process itself in
volves a host of difficult first amendment questions.
In initially turning to the decisions of book removal courts, one
major difficulty in the selection of a standard of review becomes ap
parent. The first sign of this difficulty is found in the decisions of
noninterventionist courts. One reason pointed to for their decision
not to review is the difficulty of identifying any adequate standard
for review. The point is made that the process of stocking a library
collection is inevitably and continuously content-based.231 Since
shelf space and funding are finite resources, decisions constantly
must be made about the comparative worth of books. One kind of
decision will involve whether books on a particular topic should be
included in the collection. Reasons such as lack ofstudent interest in
an area or the exclusion of an area from the school's curriculum
might cause a particular subject- not to be included in the school's
collection. Another kind of decision arises once a topic is slated for
inclusion in the collection. The various books on that topic must be
examined to determine which should be included in the collection. 232
231. Zykan v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1308 (7th Cir.
1980).
232. This examination usually will not involve a first hand appraisal of available
books by the school librarian. Since such an examination often would be an impossible
task, the librarian will rely on secondary sources such as book review journals and other
publications, the reputation of the publisher of a book, and the reputation of the author
of a book in order to select books for the library collection. A description of the decision
making process that went into a school librarian's decision to shelve a particular book is
contained in one of the cases raising a successful challenge to a book removal:
Coleman [the librarian) read the book's introduction and scanned its contents,
but did not read City, the poem which is the subject of this litigation.
Coleman felt that Male & FemoJe would be useful for students taking ado
lescent literature and creative writing courses, particularly because it would
give them an opportunity to see the variety of ways in which other students
expressed themselves. She recognized the anthology's two editors as highly re
garded professionals, and the publisher, Avon books, as having a good reputa
tion in the area of young adult literature. These considerations, plus her own
review, caused Coleman to place the anthology in the High School Library dur
ing March of 1976.
Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 706 (D. Mass. 1978)
(footnote omitted). For a list of the book review journals commonly relied on by librari
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This decision will be a function of a variety of factors such as how
many books in the area are suitable for the overall balance of the
collection and which are the "best" of the available books on that
topic. After the collection is initially compiled, a constant process of
updating is necessary. For instance, new topics may be added and
new books may be purchased and old ones discarded. These deci
sions are inescapably content-based.
Noninterventionist courts respond to this fact of life in the book
selection process by resolving to leave such unavoidable questions of
book suitability to the discretion of the elected school board mem
bers. Such courts consider a sch~ol board's proper function to be the
implementation of an educational system that transmits the ba:;ic
shared values of the community to its youth. 233 The federal courts
especially. in attempting to keep the proper state/federal balance,
should rarely intrude in this process of value transmission.
Courts that feel free to intervene in book removal cases are not
so willing to concede that all selection decisions are unavoidably
content-based, at least, to be more accurate, book retention deci
sions. These courts see a distinction between the initial selection
process, a process they see as raising fewer constitutional problems,
and decisions to remove already shelved books. 234 For these courts,
removal decisions are divided into three categories: (1) Content
neutral decisions; (2) constitutionally valid content-based decisions;
and (3) constitutionally invalid content-based decisions. Despite
identifying three categories, all of the decided cases in which a re
view of the merits occurred conclude that the situation presented to
the court falls into the third category.23S It therefore is difficult to
ans, see Comment, Censoring tlte Scltool Library: Do Students Have tlte Riglttto Read?,
10 CONN. L. REv. 747, 755 n.46 (1978).
233. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 638 F.2d 404,
426 (2d Cir. 1980) (Mansfield, I., dissenting), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 385 (1981); Zykan
v. Warsaw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1304 (7th Cir. 1980).
234. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 638 F.2d 404,
436 (2d Cir. 1980) (Newman, I., concurring), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 385 (1981);
Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1976); Salvail v.
Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (D.N.H. 1979); Right to Read Defense
Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 712 (D. Mass. 1978). For a discussion of the
related problem of challenges to the book selection process, see text accompanying notes
333-56 infra.
235. In Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976),
the removed books were described as "completely sick" and "GARBAGE." Id at 58!.
The court held that the school board was not free to remove a book because it found its
content to be distasteful. In Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H.
1979), the court held the removal of Ms. to be constitutionally improper because it was
based on objections to the political content of the magazine. Id at 1274. Finally, in
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discern much in the way of hard and fast rules on the specifics of this
tripartite classification scheme. Some rationales for removal are
identified as content neutral. These include the obsolescence of a
book, a lack of shelf space, and the wearing out of a copy of a
book. 236 Among the potential constitutionally valid content-based
justifications for book removal are that the book can be character
ized as containing unprotected speech such as obscenity,237 and that
a substantial government interest, such as education, is furthered by
the removal. 238 Constitutionally invalid content-based removals in
clude a dislike for the political content of a publication239 and a dis
taste for the offensive language contained in a work. 240
These courts, like their noninterventionist counterparts, recog
nize the need to leave school policymaking in the hands of school
officials. When basic constitutional values are at stake, however, in
tervention is deemed appropriate. The very importance of education
to our system of government is viewed as requiring that courts be
especially protective of first amendment rights in the schools. 241
While striking a proper balance between leaving the control of the
schools to school authorities and keeping an ever vigilant eye on first
amendment rights may be a difficult task, it is a task that the consti
tution irrevocably assigns to the courts.
The differences between interventionist and noninterventionist
courts on this point .underscore a question of general concern in first
amendment analysis. That question is whether and to what extent
the government is permitted to make distinctions about speech pro
tected by the first amendment based on its content.242 This issue of
Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703 (D. Mass. 1978), the
district court found that the removal of a poem, ''The City to a Young Girl," was imper
missibly motivated by the school committee's objection to the poem's use of vulgar lan
guage. Id at 713.
236. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 638 F.2d 404,
434 (2d Cir. 1980) (Newman, J., concurring), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 385 (1981);
Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 1976); Right to
Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 711 (D. Mass. 1978).
237. Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1273 (D.N.H. 1979).
238. Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703,713 (D.
Mass. 1978).
239. Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 638 F.2d 404,
434 (2d Cir. 1980) (Newman, J., concurring), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 385 (1981); Salvail
v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (D. N.H. 1979).
240. Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 713-14
(D. Mass. 1978).
241. Id at 710.
242. On this question, see generally Farber, Content Regulation and The First
Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727 (1980); Stone, Restrictions of Speech
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differential treatment of speech by government depending on its con
tent was placed in sharp focus in Police Department of Chicago v.
Mosley.243 Mosley was a challenge to a Chicago ordinance banning
picketing within close proximity to any public school building while
school was in session. The one exception to. this restriction was for
peaceful labor picketing of a school involved in a labor dispute. 244
The Supreme Court held the ordinance to be unconstitutional be
cause of the distinction it drew between labor and other kinds of
picketing. The Court was outspoken in its hostility to content con
trol: "But, above all else, the First Amendment means that govern
ment has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content."24S This and other similar
sentiments expressed by the Mosley Court turned Mosley into a bat
tle cry for those opposing content censorship.
While the result in Mosley was by a unanimous Court, later
cases raising a similar problem split the Court sharply. Two cases
especially highlight this conflict. In Young v. American Mini Thea
tres, Inc. 246 and FCC v. Pac!ftca Foundation 247 battle lines were
drawn on the question of content discrimination. American Mini
Theatres raised the issue in the context of a Detroit zoning ordinance
which differentiated between motion picture theatres exhibiting
adult films and other movie theatres. In the first paragraph of his
opinion, Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, posed the question of
the ordinance's constitutionality in terms of whether the statutory
scheme was improperly based on the content of protected speech. 248
In a part of his opinion joined only by Chief Justice Burger and
Because ofits Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Maller Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L.
HARV. L. REv. 58, 196-205 (1976);
Note, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.: Creating Levels of Protected Speech, 4
HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 321 (1977).
243. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
244. The ordinance challenged in Mosley provided as follows:
A person commits disorderly conduct when he knowingly:

REv. 81 (1978); The Supreme Court, 197.5 Term, 90

(i) Pickets or demonstrates on a public way within ISO feet of any primary
or secondary school building while the school is in session and one-half hour
before the school is in session and one-half hour after the school session has
been concluded, provided that this subsection does not prohibit the peaceful
picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute. . . . Municipal Code, c.
193-1 (i).
408 U.S. at 92-93.
245. Id at 95.
246. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
247. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
248. 427 U.S. at 52.
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Justices White and Rehnquist, Justice Stevens cautioned against
overstating the impact of the Mosley equality principle. 249 Mosley
had to be analyzed in light of its facts and contrasted to other cases
in which the Court approved of basing constitutional distinctions on
the content of speech. With Mosley cut down to its proper size, Jus
tice Stevens was free to conclude that society's interest in protecting
the kind of expression contained in erotic materials was "of a wholly
different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled
political debate."2so This lesser interest justified subjecting sexually
explicit motion pictures to a different regulatory system than other
films.
Justice Stewart, in a dissent joined by Justices Brennan, Mar
shall, and Blackmun, expressed his outrage at the Court's "drastic
departure from established principles of First Amendment law":251
By refusing to invalidate Detroit's ordinance the Court rides
roughshod over cardinal principles of First Amendment law,
which require that time, place, and manner regulations that affect
protected expression be content neutral except in the limited con
text of a captive or juvenile audience. In place of these principles
the Court invokes a concept wholly alien to the First Amendment.
Since "few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to
preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual Activities' ex
hibited in the theaters of our choice," the Court implies that these
films are not entitled to the full protection of the Constitution.
This stands "Voltaire's immortal comment" on its head. For if the
guarantees of the First Amendment were reserved for expression
that more than a "few of us" would take up arms to defend, then
the right of free expression would be defined and circumscribed
by current popular opinion. The guarantees of the Bill of Rights
were designed to protect against p:ecisely such majoritarian limi
tations on individualliberty.2s2
249. Id at 65-70. While only four Justices ascribed to the view that sexually ex
plicit expression was entitled to less protection than political speech, a majority of the
Court voted to uphold the Detroit ordinance. The fifth vote was provided by Justice
Powell, concurring in the result. Justice Powell reasoned that because the ordinance did
not suppress the production of adult films and also did not significantly restrict the pub
lic's access to such films, the ordinance should be treated as a regulation of the place
where such films could be shown and not as a complete ban on sexually explicit films.
Id at 77-79. As a place regulation, the ordinance was justified because it was an exercise
of the city's traditional and essential zoning power, it furthered the important govern
ment interest of preventing the deterioration of urban neighborhoods, and the city's in
terest was unrelated to the suppression of speech. Id at 80-82.
250. Id at 70.
251. Id at 84.
252. Id at 85-86. (citations and footnotes omitted). The reference to "Voltaire's
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The dissenting Justices' unrelenting displeasure with the Court's
willingness to differentiate between "important" and "unimportant"
speech could hardly be plainer.
This same angry disagreement reappeared several terms later in
FCC v. Pac!fica Foundation .253 This time the differentiated speech
was a radio broadcast of a George Carlin monologue entitled
"Filthy Words." The case raised a challenge to the FCC's power to
regulate indecent language. While a majority of the Court upheld
FCC authority, as in Young, no majority of Justices was willing to
condone content discrimination. The Court's opinion, again au
thored by Justice Stevens as it had been in Young, was joined only
by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist on the question of
content-based regulation of speech. 254 These three members of the
Court characterized the speech in question as of "slight social value"
and "offensive," therefore justifying its regulation. 255 The other two
members of the majority, Justices Powell and Blackmun, refused to
join in these sentiments. While these two Justices found the FCC's
action to be justified based on the presence of young children in the
listening audience, the unique character of the broadcast media, and
the need to protect unwilling adult listeners, they specifically dis
agreed with Justice Stevens' remarks recognizing a hierarchy of
speech values under the first amendment. 256 This same viewpoint is
echoed in an elegantly scripted dissent by Justice Brennan in which
he was careful to emphasize that a majority of the Court was unwill
ing to subscribe to a theory of "a sliding scale of First Amendment
protection calibrated to this Court's perception of the worth of a
communication's content."257
This ongoing debate between the Justices on the issue of content
discrimination has been criticized in a variety of quarters on a vari
ety of grounds. 258 One point of criticism, however, needs to be
immortal comment" is to an exchange attributed to Voltaire in which, in response to a
suggestion that violence is a justifiable method of overthrowing a tyrannical government,
he remarked: "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to
say it." This statement was quoted in Justice Stevens' opinion. Id. at 63.
253. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
254. Part IV -B of Justice Stevens' opinion concerned itself with the permissibility
of regulating speech based on its content. It was this section· of the opinion which drew
the support of only three members of the Court. Id. at 744-48.
255. Id. at 746-47.
256. Id. at 761-62.
257. Id. at 763.
258. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 242, at 99-100 (Supreme Court's decisions in cases
wherein a particular speech subject matter was singled out for different treatment are
"contradictory and imprecise," may well be incorrectly decided, and have failed to accu
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stressed here. One factor greatly contributing to the confusion sur
roundingMos/ey, Young, andPactfica is the Court's intermingling of
what really are two separate questions. The Court treated almost
synonymously the issues of content-based censorship and a mul
tilevel theory of speech protection. While the two questions are re
lated and both have relevance in the book removal area,259 they are
not one question and do not require a single response. It would be
possible for a court to conclude that while all protected speech has
rately pinpoint the critical factors that led to the decisions); The Supreme Court, 197.5
Term, supra note 242, at 200-02 (characterizing the attempt to distinguish political speech
from sexually explicit speech as ''unworkable'' and inconsistent with first amendment
values); Note, 28 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 456, 490-92 (1978) (describing Young v. Ameri
can Mini Theatres, Inc. as "a jurisprudential mess" because of its disregard for basic first
amendment precepts). But see Farber, supra note 242, at 729-31 (actual methodology
used by the Supreme Coun in cases involving content-based regulations provides a
workable method of analyzing such regulations-the problem of content regulation is
"largely illusory").
259. While this anicle concentrates on the issue of the permissibility of content
based regulation and only discusses in passing the possibility of a sliding scale of speech
values, this latter inquiry is also very relevant to the book removal cases. In these cases,
two of the frequently aniculated reasons for the removal of a book are the book's use of
offensive language and its description of sexually explicit scenes. E.g., Bicknell v.
Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Dirs., 475 F. Supp. 615, 618 (D. Vt. 1969), tifld,
638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980); Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F.
Supp. 703, 707 (D. Mass. 1978). Both of these speech types are among those suggested
for a lesser degree of speech protection. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 746
47 (1978) (opinion of Stevens, J.); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50,
70-71 (1976) (opinion of Stevens, J.). If a coun were to decide that one or both of these
speech categories, while protected by the first amendment, should receive some lesser
measure of that protection, it could make a significant difference in the outcome of a
book removal case. If the school board were required to justify its actions by some lesser
standard of review in cases wherein it removed books because they contained such
speech, the board would stand a much better chance of being able to show the necessary
level ofjustification to withstand a constitutional attack on its actions. Thus far none of
the cases in which a coun agreed to review the merits of a school board decision to
remove a previously shelved book have adopted such a multileveled theory of speech
protection. E.g., Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 715
n.20 (D. Mass. 1978) (finding FCC v. Pacifica Foundation inapposite because of its reli
ance on the fact "that broadcasts have the unique potential for invading the privacy of
the home"). These same couns, however, have not uniformly rejected a second potential
argument for applying a double standard of speech protection. This second argument
would be based on the idea that the scope of protected speech is not the same for children
as it is for adults. See, e.g., Erznomik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212-13
(1975); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637-43 (1968). Compare Right to Read
Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 714 n.17 (D. Mass. 1978) (rejecting
the argument that the youth of high school students justifies a school board's action in
removing books containing vulgar language from the school library) witlt Bicknell v.
Vergennes Union High School Bd. ofDirs., 638 F.2d 438,441 n.3 (2d Cir. 1980) (adopt
ing a different standard of obscenity when considering whether sexually explicit material
can be removed from a school library used by young children).
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the same first amendment weight, distinctions based on the content
of speech are constitutional if the government justification offered
for the differing treatment rests on a compelling reason. If, oli. the
other hand, a court were to conclude that some speech is more valua
ble than other speech, the impact of this conclusion would be that a
less than compelling level of government justification would be
needed to uphold content-based regulations in cases in which the
speech interfered with is given less than the full protection of the first
amendment.
This distinction can be seen more clearly by a further look at
Mosley. It certainly is true that the Court in that case was emphatic
in its support of the principle that there is "an equality of status in
the field of ideas."260 Despite this equal protection aspect of the first
amendment, however, the Court acknowledged that some content
based distinctions could be constitutional:
Similarly, under an equal protection analysis, there may be suffi
cient regulatory interests justifying selective exclusions or distinc
tions among pickets. Conflicting demands on the same place may
compel the State to make choices among potential users and uses.
And the State may have a legitimate interest in prohibiting some
picketing to protect public order. But these justifications for selec
tive exclusions from a public forum must be carefully scrutinized.
Because picketing plainly involves expressive conduct within the
protection of the First Amendment, discriminations among pick
ets must be tailored to serve a substantial governmental
interest. 261

The Court then went on to examine Chicago's justification for the
antipicketing ordinance. That justification was identified as the le
gitimate one of preventing the ~sruption of the public schools. De
spite the substantiality of the city's goal, however, the Court
concluded that the city's choice of a means to effectuate this legiti
mate end was constitutionally defective. 262 Nothing could be found
260. Police Department, of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (quoting A.
MEIKLEJOHN, POLmCAL

(1948».
261.

FREEDOM: THE CoNSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27

408 U.S. at 98-99 (citations omitted).
262. Id at 99-102. This distinction between a permissible means and a permissible
end was emphasized by the Court's decision in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104 (1972), decided on the same day as Mosley. In Grayned, the Court struck down an
antipicketing ordinance virtually identical to the one in Mosley. A second Rockford or
dinance, however, also was challenged in that case. That ordinance prohibited the will
ful ''making of any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or
good order of' a "school session or any class thereof' which is in session. Id at 108.
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to legitimately distinguish peaceful labor from nonlabor picketing.
Peaceful labor picketing was no less disruptive than other peaceful
picketing. Further, the city could not use unfounded predictions
about the potential violence that could be caused by other picketing
as a constitutionally sufficient justification for the distinction con
tained in the ordinance. 263 Therefore, the Court reasoned, the city
had not satisfied the constitutional requirement that it employ means
that were tailored precisely to further substantial and legitimate gov
ernment interests.
This analysis suggests that if Chicago had been able to demon
strate some significant distinction between labor and other picketing
so that the regulation of only nonlabor picketing was important to
the furtherance of its legitimate ends, its differential treatment might
have been constitutionally permissible. Despite the suggestion in
Mosley that the prohibition against content discrimination is not abThis antinoise ordinance was designed to prevent the disruption of school sessions, the
same goal which supported the antipicketing ordinance. Unlike its treatment of the an
tipicketing ordinance, however, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the antinoise
ordinance. Id at 108-21. The ordinance was found to be narrowly tailored to further the
city's compelling interest. Id at 117-21.
A more recent case further highlights this point. In Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455
(1980), an Illinois statute that barred all picketing of residences or dwellings, but ex
empted peaceful picketing of a place of employment involved in a labor dispute was
struck down. The Court found the situation identical to that in Mosley. Id at 460.
While the state's interest in protecting privacy in the home was an important one, the
state had chosen an impermissible means to protect that interest. As in Mosley, the state
could not demonstrate any distinction between labor picketing and other kinds of picket
ing that would make labor picketing less disruptive of residential privacy. Id at 465.
Moreover, the Court rejected the state's attempt to justify the distinction as a means of
giving special protection to labor picketing. The Court found no constitutional justifica
tion for singling out labor picketing since it was no more valuable under the first amend
ment than other types of picketing. Id at 466. Lastly, the Court found inadequate the
state's final attempt to justify the statute by arguing that residences that are also places of
employment dilute their right to privacy by "inviting" such disputes. The Court rejected
this justification because it found it to be substantially underinclusive: ''Numerous types
of peaceful picketing other than labor picketing would have but a negligible impact on
privacy interests, and numerous other actions of a homeowner might constitute 'nonresi
dential' uses of his property and would thus serve to vitiate the right to residential pri
vacy." Id at 469 (footnote omitted). While none of the state's offered justifications were
adequate to support the content-based distinction created in the Illinois statute, the Court
made it clear that the statute was not being struck down simply because it was content
based, but instead because the state had no compelling reason for utilizing a content
based distinction. Id at 465. Accord, Widmar v. Vincent, 102 S. Ct. 269, 274 (1981) ("In
order to justity discriminatory exclusions from a public forum. . . the university must
therefore satisty the standard of review appropriate to content-based exclusions. It must
show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is
narrowly drawn to achieve that end.").
263. 408 U.S. at 100-01.
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solute, the case had nothing to do with the issue of whether some
kinds of protected speech are more important under the first amend
ment than others. No basis could be suggested for giving a greater
first amendment value to labor picketing than to other kinds of pick
eting. None of the possible classifications of less protected speech
suggested by Justice Stevens in Young and Pac!ftca, such as erotic
speech and offensive speech, were applicable to Mosley. This amply
demonstrates that it is possible to justify some content-based distinc
tions without at the same time creating a sliding scale for speech
protection,
Dividing the Court's debate about content control into two sep
arate inquiries is a help in understanding the dilemma, but it still
leaves one far from a resolution of the problem. At this point one
additional content control case will be looked to for guidance.
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd v. Conrad2 64 raised the issue of con
tent-based distinctions in a context somewhat akin to the school li
brary. In Southeastern Promotions, the board of directors of the
Chattanooga Memorial Auditorium refused to approve the use of a
municipally operated theater for a production of the musical "Hair."
This denial of the use of a municipal facility occurred without any of
the directors seeing the play or reading the script and was based on
outside reports that the musical was obscene. 265 Because the board's
decision censored the production before it was performed, the Court
labeled the board action a prior restraint on speech. As a prior re
straint, it came before the Court "bearing a heavy presumption
against its constitutional validity."266 Further, "rigorous procedural
safeguards," such as a prompt system of judicial review, were a nec
essary accompaniment to the use of such a prior restraint. 267 The
Court held that the necessary procedural safeguards were lacking in
several respects. 268
.
264. 420 u.s. 546 (1975). Both Southeastern Promotions and Mosley are also im
portant cases in the development of the public forum doctrine. See notes 69-82 supra
and accompanying text.
.
265. 420 U.S. at 548.
266. Id at 558 (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963».
267. 420 U.S. at 561.
268. See note 80 supra for a description of the specific procedural requirements
found to be lacking by the Court. Procedural infirmities also may be a way of disposing
of some book removal cases. For example, in Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F.
Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979), copies of Ms. were removed from the school library after a
resolution seeking to remove the magazine had been voted on affirmatively at a Board of
Education meeting. Since the resolution had been presented to the Board of Education
by one of its members, the Board acted on the proposal without following recently
adopted interim "Guidelines for Selecting Instructional Materials." The district court
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Having based its decision on this ground, the Court avoided any
need to decide whether the board's reasons for barring "Hair" from
its theater were constitutionally adequate. 269 Certain statements
made by the Court along the way to its ultimate decision, however,
are relevant to that inquiry. For one thing, the Court expressed
some concern over the role played by the board of directors: "An
administrative board assigned to screening stage productions-and
keeping off stage anything not deemed culturally uplifting or health
ful-may well be less responsive than a court, an independent
branch of government, to constitutionally protected interests in free
expression."27o For another, it recognized ''that approval of an ap
plication required some judgment as to the content and quality of
the production."271 These same two points have equal application to
the process of school library book censorship. The school board's
interest is in an educationally uplifting library collection and the de
cisions it makes must be based on the content and quality of various
books. Unfortunately, after identifying that content evaluation is an
inevitable part of the board's job, the majority refrained from ad
dressing this crucial problem further.272
ruled that having adopted the guidelines, the Board of Education was obligated to follow
them. Id at 1273. The court invalidated the magazine's removal and ordered the Board
to follow the guidelines in any future decisions to remove books from the library shelves.
Id at 1276.
Moreover, procedural irregularities may in1luence a court in favor of intervening in
a book removal dispute.
In circumstances of such irregularity and ambiguity, aprimafacie case is made
out and intervention of a federal court is warranted because of the very infre
quency with which it may be assumed such intervention will be necessary and
because of the real threat that the school officials irregular and ambiguous han
dling of the issue will, even despite the best intentions, create misunderstanding
as to the scope of their activities which will serve to suppress freedom of
expression.
Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 638 F.2d 409, 414-15 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 385 (1981).
269. 420 U.S. at 559.
270. Id at 560-61.
271. Id at 555 n.7.
272. In addition to recognizing that content evaluation is an unavoidable aspect of
the board of director's job, the Court in Southeastern Promotions also recognized that
there may be occasions when content neutral reasons for excluding speech will come into
play. The Court, for example, pointed out that "[t]here was no contention by the board
that these facilities could not accommodate a production of this size." Id at 555. The
implications of this comment are that content neutral reasons for refusing the play would
not have been objectionable under the first amendment. This suggestion is especially
relevant in the context of the book removal cases because of the close analogy between
exclusions resulting because the theater is too small and the explanation in the book
removal cases that a book may be excluded because of a limitation on shelf space. See
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This issue received due consideration, however, in both the sep
arate opinion of Justice Douglas, in part dissenting and in part con
curring, and in the dissent of Justice Rehnquist. Justice Douglas'
concern was with the Court's "application of a few procedural band
aids"273 when the serious constitutional flaw in the case was the con
tent screening engaged in by the board of directors:
As s.oon as municipal officials are permitted to pick and choose, as
they are in all existing socialist regimes, between those produc
tions which are "clean and healthful and culturally uplifting" in
content and those which are not, the path is cleared for a regime
of censorship under which full voice can be given only to those
views which meet with the approval of the powers that be. 274

Justice Rehnquist interpreted the Court's opinion differently
from Justice Douglas, seeing it instead as a condemnation of content
screening. It was the Court's apparent disapproval of board determi
nations based on decisions relative to the content and quality of of
fered productions that distressed Justice Rehnquist. 275 While he
conceded that the theater is a public forum subject to first amend
ment constraints, Justice Rehnquist was unwilling to classify it along
with public streets and parks. Unlike expression in those places, ex
pression in a municipal theater must be on a scheduled basis and
that scheduling will involve a process of inclusion and exclusion. 276
In Justice Rehnquist's view, the Court's unwillingness to recognize
this reality and allow the theater to function as a theater produces
some unsatisfactory consequences and leaves some important ques
tions unresolved:
Maya municipal theater devote an entire season to Shakespeare,
or is it required to book any potential producer on a first come,
first served basis? These questions are real ones in light of the
Court's opinion, which by its terms seems to give no constitution
ally permissible role in the way of selection to the municipal
authorities.
A municipal theater may not be run by municipal authorities
note 236 supra and accompanying text. The Court's remarks on this point in Southeast
ern Promotions lent validity to the noninterventionist courts' decision to uphold content
neutral book removals under their three-part classification scheme. Accord, Heffron v.
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 101 S. Ct. 2559, 2564-65 (1981).
273. 420 U.S. at 563.
274. Id
275. Id at 571-72.
276. Id at 570.
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as if it were a private theater, free to judge on a content basis
alone which plays it wishes to have performed and which it does
not. But, just as surely, that element of it which is "theater" ought
to be accorded some constitutional recognition along with that ele
ment of it which is "municipal."277

These same unresolved questions might just as easily be asked about
the public school library. Unfortunately, the Court's analysis in
Southeastern Promotions suggested no surefire way to determine the
extent to which the first amendment recognizes that element which is
"school library" along with that element which is "public."
The conflict of roles crystallized in Southeastern Promotions is
not unique to the municipal theater and the school library. It arises
whenever government sponsorship is afforded an activity in which
selectivity is ordinarily an important aspect. It is undoubtedly true,
as Justice Rehnquist pointed out, that a private theater would select
its productions based on a variety of content-based factors. The ex
tent to which government must refrain from relying on these same
factors when it is involved in mooiog a theater or other similar activ
ity is indeed a troublesome point. Regrettably, the judicial responses
to this troubling inquiry leave us far. from a complete resolution of
the problem. For the most part courts, probably sensing this di
lemma lying in wait for them once they determine some degree of
scrutiny should be applied, avoid the dilemma entirely by the use of
several evasive techniques. 278 A screening of the case law for cases
in which the issue of the permissible scope of editorial discretion was
squarely addressed produces only a few solid nuggets of analysis.
One example of a case in which the court examined the proper
scope of government editorial discretion is Advocates for Arts v.
Thomson. 279 In that case Granite, a literary journal, had applied for
a grant-in-aid under a program of public funding for the arts spon
sored by the New Hampshire Commission on the Arts. Granite's
grant application was turned down because of objection to a poem
published in a past issue of the magazine. The poem was described
277. Id at 573-74.
278. Among the techniques used by courts to avoid tackling the difficult problem
raised by government exercise of editorial discretion are a finding of insufficient state
involvement in the challenged action to give rise to a first amendment claim, e.g. , Missis
sippi Gay Alliance v. Goudelock, 536 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976), cerl. denied, 430 U.S.
982 (1977), and a decision that no public forum exists, thereby permitting the court to
refuse all claims of access, e.g., Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm'n, 656 F.2d
1012 (5th Cir. 1981); Avins v. Rutgers, State Univ., 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967), cerro
denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968).
279. 532 F.2d 792 (1st Cir.), cerro denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976).
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as "an item of filth" by the New Hampshire Governor. 280 Granite
challenged the denial of its application as a violation of its first
amendment rights. While the First Circuit noted a resemblance be
tween the case before it and Southeastern Promotions, it found the
differences between the two cases more compelling. The court found
no tradition of neutrality in public support of the arts and could see
no way that funding decisions could be made on a neutral basis. 281
While access to a municipal theater could be allocated neutrally on a
first-come-first-served basis, no method of avoiding a judgment on
the comparative worth of projects applying for grants could be
discerned:
The decision to withhold support is unavoidably based in some
part on the "subject matter" or "content" of expression, for the
very assumption of public funding of the arts is that decisions will
be made according to the literary or artistic worth of competing
applicants. Given this focus on the comparative merit of literary
and artistic works equally entitled to first amendment protection
as "speech", courts have no particular institutional competence
warranting case-by-case participation in the allocation of
funds. 282

The First Circuit's reaction to the fact that decisions based on artistic
merit are necessarily both content-based and subjective was to leave
those decisions entirely in the hands of the administrators of the pro
gram. Thus the solution proposed by the court in Advocatesfor Arts
is that in cases in which the government activity requires the exercise
of editorial discretion and no neutral standards can be substituted
for subjective ones, that discretion should be exercised unhampered
by any constitutional restraints. This result is on all fours with the
result and reasoning of noninterventionist courts in the book re
moval cases. 283
280. Id at 793.
281. Id at 796.
282. Id at 795-96.
283. Despite this similarity in reasoning between Advocatesfor Arts and the analy
sis of noninterventionist courts, an attempt was made by one interventionist court to
distinguish the case. In Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp.
703 (D. Mass. 1978), the court found a difference between censoring speech, as in the
book removal cases, and enlarging speech by making money available to fund expres
sion, as in Advocatesfor Arts. Id at 712 n.15. This distinction, while facile, seems a
semantic difference at best. One also could argue that creating a library, which the
school had no obligation to do in the first instance, enlarges expression and, therefore,
decisions about what to shelve or not to shelve are not different than decisions about
whether to fund.
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While cQntrary points of view are available in the case law, for
the most part these sources provide little in the way of satisfactory
analysis. 284 The most complete analysis suggesting some constitu
tional limitations on editorial discretion is found in the opinion of
Circuit Judge Goldberg, dissenting in Mississippi Gay Alliance v.
Goudelock. 285 In that case, the Mississippi Gay Alliance submitted a
paid advertisement to the student newspaper at Mississippi State
University. The editor of the paper refused to publish the ad and the
Gay Alliance sued. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit denied plaintiffs' claim relying on evidence that no uni
versity official had taken part in the decision not to publish the ad.
The decision was made solely by the student editor of the paper in
the proper exercise of his discretion, thus the Court found a lack of
284. Typical of the cases finding exercises of editorial discretion to be reviewable
are Radical Lawyers Caucus v. Pool, 324 F. Supp. 268 (W.O. Tex. 1970), Lee v. Board of
Regents of State Colleges, 306 F. Supp. 1097 (W.O. Wis. 1969), aJf'd, 441 F.2d 1257 (7th
Cir. 1971), and Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). In Pool, a political
advertisement was found to be wrongfully excluded from a state funded bar journal de
spite a journal policy prohibiting the acceptance of political ads. See note 100 supra.
The court in Pool applied a compelling state interest test in evaluating the justifications
offered by the journal in support of its policy and found those justifications wanting. 324
F. Supp. at 270. The court rejected defendants' explanation that its policy was designed
to protect the State Bar's public image for disinterestedness and integrity. Id That rejec
tion was based on the fact that speech that invites dispute is equally protected by the first
amendment. The court did not even consider whether the need to exercise editorial dis
cretion in any way tempered the application of this first amendment principle. The court
also found that defendants could not rely on the argument that the State Bar desired to
maintain a position of political neutrality in the face of the journal's practice of re
printing highly political editorials from various news sources. Id In Lee, plaintiffs suc
cessfully challenged a university newspaper policy against accepting editorial
advertisements. After finding the paper to be a public forum, the court based its decision
that the ads could not be refused on the paper's acceptance of commercial and political
ads. 304 F. Supp. at 1101. Contra, Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298
(1974). Additionally, the defendants failed to demonstrate that the printing of editorial
ads would "materially and substantially interfere" with the operation of the university.
Id Finally, in Zucker, the issue of a publication's policy against the acceptance of polit
ical ads was again before a court. As in Pool and Lee, the court struck down the refusal
to accept such ads. The facts in Zucker, however, did differ significantly from the situa
tions in Pool and Lee. In Zucker, the student editor of a school paper wanted to publish
an ad submitted by a student group opposing the Vietnam War. The school principal,
however, refused to allow the ad to be printed. 209 F. Supp. at 103. The court found
that the paper served as an important educational public forum for students in the school
and that Tinker supported a right of access to the paper for the expression of student
ideas. Id at 104-05. Thus, in Zucker, no issue of the degree of editorial discretion that
should be allowed the editors of a state-supported publication was raised. Unlike the
events in Pool and Lee, in Zucker the paper's editor wanted to publish the ad and the
refusal came at the hands of the school principal.
285. 536 F.2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 982 (1977).
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state action. 286 In the absence of state action, a necessary prerequi
site to any claim of constitutional invasion, no review of the propri
ety of the editor's action was required.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Goldberg first took issue with
the majority's analysis of the state action question. After finding
sufficient state involvement to justify a remand of the case to the
district court,287 Judge Goldberg considered the delicate interplay
between equal access principles and the right of the student editors
to control the content of the newspaper they edit. Early on in his
analysis, Judge Goldberg rejected both extremes of a feast or famine
analysis. He refused to find either that a student newspaper is un
hampered by constitutional constraints in its exercise of discretion or
that student editors may never exclude material from the student pa
per for content-based reasons. In compromising on a happy medium
between these two extremes, Judge Goldberg divided the campus
newspaper into two parts: The "editorial product" of the newspaper
and the paper's "unedited space." Student editors are permitted
"unfettered discretion" over the "editorial product," which includes
materials written by the student staff of the paper, guest columns,
and letters to the editor. 288 On the other hand, "unedited space,"
such as space available for "unedited advertisements or announce
ments from individuals outside the newspaper staff," must be made
available on a content neutral basis. 289 Despite the requirement of
content neutral access to these spaces, Judge Goldberg recognized
the need to allow some regulation of these parts of the student news
paper. For instance, he suggested that certain limits placed on the
sources of the announcements might be permissible. 290 This would
include restricting access to members of the university community.
Judge Goldberg also was aware of the problem of limitations on the
space available in unedited portions of the paper. 291 Space limita
tions ~ght cause the publication to restrict each announcement to a
maximum number of words, require the payment of a reasonable fee
for the placement of an announcement, or select from the submitted
. announcements at random until all the space allotted for this pur
. 286. Id at 1075. For additional comments on the state action question as it affects
school newspapers, see Newell, A Rigltt ofAccess to Student Newspapers at Public Univer
sities, 4 J. COLL. & U.L. 209, 210-15 (1977); Note, The State College Press and tlte Public
Forum Doctrine, 32 U. MIAMI L. REv. 227, 232-35 (1977).
287. 536 F.2d at 1085.
288. Id at 1087.
289. Id
290. Id at 1088.
291. Id
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pose is filled. These solutions to the problem of limited space are
approved because they are content neutral and not content selective.
The analysis suggested by Judge Goldberg appears to work well
in the context of a school newspaper composed of both edited and
unedited space. The nature of the forum involved makes feasible the
exercise of Solomonic wisdom as a solution to the editorial discretion
quandary. Not all forums, however, provide such convenient dual
ity. Neither the municipal theater nor the school library seem easy
targets for this half-and-half solution. Neither of these facilities has
the equivalent of unedited space. If some access is to be made avail
able on a content neutral basis it will have to be at the expense of
editorial discretion in space akin to the edited portion of the
newspaper.
A more broad based solution than is found in Judge Goldberg's
opinion in Mississippi Gay Alliance is offered by Professor Karst. 292
Professor Karst proposes a standard of review that would tolerate
government exercise of editorial discretion in the operation of a pub
lic forum only to the extent necessary to further a compelling gov
ernment interest in maintaining the integrity of the forum.293
To see how this solution would work in actual operation, a good
initial example is found in the campus newspaper. Like the division
employed by Judge Goldberg, this standard sometimes will treat dis
similarly the different parts of the paper. With regard to the uned
ited space of the paper, no compelling need exists to exercise content
control over such space. No essential characteristic of the newspaper
will be threatened by requiring neutral distribution of such space.
On the other hand, a different result is required when considering
the treatment of articles written by members of the paper's staff. If
student editors are not permitted to make judgments about the quali
ty and content of these submissions, the essence of what a newspaper
is all about would be sacrificed in the name of content neutrality. At
this stage, as well, Professor Karst's compelling interest analysis
292. Karst, supra note 112.
293. Id at 253-59. A similar approach is suggested by Professor Canby:
The court must. . . determine whether the medium is one in which the state
necessarily exercises an editorial function. . . . [N]othing in the nature of an
auditorium or school plant requires the exercise of editorial judgment over the
entire facility . . . . As long as alternative methods of expression are available,
a right of access should be denied where the government enterprise cannot truly
exist without the exercise of editorial discretion.
Canby, The First Amendment and the Stale as Editor: Implications for Public Broadcast
ing, 52 TEX. L. REv. 1123, 1133-34 (1974) (emphasis in the original) (footnote omitted).
See also Comment, supra note 209, at 1451-60.
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reaches an identical result to Judge Goldberg's "editorial product"
theory. The two theories, however, diverge with respect to guest col
umns and letters to the editor. While Judge Goldberg treated these
paper parts as marginal examples of editorial product, Professor
Karst's compelling interest analysis standard dictates no clear-cut re
sult in all cases based solely on the label attached to the section of
the paper to which access is sought:
Can any constitutional doctrine be devised to permit the editor
to exercise the discretion that is necessary to the operation of a
"real" newspaper and at the same time prevent the exclusion of
views from a government newspaper merely because the editor
does not share those views? One solution might be found in a
constitutional principle that tolerated editorial discretion so long
as it were lodged in someone who could be counted on to use pro
fessional (rather than personal) standards in exercising it. In a
given case, where it could be shown that an editor had abused this
discretion by excluding opposing views. . . a court should feel no
hesitation in intervening to guarantee access to the opponents, in
the name of the first amendment's equality principle. But the re
fusal of the school newspaper editor to print a cartoon because of
its bad taste . . . or to print an article that is badly written . . .
should not raise a first amendment problem. That these two areas
blur together at their edges should not disqualify a court from de
ciding where a particular editorial action falls. 294

While Professor Karst concedes that courts may have to struggle
with cases on the borderline of compelling, he also is correct in as
suming that this failing should not serve as a deterrent to the use of
his standard, as it is a failing held in common by all evaluative for
mulas employed in constitutional analysis.
The next step in testing the durability of the Karst formulation
of course will be to apply it to the school library book removal pro
cess. In deciding when the government's interest in removal is com
pelling, it will be necessary to determine what varieties of removal
are essential to the task of proper library management. It should be
pointed out initially that making this determination is complicated
by the human dimensions of the average book removal case. Ordi
narily, those initially promoting removal of a book are not members
of the professional staff of the library. The impetus for removal
likely will come from a parent or an individual member of the school
board. 295 While an administrative review process usually will come
294. Karst, supra note 112, at 257-59 (footnotes omitted).
295. E.g., Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 638 F.2d
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into play before such a request results in the removal of a book,296
this process may be influenced by the political heat generated by a
vocal group of parents. Therefore, the cooler heads of library per
sonnel may be overruled on the issue of the book's suitability.297
This private intervention in the professional operation of the
school library adds an interesting complication to any effort to apply
a compelling government interest analysis to the book removal pro
cess. Professor Karst lists as one of his reasons for allowing some
degree of content control to government officials the idea that profes
sional judgment ought to be given some weight. 298 If editorial dis
cretion is to be vested only with professionals, this creates somewhat
of a conundrum in the typical library book removal case. In truth,
the book removal decision usually will be the product of collective
deliberations by both professionals and nonprofessionals. While the
instigation for the investigation of a book will be from a concerned
parent, professionals at least will have been called in to participate in
the final decisionmaking process. 299 Whether this should influence a
court in its resolution of a book removal case is open to debate. In
part, the answer will be a function of whether the concern is more
404,409 (2d Cir. 1980), cerl.. granled, 102 S. Ct. 385 (1981) (removal directed by members
of the (Board of Education); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1271
(D.N.H. 1979) (removal proposed by a member of the Board of Education); Right to
Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 705 (D. Mass. 1978) (removal
instigated by a parent).
296. E.g., Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Dirs., 475 F. Supp. 615,
617-18 (0. Vt. 1979), qffd, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980). Book removal
procedures provide that a parent or local citizen objecting to a book in the li
brary may initiate a review of the work by completing a form entitled "Citizen's
Request for Professional Reconsideration of a Work," and submitting it to the
High School Principal. The Principal must provide copies of the request to the
librarian and Superintendent of Schools and must inform the Board of the re
quest. The librarian must then review the request and submit a written report
of "action taken" to the Board. Finally, the procedures provide that ''un
resolved issues shall be settled by a majority vote of the Board or its designees."
Id (citations omitted).
297. E.g., Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 708
(0. Mass. 1978) (school librarian's opinion that the poem ''was not obscene" and ''that
both students and faculty should have access to it" was rejected by School Committee
and librarian was threatened with loss of her job for decision to initially place poem on
the library shelves).
298. Karst, supra note 112, at 257.
299. E.g., Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1271 (D.N.H. 1978)
(complaints about library books were handled by ''the appointment of an Instructional
Materials Reconsideration Committee composed of professional library-media person.
nel. the principal or his representative, the appropriate assistant superintendent, the per
son or persons involved in the original selection of the material. and the person or
persons using the materials in the individual school.").
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with process or result. If this effort is solely to decide if a particular
decision is justified, one ought to examine the proferred justification
for removal to see if it satisfies constitutional standards. If the con
cern is with process, this flaw ought perhaps to be dealt with sepa
rately, and not intermixed with an appraisal C?f the importance of the
justification offered for the removal. 300
Despite this added difficulty in the analysis, there still is no rea
son to assume that the Karst standard will not prove workable in the
context of the book removal cases. To test this assumption, it will be
necessary to consider several different fact patterns. Suppose, for ex
ample, a book is removed because its contents are determined to be
obsolete-a science textbook now out of date because of more recent
scientific advances-it is essential to the nlDning of the library that
the librarian have the ability to make such decisions. Although a
judgment is being made about the contents of the book in question,
it is a judgment a court would not want to second-guess. Even if
some degree of parental involvement in raising the question of obso
lescence came to light, it is hard to see why this would make any
difference in the outcome of the case.
As a second example, suppose a book were removed from the
library because the school disagreed with the position it took on a
controversial issue. Nothing necessary to the maintenance of a top
flight library requires allowing such a decision to stand un
checked. 301 Once a decision is made to include a book on a
300. See note 268 supra.
301. Some evidence of this is found in the "Guidelines For Selecting Instructional
Materials" adopted by the Nashua Board of Education:
It was required by the guidelines that the materials be consistent with the gen
eral educational goals of the school district, meet high standards of quality in
factual content and presentation, be appropriate for the subject area and for the
age, maturation, ability level, and social development of the students, have aes
thetic, literary, or social value, be designed to help the students gain an aware
ness and understanding of the contributions made by both sexes, and by
religious, ethnic and cultural groups to American heritage; and tltat a selection
. of materials on controversial irsues be directed toward maintaining a balanced
collection representing various views.
Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1271 (D.N.H. 1979) (emphasis ad
ded).
Further support for this position is contained in the Library Bill of Rights adopted
by the American Library Association Council:
The American Library Association affirms that all libraries are forums for in
formation and ideas, and that the following basic policies should guide their
services:
1. Books and other library resources should be provided for the interest, infor
mation, and enlightment of all people of the community the library serves.
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particular topic in the library, expulsion solely because of disagree
ment with the point of view taken by the author should be viewed as
an unjustified instance of content discrimination. This would be true
no matter what the identity of the participants in the removal
process.
Finally, suppose a book was removed from the library because
the language used by the author was considered offensive or because
the book included nonobscene, yet sexually explicit scenes; what
then? This last example is by far the hardest. In part, a solution to it
depends on one's definition of the essential function of the school
library. If a school library is viewed as a limitless marketplace of
ideas, no editorial discretion needs to exist based on dislike for the
language or themes chosen by an author.302 We are dealing here
with a particular species of library, however, a school library. The
question to be posed is whether there is something essential in the
operation of a school library that requires allowing the school to at
tempt to foster certain ideas of morality by restricting its book collec
tion. This question has been given varying answers by the courts
deciding book removal cases. 303 There also are constitutional conMaterials should not be excluded because of the origin, background, or views of
those contributing to their creation.
2. Libraries should provide materials and information presenting all points of
view on current and historical issues. Materials should not be proscribed or
removed because of partisan or doctrinal disapproval
3. Libraries should challenge censorship in the fulfillment of their responsibil
ity to provide information and enlightenment.
4. Libraries should cooperate with all persons and groups concerned with re
sisting abridgment of free expression and free access to ideas.
5. A person's right to use a library should not be denied or abridged because
of origin, age, background, or views.
6. Libraries which make exhibit spaces and meeting rooms available to the
public they serve should make such facilities available on an equitable basis,
regardless of the beliefs or affiliations of individuals or groups requesting their
use.
AMERICAN LmRARY Assoc. COUNCIL, LIBRARY BILL OF &OHTS (1980); reprinted in 2
CURRENTS 3, at 10 (1980).
302. An exclusion based on objection to the language or themes chosen by the
author should not be confused with exclusion because a book is badly written or con
structed. While an exclusion based on the literary quality of a book is content-based, it
should be categorized with exclusions based on obsolescence. One of the characteristics
of a school library is that it serves as a repository for high quality writings. Therefore, to
maintain this aspect of the library collection, it is essential that removals based on judg
ments about literary merit be permitted.
303. Compare Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703,
714 (D. Mass. 1978) ("The prospect of successive school committees 'sanitizing' the
school library of views divergent from their own is alarming. . . .") witll Zykan v. War
saw Community School Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1304 (7th Cir. 1980) ("[T)he importance of
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siderations associated with the question. 304
One bright note is that this judgment is not further complicated
by whether the removal was effected by parents, librarians, or the
school board. If one were to accept the idea that the school may
properly transmit community values to its students, there is no need
to draw a line between professional judgments about morality and
parental opinions on this same issue. Since the professionals only
serve as surrogates for members of the community, it hardly should
invalidate the decisions reached when the community expresses itself
directly. On the other hand, if one were to deny the validity of the
school as moral censor, moral justifications would not be compelling
reasons for book removals, whether those removals were caused by
parents or professionals. Because these questions are very much
judgment calls, no final answers will be attempted here. Whichever
way one chooses to define the contours of the role of the school li
brary, once supplied with a definition a result can be reached easily
in cases of removals for offensive language or sexual explicitness.
Despite some "blurring at the edges," Professor Karst's analysis
provides a very workable standard of review' for the typical book
removal case. What is especially interesting about how this standard
operates in practice is that it comes very close to what is done by
courts following the judicial review model in the book removal
cases. These courts have seen the need not to treat all content-based
removals identically. The cases uniformly recognize the inappropri
ateness of removals based on the political content of a book.305 They
reach divergent results, however, when books are removed because
they contain foul language or explicit sexual descriptions, and their
disagreement stems from a differing view of the goals of public
education. 306
If the cases have an obvious flaw, it is the way in which they
secondary schools in the development of intellectual faculties is only one part of a broad
formative role encompassing the encouragement and nurturing of those fundamental s0
cial, political, and moral values that will permit a student to take his place in the
community.").
304. See earlier discussion of whether the first amendment permits the government
to disseminate a favored ideology in the schools in text accompanying notes liS-59
supra.
305. E.g., Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (D. N.H. 1979).
306. Compare Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703,
714 (D. Mass. 1978) wi/It Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist.,
638 F.2d 404, 436-37 (2d Cir. 1980) (Newman, J., concurring), cerJ. gran/ed, 102 S. Ct.
385 (1981).
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distinguish between content-based and content neutral removals. 307
One example given in the case law of content neutral removal is a
removal based on a lack of shelf space. 308 If the library shelves were
to overflow, removing the excess books by a random drawing of titles
from the card catalogue would be content neutral. Removal based
on a review of the collection to decide which books are least neces
sary to the overall balance of the collection, however, is not content
neutral. While such a removal need not be viewed as an improper
exercise of content discrimination, it is not neutral. For a second
example, tum to the example of the outdated science book used ear
lier in discussing the Karst formulation. The book removal cases
define removals resulting from the obsolescence of a book as content
neutral.309 Because the process of deciding if something is obsolete
requires an evaluation of its contents, such a removal cannot accu
rately be described as content neutral. While the removal of an ob
solete book should not be found invalid, its proper classification is
with other cases of justifiable content-based selection. This flaw
aside, the cases do come to grips with the need to distinguish be
tween valid and invalid content-based decisions. While the analysis
relied on may overlook the controversial history of content control in
first amendment analysis, the judgments reached, while in some
cases debatable, are all eminently justifiable.
Thus, in attempting to summarize the results of this in-depth
view of the book removal cases, there is both good news and bad
news. The good news is that when dealing with the actual review of
such decisions on the merits, the courts that reach the merits have
applied standards and achieved results with which it is easy to feel
comfortable. While these courts have not articulated the nature of
the task required of them in as accurate a fashion as one might hope
for, their ability to apply standards developed outside the book re
moval cases to this new context rates generally high marks. As for
the bad news, it is found in the inability of both interventionist and
noninterventionist courts to satisfactorily analyze those matters lead
ing up to a decision whether to review on the merits. In this sphere,
307. This comment is not meant to suggest that the distinction between content
based and content neutral removals is not a legitimate one. The legitimacy of this dis
tinction seems well established. See note 272 supra. The point made here is only that the
line drawn by the interventionist courts between content-based and content neutral justi
fications is not an accurate dividing line.
308. Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703, 711 (D.
Mass. 1978).
309. Id
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the major question to be asked is whether the plaintiff has suffered
the invasion of a constitutionally protected interest. If no such inva
sion has occurred, no further review of government action is justi
fied. The efforts to find such an invasion have involved two central
first amendment doctrines. In dealing with the possibility that the
school library is a public forum, the courts seemingly lack awareness
of the complexities raised by this inquiry. Similarly, in deciding
whether students have a constitutionally protected right to know, the
courts' resolution of this issue fails to take into account many of the
difficult aspects of applying right to know principles in the library
book removal context. With respect to both of these doctrines, the
courts' analysis leaves something to be desired.
III.

SUITS TO FORCE REMOVAL OF A BOOK FROM
THE SCHOOL LIBRARY

Having explored the ins and outs of the first of the situations in
which school library book censorship occurs, the removal of a
shelved book, it is now time to turn to the other two library censor
ship fact patterns for a brief comparison of the problems raised. The
first of these alternative factual settings arises when a lawsuit is
brought to force the removal of a book from the school library.
In such a setting, it is easy to imagine the chain of events lead
ing the complainant to seek judicial intervention beginning with a
parent being informed that the school library has a copy of a certain
book. The parent then would initiate a complaint through whatever
administrative channel is provided for such purposes to object to the
book being available to students. 31o Dissatisfied by the school's deci
sion to allow the book to remain in the library collection, the parent
would petition for judicial revlew of the school's decision.
The case law involving this fact pattern is sparse. 311 No case
310. An example of such an administrative review procedure is found in Salvail v.
Nashua Bd. of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (D.N.H. 1979). In that case, the Nashua
Board of Education had adopted guidelines to be followed when a member of the public
raised a complaint about a library book or other instructional material. After the filing
of a complaint, an Instructional Materials Reconsideration Committee would be ap
pointed. See note 299 supra. The committee was given the task of reexamining the ma
terial and issuing a report which would be given to the School Superintendent and then
forwarded to the complainant. If the complainant was dissatisfied with the results of the
reexamination, an appeal could be taken to the School Superintendent. If the complain
ant still was not satisfied, there was provision for a further appeal to the Board of
Education.
311. The only cases that can be found involving this fact pattern are Evans v.
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directly discusses the free speech aspect of such a lawsuit. 312 This
paucity of case law might be viewed as a reason for paying little
attention to this category of censorship dispute but for one factual
reality. In truth, there is no bright line separating cases in which the
school's removal of a book is challenged and cases in which suit is
brought to force removal. In many cases, as was pointed out previ
ously,313 a book is removed because of prompting by concerned par
ents. Some of these parental efforts meet with success in their initial
encounter with the school administration. When this occurs, one po
tential result is that another group of parents and students with op
posing views on whether the book should be left in the library will
seek legal recourse to bring about the return of the book to the li
brary shelf. In other cases, the early efforts of parents seeking re
moval will meet with failure. Thereafter, these parents may decide
to take their fight to the courts. Viewed in this light, the two kinds of
lawsuits begin to look more of a piece and simply reflect two sides of
the same coin. Whether the judicial response to these two varieties
of censorship dispute ought to be similar, of course, is not clear just
from the disclosure that all that separates the cases is which group of
Selma Union High School Dist., 193 Cal. 54, 222 P. 801 (1924), and Rosenberg v. Board
of Educ., 196 Misc. 542, 92 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
312. In Evans v. Selma Union High School Dist., 193 Cal. 54, 222 P. 801 (1924),
plaintifl'sought to enjoin the purchase of 12 copies of the King James version of the Bible
for the high school library. Plainillrs claim was that the purchase of the Bible violated
several provisions of the California Constitution and a number of state statutes that for
bade the use of sectarian or denominational books in public schools and school libraries.
The court denied plainillrs request for relief on the ground that "[t)he mere act of
purchasing a book to be added to the school library does not carry with it any implica
tion of the adoption of the theory or dogma contained therein, or any approval of the
book itself except as a work of literature fit to be included in a reference library." Id at
60,222 P. at 803. Since the lawsuit involved a religious book, the case raised a claim in
the nature of an establishment clause violation and did not involve any free speech issue.
In Rosenberg v. Board of Educ., 196 Misc. 542, 92 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sup. Ct. 1949),
petitioners challenged the shelving of Oliller Twist by Charles Dickens and TIre Mercluutt
of Venice by William Shakespeare in the school library. Petitioners argued that the
Board of Education of the City of New York had abused its discretion, under the New
York Education Law, to select appropriate books for placement in the school library and
for use as instructional material. They based this claim on the fact ''that the two books
are objectionable because they tend to engender hatred of the Jew as a person and as a
race." Id at 543, 92 N.Y.S.2d at 345. The court rejected petitioners' claim because it
found the Board's action consistent with the educational objective of developing inquir
ing minds. In the absence of proof the Board had selected the books in order to en
courage anti-religious feelings, the court upheld the Board's actions. While petitioners in
Rosenberg could have argued their case based on first amendment principles. they did
not do so. Instead, the case was argued and decided solely on the basis of the New York
Education Law.
313. See note 295 supra and accompanying text.
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parents the school sides with in the first round of the censorship con
test. Still, this aspect of the situation justifies a more than cursory
examination of suits that seek the removal of a book from the school
library.
As a starting point in that examination, it will be useful to con
sider what this change in the fact pattern augurs in terms of the two
judicial attitudes reflected in the book removal cases. From the per
spective of a noninterventionist court there is no greater justification
for intervention in a challenge to nonremoval than in the removal
situation. The decisions of school administrators are no less trust
worthy when they decide to turn back parental efforts to remove
books than when they accede to such demands. Thus, courts wishing
to defer to the greater expertise of the school board in such matters
will feel comfortable with their noninterventionist stance in both
kinds of cases.
As for interventionist courts willing to act where necessary in
book removal cases, for several reasons they will not feel equally at
ease second-guessing school authorities where the book has been
kept on the library shelf. In the first place, as these courts view the
library as a public forum, the issue arises whether there is a first
amendment right to keep certain ideas out of a forum in addition to
the acknowledged right to include ideas in a forum. Similarly, with
the right to know, a version of this doctrine that would recognize a
right not to know and to keep others from knowing would have to be
adopted. Because in many ways both of these ideas are antithetical
to the basic values furthered by the first amendment, they seem un
likely judgments to be made by interventionist courts. This is espe
cially true in light of the fact that much of the philosophy behind the
activist position is premised on the need to ferret out acts of censor
ship, even those committed by school authorities. To have these
same courts turn around and force the school to censor its book col
lection seems an unlikely result. Thus, when dealing with suits to
force the removal of a book, it appears that noninterventionist courts
-and interventionist courts will reach the same conclusion, though for
very different reasons, and will refuse to remove a shelved book.
The only remaining question is whether this result is justified by
analytic differences between the two kinds of censorship cases. To
make this judgment will require a brief rethinking of some of the
issues addressed in the analysis of cases challenging the removal of a
book. Whether public forum and right to know principles demand a
similar treatment of cases challenging book removals and cases seek
ing such removals or whether proper analysis requires dissimilar re
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suIts in these two categories of censorship dispute needs to be
determined.
In the cases challenging the removal of books, two public forum
arguments were identified as being the most suited to characterizing
the library collection as a public forum. Both of these arguments
required reliance on the concept of an involuntary forum. Under the
first of these arguments, the government's attempt to create a forum
for a certain kind of expression and to reserve that forum exclusively
for its own use will fail. Having opened a forum for government
expression, the first amendment imposes an obligation on the gov
ernment to make that forum available to nongovernment partici
pants as well. Under this theory, if the school library is to be
considered a public forum for purposes of challenges to book remov
als, that characterization will apply whether the plaintiffs seek to re
store a book or remove one. Despite its continuing identity as a
public forum, however, the critical question revolves around the na
ture of the rights granted to participants in the forum. The basic
right involved in most public forum cases is the right to have one's
voice heard in the forum along with the voices of others who seek to
exercise their forum rights. In the book removal context, students
seek to "speak" in the forum by having a book retained in the collec
tion because it represents an idea they want included in the forum.
Nothing about public forum principles suggests a parallel forum
right to silence disfavored ideas. A speaker may not be forced to
speak;314 nor does a speaker have a right to silence others. Because
the theory upon which the forum comes into being is premised on
the idea that the government may not create a forum exclusively for
the exposition of its own ideas, it would be ironic if that same censor
ing of ideas could be accomplished by a nongovernment participant
in the forum. The idea behind this forum theory rebels at such a
notion. Its thought is to open up forum use to a wider circle of ideas,
not to constrict its use even further. Therefore, it is clear that under
a theory that precludes the government from. maintaining the school
library exclusively for its own use, that same theory would not pro
tect the right of someone to successfully request the removal of a
library book.
A more interesting analysis results by looking at the involuntary
forum theory that is rooted in limitations on the right of government
advocacy. If it is determined that some constitutional limitations ex
ist on the right of the government to advocate a preferred ideology,
314. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
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query what mechanism would exist to correct instances where the
government oversteps the bounds of its discretion in this area. One
obvious mechanism is that an affected parent or student, harmed by
being the victim of this one-sided message, would be able to sue to
correct the situation. The most likely form of relief to be sought in
this event would be one that requires the government to deem
phasize its favored ideology or to broaden the spectrum of messages
being delivered by including other views in the delivery system as
well. One alternative to this remedy, however, may exist. That al
ternative remedy would seek to silence the government's one-sided
message by eliminating government speech in an area altogether.
For instance, inAnderson v. CityofBoston,3lS Citizens to Protect Pub
lic Funds v. Board of Education of Parsippany-Troy Hil/s,316 and
Stem v. Kramarsky,317 plaintiffs prevented the government from us
ing public funds for the endorsement of political issues. 3ls The rem
edy in these cases involved silencing the government's voice in
certain areas. While the government was permitted to relate neutral
information revealing the pros and cons of particular issues, it could
not speak as an advocate for a position. The choices available were
to say nothing at all on a particular issue or to reform its speech so as
to make it neutral. These two alternatives would seem to exist in the
book censorship cases as well. One of those options would result in
the removal of certain books from the library. For mstance, suppose
the school included books on the subject of capital punishment in its
library, but all of the included books argued in favor of the death
penalty. If a suit were brought to protest this practice, two remedies
would be available. One would entail the school removing all the
books it had on the subject of capital punishment, thus amounting to
a judicially supervised example of book removal. Alternatively, the
school could add books taking a position opposed to the death pen
alty. This remedy would render an equally satisfactory result in
such a case. 319 Ultimately, the choice of remedies would be the li
315.
(1979).
316.
317.
318.

1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2297, 80 N.E.2d 628, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 1060
13 N.J. 172,98 A.2d 673 (1953).
84 Misc. 2d 447, 375 N.Y.S.2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
For a discussion of these three cases, see text accompanying notes 142-50

supra.
319. Indeed, it might be more accurate to describe this second remedy, the addition
of books, as more satisfactory. From an educational point of view, the library should
choose to enhance its book collection rather than to restrict it still further and to screen
out valuable subject areas. Despite the superiority of a decision to add books, from the
perspective of improving the library as a tool for learning, it is difficult to find any consti
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brary's own to make. Because either option would cure the uncon
stitutional aspects of the school's behavior, and the removal option
itself is not supported by any constitutionally based right to silence
speech on controversial issues, the choice is the school's to make.
While the above situation sets out a scenario in which a suit to
remove a book or books from the school library would be successful,
this theory will be of limited utility in a practical setting. Realisti
cally, most parental complaints about books in the library do not
stem from a desire to expand the universe of ideas found in the li
brary collection, but instead seek to contract that universe. Most
suits will be intended to produce a library that fosters the complain
ant's one-sided view and not to allow the library to display alterna
tive perspectives on its bookshelves. For instance, a suit might be
brought because a parent objected to the collection including a book
advocating premarital sex. The parent would wish to have this book
removed from the library; a solution that involved the addition of a
book taking the opposite outlook would not be an equally satisfac
tory result from the parent's point of view. Additionally, if the li
brary collection already included books discouraging teenagers from
engaging in sexual relations, no parental complaint could be raised
to the presence of the offensive book. In such a case the school
would not be guilty of having a book collection that preached too
narrow a message, and therefore a book removal suit would have no
legal basis.
Turning to the right to know issue, there is even less likelihood
that this doctrine would support a lawsuit to remove a book from the
school library. The idea behind a suit to remove a book is that there
is a constitutionally guaranteed right not to know and to keep others
from knowing. This notion is the antithesis of the right to know doc
trine, thus it is difficult to imagine any twist of perspective that could
tutional basis for forcing this choice upon the library. Decisions about what subject areas
to include in the library collection are among those compelling content-based decisions
the school should be entitled to make. See earlier discussion of this suggested standard
of review in text accompanying notes 292-304 supra. Of course, one might argue that
once the government has established a forum that includes books on a certain topic, it is
not free to disestablish that forum or any part thereof for an improper reason. Since the
reason for now excluding books on a controversial topic is that otherwise the government
would be forced to include books advocating a disfavored point of view, this reason
arguably is constitutionally impermissible. Cf Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (School Board's failure to rehire untenured
teacher is Unconstitutional if the teacher's engaging in conduct protected by the first
amendment was a motivating factor in the Board's decision, and the Board fails to show
by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even in
the absence of the exercise of first amendment rights).
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result in restructuring the theory so as to make it exploitable by a
person seeking to achieve the removal of a shelved library book. To
be more specific, under one' view of the right to know, the listener is
the student and the speaker is the publisher or author. Here, instead
of seeking to enforce a right to hear what the speaker has to say, the
student (or the student's parent) would seek to stop the speaker from
speaking. Similarly, if the speaker is the government and the listener
is the student, the effort would be to stop the government as speaker
from conveying its message. No right to know principles would sup
port either of these positions.
In looking to other first amendment theories that involve silenc
ing speech, there is little in the first amendment galaxy that could be
called upon as an aid in this enterprise. One theory of forced silence
is rooted in notions of privacy where the rights of others must be
balanced against the plaintiffs right to privacy.320 Because the infor
mation being revealed by the presence of a book on the library shelf
does not involve anything private to the plaintiff, this theory is of no
assistance.
Another privacy related concept is that of the need to protect a
captive audience that may deserve some protection from unwanted
ideas.321 It can be argued that the captive audience rationale is still
more persuasive when the captives are juveniles.322 While the school
library patrons are juveniles, they do not qualify as captives. A stu
dent is free to ignore an offensive book in the library where there is
no requirement that certain books be read, therefore no captive audi
ence claim can be raised.
One additional theory of forced silence finds its origins in the
320. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 356 Mass. 251, 249 N.E.2d 610 (1969)
(injunction granted to prevent the showing of a film, ''Titicut Follies," to anyone other
than professionals with a special interest in the subject matter of the film because the
film's portrayal of conditions at state correctional institution for the criminally insane,
including numerous episodes of naked inmates exhibiting obvious signs of mental illness,
violated the privacy rights of the inmates); Doe v. Roe, 93 Misc. 2d 201, 400 N.Y.S.2d
668 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (permanent injunction granted to prevent further circulation of a
book by a psychiatrist containing verbatim transcripts of sessions between psychiatrist
and patient which detailed intimate facts of patient's life).
321. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 759 (1978) (powell, J., concur
ring); Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970); Black, He Cannot Choose But
Hear: The Plight of the Captive Auditor, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 960 (1953); Haiman, Speech
v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not to he Spoken To?, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 153 (1972).
322. Cj Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concur
ring) ("I think a State may permissibly determine that, at least in some precisely deline
ated areas, a child-like someone in a captive audience---is not possessed of that full
capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guaran
tees.") (footnote omitted).
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parent/child relationship. The argument here would be that the pri
mary responsibility for instilling values in a child is with the child's
parents and that this parental role is entitled to constitutional protec
tion as part of the concept of liberty within the due process clause. 323
Therefore, the school would not be free to interfere with the constitu
tionally protected parent/child relationship by making available to
children ideas that differ from the ideas of their parents. While this
notion may have some credibility in the situation where the child is
the captive of certain ideas in the classroom setting,324 whatever the
scope of parental rights, those rights do not extend to the point of
permitting a parent to "cleanse" the library shelves by removing all
offensive books. One solution occasionally relied on by school
boards in dealing with controversial books is an offshoot of this pa
rental control model. In some cases, instead of being removed en
tirely, books are placed on a limited access shelf.32s In order to
check a book on this shelf out of the library, the student must have a
parent's approval for the loan of the book. Some schools claim this
is a fair accommodation of the rights of the parties. Whether it is
must be determined by delineating the extent to which minors have
first amendment rights independent of the rights of their parents. 326
This was not an issue in Tinker because the Tinker parents shared
the same point of view as their· children and actively encouraged
their children to participate in protests against the Vietnam War. No
clear answer to this difficult constitutional question has ever been
provided. The answer may in part tum on the age of the students
involved. 327 The "mature minor" may have more constitutionally
protected rights than the "immature minor."328 Whatever the an
swer to this problem, it is difficult to see that it makes a difference in
323. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 758 (1978) (Powell, J.,
concurring); Wisconsin v. Yoder,406 U.S. 205,232-34 (1972); Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923).
324. See Comment, supra note II, at 492-503.
325. E.g., Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 638 F.2d
404,423 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 385 (1981) (while nine books were en
tirely removed from school libraries, one book, Black Boy by Richard Wright, was re
turned to the libraries with student access conditioned on parental approval); Presidents
Council Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289, 290 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972) (Down These Mean Streets, while removed from schoolli
braries, was made available on a direct loan basis to the parents of children attending
district schools).
326. See Garvey, supra note 12, at 328-37.
327. See Tushnet, Free Expression and tire Young Adult: A Constitutional Frame
work, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 746, 749-52.
328. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
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the context of a suit to remove a book from the school library. In
such a case, students are not being forced to read any particular book
and it is hard to imagine that one parent would be granted rights that
could be used to preclude other parents and their children from hav
ing access to books that they consider educationally beneficial. Giv
ing one parent monopolistic control over the content of the school
library and what it may not contain is no more satisfactory than giv
ing the school itself this exclusive right.
The fourth possibility for a right of enforced silence stems from
the idea that some speech is socially harmful. Arguments occasion
ally have been advanced that 3peech tending to promote socially
harmful ideas is not protected speech and ought to be silenced. 329 In
the main, these arguments have been unsuccessful because one of the
central purposes of the first amendment is to protect the expression
of unpopular views. 33o If the first amendment only protected views
acceptable to a majority of the population, it would have little point
since such views are in small danger of being suppressed. It is a
cornerstone of first amendment theory that all ideas, good and bad,
should have a chance to compete in the marketplace of ideas and
that only the best ideas will emerge victorious as a result of this con
test. 33i This notion runs counter to the idea of forced censorship.
Moreover, even if in some cases the government may be able to de
termine that it needs to silence certain speech for the protection of
the public interest, this is still a far cry from one individual being
able to force the government to suppress speech against the govern
ment's better judgment. 332 Therefore, even this potential idea for
329. See, e.g., Note, Group Vil!fication Reconsidered, 89 YALE L.1. 308 (1979).
330. E.g., Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. lli.), aJl'd, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th
Cir.), cerl. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of
America, 51 Ill. App. 3d 279, 366 N.E.2d 347 (1977), aJl'd in part and rev'd in part, 69 Ill.
2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978).
331. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, 1., dissenting).
But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas,-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself ac
cepted in the competition of the market; and that truth is the only ground upon
which their wishes safely can be carried out.
Id
332. If speech is shown to be unprotected, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49 (1973), or if the government has a sufficiently compelling justification for the
suppression of speech, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), government
restraints on speech are constitutionally permissible. That the government may be enti
tled to silence speech, however, does not mean that an individual would be able to force
the silencing of speech the government chooses to leave alone. See Organization for a
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imposed silence has no real application to cases attempting to force
the school to remove books from its library.
It seems fairly clear that there is little support in first amend
ment theory for an argument that would result in a court ordering
the removal of a book from the library shelves. With the limited
exception that restraints on the right of government advocacy could
produce such a result in the form of a remedy for the government
overstepping the constitutionally prescribed bounds of its right to
speak, no real claim can be grounded in any doctrine consistent with
first amendment theory. Thus, the position that such suits are
doomed to failure, shared by interventionist and noninterventionist
courts alike, seems easily supported by first amendment principles.
While intervention may be justified under several different theories
in cases in which a school board's decision to remove a book is being
challenged, this is not the case wherein a plaintiff is seeking to force
the removal of a book.
IV.

SUITS TO REQUIRE THE PURCHASE OF A BOOK FOR THE
SCHOOL LIBRARY

The third and final censorship scenario arises in a situation
wherein a parent or a student sues to force a school to purchase cer
tain books for the school library. As a last point of examination into
the school library censorship arena, this situation will be compared
to its other two censorship counterparts: suits to challenge removal
and suits to bring about removal.
The genesis of a suit to require the purchase of certain books for
the school library will be rooted in parental or student dissatisfaction
with the quality of the school library collection. Mter meeting with
no success in efforts to suggest additional titles for the collection, a
lawsuit will be commenced to force the school to correct deficiencies
in its library collection.
While this situation is almost nonexistent among reported
cases,333 it has not escaped the attention of courts handling book reBetter Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); cf. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281,
292-94 (1979) (while Freedom of Information Act permits federal agencies to withhold
information under certain circumstances, nondisclosure cannot be forced upon agency by
submitter of information who wishes to keep that information confidential).
333. In re Appeal of Daniel Kornblum, 70 N.Y.S. Educ. Dep't Rep. 19 (1949) is
the only decision this author has been able to identify that came close to the situation of a
suit seeking to require the purchase of a book. In that case, The Nalion was removed
from the list of periodicals approved for purchase by high school libraries in the City of
New York. While previously on the approved list, the New York City Board of Educa
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moval controversies. All of the courts deciding cases raising a chal
lenge to a book removal have parenthetically remarked on the likely
fate of attempts to challenge a school library decision not to select a
particular book for the school library as contrasted with a decision to
remove an already shelved book. 334 In most of the cases, the court,
whether interventionist or noninterventionist, has concluded that ju
dicial intervention rarely is merited in the initial book selection pro
cesS. 335 This result is easily reached and explained in the case of
noninterventionist courts. Such a result is in keeping with their gen
eral philosophy of school autonomy in such matters. As for in
terventionist courts, while most such courts take time in their
opinions to state that no intervention would be justified in the book
selection process,336 none of the courts expressing such an attitude
bother to supply an explanation for the distinction it draws. This
willingness to leave selection decisions in the hands of the school
board is pounced upon by noninterventi~nist courts as a basis for
criticizing the judicial review approach. The noninterventionist
tion removed The Nation for the 1948-49 school year because of several anti-Catholic
articles that had appeared in the magazine during 1948. Suit was brought by Daniel
Kornblum, a taxpayer, and The Nation Associates, Inc., The Nation's publisher, chal
lenging the Board of Education's action on a variety of statutory and constitutional
grounds. The Commissioner of Education, in ruling on appellants' claim of a violation
of the freedom of the press, held that free press principles did not require the Board to
purchase any particular publications. After rejecting the remainder of appellants' argu
ments, the Commissioner ruled in favor of the Board of Education. The Nation was not
returned to the approved list until 1963. Since that time, the Board of Education has
changed its practices and the Magazine List is now merely a suggested list, no longer
restricting what magazines schools may purchase. Letter from Helen Scattley, Director
of the New York City School Library Service to David Beminghausen (Apr. 6, 1972),
reprinted in D. BERNINGHAUSEN, THE FLIGHT FROM REASON 55 (1975).
The only other case seemingly involving such a fact pattern is Minarcini v. Strongs
ville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577 (6th Cir. 1976). In Minarcini, the court initially
described the case as raising issues of what books should be chosen as textbooks,
purchased for the library, and removed from the library. Id. at 578. Moreover, the facts,
as recounted by the court, indicated that one book at issue in the case, God Bless You, Mr.
Rosewater by Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., had not yet been purchased by the library. Despite
these facts, this aspect of the case was ignored throughout the decision. While the court
stated that the school has no obligation to purchase any particular books for the school
library, this remark appears to be dictum and was not made in relation to any facts in the
record. Id. at 582.
334. See, e.g., Pico v. Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist., 638
F.2d 404, 435-36 (2d Cir. 1980) (Newman, J., concurring), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 385
(1981); Minarcini v. Strongsville City School Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1976).
335. See, e.g., Bicknell v. Vergennes Union High School Bd. of Dirs., 475 F. Supp.
615,620 n.3 (D. Vt. 1979), ajJ'd, 638 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1980); Salvail v. Nashua Bd. of
Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269, 1272 (D.N.H. 1979).
336. See, e.g., Right to Read Defense Comm. v. School Comm., 454 F. Supp. 703,
711 (D. Mass. 1978).
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courts claim that this distinction is justified only by the theory that a
book acquires tenure by being shelved in the library,337 a theory
these courts find indefensible.
While there is agreement by almost all of the courts concerned
that attempts to gain access to the book selection process should be
rebuked, the question arises whether this easy dismissal is justified
by the legal principles involved. Because no explanation is offered in
defense of this distinction, an attempt will be made here to deter
mine if a challenger seeking to force the purchase of a book ought to
be perceived as in a different legal posture than one seeking to chal
lenge the removal of a book.
The place to initiate a search for legally justifiable distinctions,
as in the case of suits to restore removed books, is with public forum
principles.. The question to be asked is whether a finding that the
school library is a public forum for purposes of the book removal
situation requires this same characterization to be carried over to the
book selection context as well. To resolve this inquiry it will be nec
essary to reexamine the several public forum theories that proved
most workable when applied to book removal disputes.
The first theory successfully employed in the book removal set
ting was an involuntary public forum theory that required the gov
ernment to give students access to a forum it had created exclusively
for its own use. Despite a government intention to monopolize the
primary forum it had established, public forum theory precluded it
from doing so. Having opened a forum for its own use, the school
was required to admit nongovernment users based on something
akin to the Mosley equal access principle. In light of this theory, it
must be asked why the access of nongovernment participants to the
forum must be limited to contesting the removal of selected books.
One obvious explanation comes to mind. Suppose the forum is con
sidered to be the library collection itself, those books the library has
purchased and placed on the library shelves. In that event access
rights will rightfully exist only within the contours of the forum as
defined. If a shelved book is removed, the exclusion of that book can
be objected to by students who have the right to participate in the
forum. If a book is not yet part of the collection, however, it is
outside the forum and no student forum related rights come into
play.
This interpretation of the situation does explain why book selec
337. Presidents Council, Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289,
293 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972).
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tion is not subject to the same constitutional limitations as book re
moval. This interpretation, however, is not the only possible view of
the situation. An alternative position is that the government con
trolled forum is not comprised only of the books already purchased
by the school but, instead, consists of the libr~ry bookshelves and all
books that potentially could fill those shelves. If this is an accurate
description of what it means to label the school library a public fo
rum, students having rights in the forum can challenge both deci
sions about what goes on the library bookshelves as well as what
comes off those shelves.
This alternative explanation raises the question of why there are
two equally plausible ways of defining the school library as a forum
in the context of this first public forum theory. The one answer that
can be suggested for this anomaly is the flexibility of the public fo
rum concept. Under this involuntary public forum theory, the gov
ernment's promise of a forum is one implied in law and not in fact.
The government's actual intent is to create a forum exclusively for
the expression of government views and the first amendment simply
says that such an intent cannot be effectuated. Instead, the govern
ment is required to allow nongovernment users access to the forum.
Since the government never had the intent to open its forum to
outside users, it is not possible to examine the government's intent in
order to determine the scope of the primary forum it has created. As
a forum implied in law, the forum can be either the protection of
already shelved materials or the library bookshelves and all materi
als that potentially could be suited to filling those shelves. 338
Another description of a situation in which this same problem
occurs may be helpful in clarifying this difficulty. In Roherts v.
DiMauro,339 the City of Springfield agreed to provide space and
funding for a system of 180 medical information tapes (Tel-Med)
338. In most public forum contexts the distinction between initial exclusion and
exclusion after access has been granted is irrelevant. In the case of a traditional volun
tary public forum that is available to outside speakers, the speaker who has not yet been
granted access to the forum is the very person who has the right to complain about his
exclusion from the forum. Even in the case of voluntary forums where the government
desires to be the only voice heard in the forum but has the intention of speaking on
behalf of all who wish their views aired, e.g., Alaska Gay Coalition v. Sullivan, 578 P.2d
951 (Alas. 1978), the difference between views once included and views never included is
irrelevant. If the government's forum "offer" involves the expression of all points of
view, then a violation of first amendment rights occurs both when the government
removes a previously included viewpoint, and when it fails at any time to include a
viewpoint.
339. No. 78-1634 (Super. Ct. Mass., Dec. 26, 1978) (order granting preliminary
injunction).
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compiled by Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Massachusetts. The tapes
were played for members of the public who called the Tel-Med Tape
Library phone number and requested particular tapes by number.
After the tape system had been installed, the mayor became aware
that the Tape Library contained tapes on the subjects of birth control
and abortion. He then took it upon himself to remove a total of six
tapes on these subjects. A suit was brought by several local residents
claiming that the city's decision to fund the tape system created a
public forum and that the removal of the six tapes violated their first
amendment right to know.
The claim made by plaintiffs in Roberts is analogous to a suit
challenging the removal of a book from the school library. The
city's sponsorship of the collection of 180 tapes can be viewed as the
creation of. a primary forum exclusively for government controlled
speech. As in the school library book removal cases, one can argue
that the first amendment requires that the government's attempt at
exclusivity fail and that members of the public acquire a vested in
terest in the availability of the information system. That being so,
decisions by the government to remove previously included tapes are
subject to challenge by those who are the intended beneficiaries of
the information. 340
That easy issue aside, the litigation developed a more interesting
component. After the suit was brought to have the six tapes returned
and a temporary restraining order was issued requiring the mayor to
restore the missing tapes,341 another group of citizens moved to inter
vene in the lawsuit claiming that they had a right to include a prolife
tape in the Tel-Med Tape Library. They argued that having created
340. Characterization of the Tape Library as a primary forum has avoided the
question of whether the forum (with respect to the original 180 tapes) was a voluntary or
an involuntary forum. Two differing views o~ this question are possible. One view
would characterize the Tape Library as a voluntary forum much like the Anchorage Blue
Book in Alaska Gay Coalition v. Sullivan, 578 P.2d 951 (Alas. 1978). See text accompa
nying notes 86-88 mpra. Under this view, the argument would be made that it was the
city's intention to create a medical information system of 180 tapes for the benefit of local
residents. Having such an intent and thereby creating a public forum, the city was not
free to renege on its intention by selectively removing some of the 180 tapes. An alterna
tive view of the facts would perceive the situation as involving an involuntary forum.
Here the claim would be that the city was providing a service to the community that it
felt free to alter or discontinue at any time and that the city never intended, by the provi
sion of this service, to vest city residents with a constitutional interest in the continued
existence of the Tape Library.
341. Roberts v. DiMauro, No. 78-1634 (Super. Ct. Mass., Dec. 18, 1978) (tempo-,
rary restraining order issued as follows: ''The Court orders that as long as the 180 tapes
are on city property, the Mayor, agents or servants, cannot interfere or act as a censor
over the playing of any of the tapes.").
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a forum, the city was not free to use that forum to advocate a posi
tion on a controversial issue like abortion without giving opposing
views a chance to be heard through the same medium. Unfortu
nately, this issue was never resolved by the court.342 The case be
came moot when Blue Cross-Blue Shield rC?moved the tapes from
city property and began running them as a privately sponsored
service. 343
Had the court been forced to deal with this issue, however, the
resolution of the issue, as in a book selection case, would focus on
the exact nature of the forum that the city had created. Was the
forum the closed collection of 180 medical information tapes or an
open ended forum for all medical information tapes in areas related
to the original 180? No easy answer to this dilemma presents it
self.344 Either result is possible. The choice between the two ap
proaches, however, has great significance in the context of a book
selection challenge. One approach would make possible such chal
lenges and the other would not.
Without resolving the issue of how the forum should be defined
in such cases, it should be remembered that one other involuntary
forum theory was suggested for use in the book removal cases. That
version of the doctrine instead involves constitutional restrictions on
what the government may say in its exclusive forum. If this forum
theory is relied on, it seems fairly certain that book selection and
removal cannot be analytically separated. Since the problem is that
342. Id (Dec. 26, 1978) (application for intervention denied without prejudice on
the ground that a further request for the inclusion of the proposed additional tape should
be directed to the city before such an application for intervention could properly be
considered).
343. Blue Cross-Blue Shield removed the Tape Library from city property on De
cember 28, 1978. The city thereafter filed a motion to dismiss on the ground ofmootness.
The city's motion was never acted upon and thus the preliminary injunction issued on
December 26, 1978 remains in effect.
344. In the interest of complete accuracy, one easy solution did seem in the offing
had the Tel-Med controversy continued. While the court dismissed the intervenors' com
plaint, it did so without prejudice. The suggestion made to the intervenors by the court
was that they should write to the city reiterating their request for including an additional
tape. The city had turned down the initial request on the ground that it was prevented by
the temporary restraining order issued against the city from tampering with the Tape
Library. The superior court, however, stated that the city was in error in its interpreta
tion of the court order. Under that order, the city was precluded only from removing any
of the 180 tapes. The order did not prevent adding tapes to the collection. With this
clarification of the court order presented to the city, it is entirely possible, had the tapes
not been removed from city control, that the city would have granted the intervenors'
request, thereby voluntarily opening up the forum to medical information tapes beyond
the original collection. Aside from this development, however, the case would have had
to be resolved based on involuntary forum grounds.
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the government is using the forum it created and it monopolizes for
the expression of one-sided viewpoints, behavior that is contrary to
constitutional requirements, the proper remedy for this constitu
tional violation is for the government to correct the imbalance in its
collection. This can be accomplished in several ways. If the imbal
ance arose only because shelved books were removed, reshelving is
an appropriate remedy. If the collection was unbalanced from its
inception, a cure will be achieved through either of two solutions.
The first solution is the removal of those books that create the imbal
ance;345 all shelved books on abortion if all such books advocate a
prochoice position. The second possible remedy is the addition of
books to offer a wider selection of viewpoints: the addition of prolife
books if all the shelved books advocate a prochoice position. This
version of the involuntary forum theory necessarily would create a
right on the part of a student to complain about the nonselection of
books. Thus, in applying the public forum doctrine to book selection
cases, one finds that under some applications of that doctrine, book
selection and book removal cases can be dealt with differently and,
under others, the results in both kinds of cases are identical.
The next point of comparison between book selection and book
removal cases involves the right to know. In making this compari
son, it must be recalled that originally in discussing right to know
principles it was decided that two alternative analyses were avail
able: One viewing the speaker as the publisher or author and the
other viewing the speaker as the government. 346 In a complaint
about the book selection process, if the speaker were to be consid
ered the author of a book that the government failed to include in
the school library, there is a relationship between a willing speaker
and a willing listener. As in the book removal cases, for this analysis
to be tenable, it will be necessary to show that the speaker/listener
relationship has been assisted by the government through the gov
ernment's creation of a public forum. Thus, one must demonstrate
that public forum theory includes a right to force the government to
buy unpurchased books. If public forum principles attach only to
purchased books, the right to know argument will fail. It will be
only in the event that the forum consists of the bookshelves and
books that could fill those shelves that a student will obtain relief by
asserting the right to know. Ultimately, under this right to know
345. See text accompanying notes 315-19 supra.
346. See text accompanying notes 197-203 supra.
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theory, removal and selection are not analytically separate because
they both depend on the existence of a public forum.
As was pointed out, however, an alternative way of lookffig at
the right to know question exists. It also is possible to utilize that
doctrine by viewing the government as the speaker. Under this ap
proach, the right to know is a self-sufficient basis for finding the in
vasion of a right protected by the first amendment and has no
dependence on public forum theory. Unfortunately, under this view
the speaker is no longer a willing speaker. As an unwilling speaker,
however, there are significant differences between the book removal
situation and the initial book selection process. In the removal con
text, smce the book is owned by the school and has only been taken
off the shelf; the student is seeking access to information (a book) in
the control of the government. While one may quarrel over whether
the information being sought is governmental in character or relates
to the operation of government, at least it is government property.
By contrast, in a suit to force the purchase of a book, the information
being sought (the requested book) has never been in government
hands and thus seeking such information from an unwilling govern
ment finds little or no justification in right to know theory.
The only other right to know argument with a potential for cov
ering the selection situation is Professor Emerson's idea of the right
to know acting as a restraint on government monopolization of an
important channel of communication. 347 As was pointed out in ini
tially discussing that theory,348 as students are not a captive audience
in the library and because library books do not so obviously bear a
government seal of approval, Professor Emerson's theory is not as
easily applied in the school library setting as it is in the context of the
classroom.
Despite the significant difficulties standing in the way ofjudicial
review of a claim of improper book selection, the greatest difficulty
of all may be encountered in the process of a review of the merits of
such a claim. Initially, it must be remembered that the job of filling
the library's shelves involves continuous choices between numerous
book titles, many of which are rejected for every one that is chosen.
One's visceral reaction to this may be to conclude that the realities of
the process ought to prevent holding each of these decisions up to
scrutiny by a court. Once one begins to look carefully at the possible
347. See note 226 supra and accompanying text.
348. See text accompanying notes 227-30 supra.
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reasons for selection, however, this nearly impossible task begins to
look quite possible.
To begin with, the plaintiff in such a case will have the burden
of showing the existence of a constitutionally improper reason for
nonselection. Many reasons, as can be seen from the analysis of con
stitutionally adequate versus constitutionally inadequate justifica
tions in the context of allegedly improper book removals,349 are
entirely appropriate reasons for library action. Explanations such as
a book's excessive cost, that its author or publisher is unknown to the
selector, an author's reputation for poor quality work, the library
collection being already adequately supplied with books iq a certain
subject area, a certain topic being unsuited to the needs of the school
library, and many others of the same ilk, are easily identified as deci
sions it is essential that the school be able to make. 350 The plaintiff
must therefore demonstrate some other basis for the school's action.
Among the improper reasons would be that the selector disagrees
with the position the author of a book takes on a controversial mat
ter, that the selector is antipathetic to the background or views of the
author of a book, and possibly that the book contains offensive lan
guage or sexually explicit scenes. These reasons would be consid
ered improper bases for book removal,35 1 thus they are equally
improper in the case of nonselection of a book.
The major obstacle for the plaintiff in a book selection case will
be in obtaining evidence of improper selection. In cases in which the
nonselection is essentially inadvertent-for example, where the li
brarian had no special knowledge about a nonselected book; instead,
a positive choice was made to include a different book-no such evi
dence will be available. Such cases, however, are not bothersome.
As the reasons for nonselection in these cases are not unconstitu
tional, there is no cause for feeling troubled by the unavailability of
evidence of the specific reason· for nonselection. In other cases, evi
dence may be more easily available. If a book were actively consid
ered and then rejected for an improper reason, evidence of this may
be available in the form of statements made by the selector. 352 In
349. See text accompanying notes 295-309 supra.
350. See notes 292-94 supra and accompanying text for a more detailed description
of the standard of review suggested for use in cases raising a challenge to a book re
moval. This article assumes this same standard of review is appropriate for use in the
book selection situation.
351. See text accompanying notes 301-04 supra.
352. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
268 (1977).
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still other cases, the nonselection decision may be made neither in an
obviously improper manner nor in an obviously innocent one. In
such cases, the plaintiff must show that at least one of the factors' that
motivated the decisionmaker was an unconstitutional factor. 353 The
burden then will shift to the defendant school board to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the same decision would have
been made in the absence of an improper motive. 354 Thus, if the
plaintiff shows that the book was initially slated for purchase and
that decision later was reconsidered and changed, this departure
from ordinary book selection procedures would be prima facie evi
dence of an improper motive for nonselection. 355 The burden of
proof then would shift to the school to show that the reconsideration
was unrelated to the book's content: For example, where all book
purchases were reconsidered during that period because of cutbacks
in the library budget; or that the reconsideration, while initiated by a
member of the library staff because of concern over offensive lan
guage in the book, was made because the book in question had re
ceived bad reviews in several influential book review magazines due
to its poor literary quality. These examples demonstrate that while
the availability of evidence sometimes may present a problem to the
plaintiff in a book selection case, that problem is no more acute than
the difficulty usually faced in an attempt to demonstrate that govern
ment action is improperly motivated. 356 Thus, despite surface differ
ences between book removal and book selection controversies, in
,attempting to review the merits of such controversies the same stan
dard of review that proved workable in the book removal cases is
equally functional when applied to book selection cases.
In the end, despite the knee jerk reaction of interventionist
courts, it appears that the distinction drawn between the initial selec
tion situation and later removal of a book is not an inevitable one.
While the selection situation encounters some additional difficulties,
both in showing that a constitutional violation has occurred and in
353. Mt. Healthy City School Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287
(1977).
354. Id
355. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
267 (1977).
356. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55,65-74 (1980); Brest, The Supreme
Court, 1975 Term-Foreword' In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L.
REv. I (1976); Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Legislative
Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REv. 95; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitu
tional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970); Symposium. Legislative Motivation, 15 SAN DIEGO
L. REv. 925 (1978).
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proving that the government has no compelling reason to justify that
violation, these difficulties are not insurmountable.
V.

CONCLUSION

As was suggested at the outset of this article, the resolution of
school library censorship disputes requires an exacting application of
a number of intricate and interwoven first amendment doctrines. In
much of that analysis, it is necessary to cross uncharted first amend
ment territory, determining the proper boundaries of doctrine and
exploring new aspects of recognized first amendment concepts.
Courts faced with such controversies usually have chosen instead to
rely on established doctrine, avoiding an attempt to examine new
analytic possibilities. Unfortunately, this path is not really available
without the sacrifice of accuracy and doctrinal integrity. In the
Supreme Court's pending decision of a school library censorship
case, the Court must be willing to deal with these complexities, no
longer sweeping aside analytic weaknesses. Even if the result of this
new probing is to reveal a number of first amendment dilemmas, this
consequence should not be feared. In the end, the result of exposing
these dilemmas and attempting to resolve them will be to strengthen
the doctrinal foundation of free speech analysis and to add to the
overall understanding of first amendment principles.

